The threat of radiological terrorism has recently come to the attention of the international community, as it became clear that terrorist organizations are seeking nuclear and radiological material to manufacture and use improvised nuclear devices (IND) and "dirty bombs", and/or commit acts of sabotage against nuclear power infrastructure. But while nuclear weapons and INDs, still remain relatively secure from terrorist access, radiological material is more readily available in large quantities throughout the world. Also, radiological explosives or other dispersal devices are easier to manufacture and to use. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) come in many shapes and sizes; A dirty bomb uses a conventional explosion to scatter radioactive material; Terrorists could launch an attack by placing a container of radioactive material in a public place and an airplane can easily disperse radioactive material as a powder or an aerosol. On a grand scale, a nuclear facility could become an RDD. Intentional damage done to a nuclear power plant or other site could release radiation, contaminating the immediate surroundings or even beyond. RDDs of any kind present a potent and effective terrorist weapon because they threaten to expose civilian populaces to radiation - engendering panic out of proportion to the modest number of casualties likely to result from limited doses of radiation. Coming to terms with the psychological and social dimensions of radiological attacks - areas that are inadequately studied and assessed - is thus a matter of considerable importance for those entrusted with national, and ultimately international, security.
Volume 29 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics
Edited by: I Khripunov , L. Bolshov and D. Nikonov
October 2007, approx. 176 pp, Hardcover
ISBN: 978-1-58603-787-1
Over the past several years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been working on a definition of "nuclear security culture" so that it can be used as a tool to improve the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. A 2001 IAEA report titled "Fundamental Principles of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities" identified security culture as one of the twelve principles underlying fissile-material security. In February 2005, at their summit in Bratislava, President Bush and President Putin vowed to step up joint efforts to bolster nuclear security, pairing disciplined, well-trained, responsible custodians and protective forces with well-maintained security systems. In July 2005, a series of amendments to the Physical Protection Convention was approved elevating the status of security culture to that of a treaty obligation. Since that time, IAEA member states worked on a concept, definition and guidelines for developing and implementing a robust security culture at nuclear facilities worldwide. This publication presents the views of experts with the hope to contribute to the IAEA's work and facilitate better nuclear security culture worldwide. Issues include: universality of nuclear security cultures, Nuclear security in a nation's culture; differences and similarities between regions such as US, European Union, Japan, etc.; the advantages of similarities between the regions.
Volume 28 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics
Editors: I. Khripunov, N. Ischenko and J. Holmes
November 2007, 168 pp, Hardcover
ISBN: 978-1-58603-786-4
Weapons of mass destruction (WMO) are not necessarily acquired as entire systems. They are often assembled from parts and materials, many of which are dual-use - i.e., of both commercial and military utility. Often, suppliers of these components do not ask who their customers are or inquire about the intended application. This has for a long time been the Achilles' heel of well-intentioned nonproliferation conventions. The answer lies in more stringent export controls of weapons-related technologies.
In this eye-opening collection of essays, sponsored by the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia (USA), a group of outstanding experts in the nonproliferation field report on the efforts of five leading supplier countries - the United States, France, Russia, China, and India - to implement export controls on weapons and sensitive technologies used for producing WMD.
The book is both reassuring and alarming in its very precise survey and analysis of export control regimes. At most national levels, regulation is rapidly making firms more accountable, and more industries are routinely implementing internal compliance programs. However, these advances are in a' neck-to-neck race with intangible methods of transferring information, corporations with no national allegiance, and competition among international suppliers. Based on in-depth research - each of the contributors spent considerable time conducting interviews with government officials and other policy experts, observing policy making and implementation, and gathering empirical data - this detailed and thought-provoking book will be of great value to all concerned with security objectives for the twenty-first century.
Michael Beck, Richard Cupitt, Seema Gahlaut, and Scott Jones
Kluwer Law International 2003
194 pp, Hardcover
ISBN: 9041122168
