Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and U

Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction and U.S. Security

Nunn Forum
The University of Georgia
Athens, GA
April 28, 1997
Executive Summary

"The prospect of terrorists acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction is the 'single greatest threat' facing the United States today and in the future."
-Former Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey, Athens, Georgia, April 28, 1997

On April 28, former Senator Sam Nunn convened the inaugural Sam Nunn Policy Forum to assess the national security threat posed by the combination of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The participants in the Forum also reviewed the state of U.S. preparedness to meet this threat with regard to three tiers of America's defense:

· Ongoing international efforts to control the proliferation of dangerous weapons at their source, particularly in the Soviet Union;

· National efforts to interdict materials and arrest threats at U.S. borders; and,

· State and local government efforts to develop contingency plans and procedures for the prevention of, and response to, a terrorist attack.

The 1997 Sam Nunn Policy Forum Committee offers this executive summary of the main findings and recommendations of the Forum to promote a timely dialogue on these issues.

Findings

Today, the United States is safer from a massive nuclear, chemical and biological assault by a foreign power than anytime during the Cold War. However, the threat of limited attacks by terrorists and rogue states using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has increased.

The Cold War was a period of high risk, but high stability. While the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the risk of global war, it also made world affairs less stable. WMD became more accessible to terrorists and rogue states, while reducing Cold War restraints on the behavior of client states. Increasing availability of sensitive information on the Internet and of strategic goods and materials in the global market, coupled with a turn toward religious or anarchist rationales for terrorist acts, exacerbate the probability of terrorist incidents involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Finally, U.S. preeminence in conventional warfare and its massive nuclear deterrent forces are likely to drive U.S. adversaries to resort to unconventional warfare, including support for terrorism and the use of WMD. Traditional military deterrence, moreover, will be less effective against false-flag attacks or the actions of anarchists, ideological or religious zealots, and others with little regard for domestic tranquillity or international stability.

A significant threat of terrorist attacks on the United States using WMD exists today, and likely be a chronic condition of the future.

In some cases, terrorists have already turned to the use of WMD. The sentencing judge of those convicted of the World Trade Center bombing, for example, stated that the perpetrators employed a chemical weapon, but the blast consumed the chemical component. Members of Aum ShinRikyo sect apparently attempted to develop biological weapons to add to its arsenal of chemical weapons. The large scale bombings in Dhahran and Oklahoma City also suggest that some terrorists see the infliction of mass casualties as desirable. Given relative access to technology and materials, the public faces the gravest threat from biological and chemical weapons. The opportunity for terrorist acquisition of nuclear technology and materials, however, is also more of a problem now than during the Cold War. Consequently, a catastrophic use of WMD by terrorists against the United States is possible in the next few years, and we should undertake more preparedness measures today.

Responding to this threat requires a new partnership among federal state, and local officials.

The 1996 Summer Olympic Games served as a watershed in U.S. preparedness against terrorist WMD attacks on U.S. territory. Even with the luxury of years of planning for the set time and locations of the Olympic program, coordinating the antiterrorism activities of 50 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies created a massive challenge in organization and management. New tasks, such as sharing local, national, and international intelligence information, or integrating the skills and resources of the U.S. military for a domestic mission, test traditional distinctions in the political system. Above all, the Olympic experience brought home the immense difficulties facing local communities in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack involving WMD.

The "first responders" (ie., local police, fire, health, and emergency officials) are ill-prepared to manage the consequencs of terrorist use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Although the greatest difference in managing the consequences of a terrorist WMD attack comes in the first few hours, most first responders lack the training and resources to respond effectively to such an event. Currently, for example, only Atlanta and Washington, D.C. have the local capacity to detect the specific chemical or biological agents at the scene. Education and training for local emergency physicians are nil, and the resources to treat hundreds rather than handfuls of victims are woefully inadequate. Only a few large cities have antiterrorism police units. Firefighters feel frustrated that federal officials ignore their specific concerns on these issues.

The United States has taken the first steps to improve domestic preparedness against terrorist use of WMD.

Presidential Decision Directive 39 outlines the duties of federal agencies in preventing and managing terrorist threats, with special responsibilities assigned the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and State, and the intelligence community. Federal emergency response plans include procedures for managing terrorist and WMD disasters. The Department of Energy already has a Nuclear Emergency Search Team, while the Army and Navy have units to respond to chemical and biological threats. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici provision in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 1997 requires the president to appoint someone at the National Security Council to coordinate the separate antiterrorism and nonproliferation policies and bureaucracies, including issues related to terrorism and international organized crime. Through the same provision, the NDAA also mandates the Department of Defense to provide training for local civilian authorities and create chemical and biological response teams to assist those authorities. With an appropriation of more than 50 million dollars, the Department of Defense has begun a multi-year program of assessment, low-cost training, preparedness exercises, and improvement of local access to federal antiterrorism resources for officials for 120 of the largest U.S. cities, as well as improving local access to federal antiterrorism resources. By 1998, assessments will be completed for 27 cities, and training will have begun in nine cities. Denver, Colorado, will see the first major training and pilot exercise under this new program. In addition, nearly 2,000 emergency physicians will receive training by the year 2000 to manage the consequences of nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. The Defense Department also will create a national hotline this year and establish two consequence management Response Task Forces.

Avoiding global anarchy from the proliferation of WMD also requires a new framework for bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

Preventing proliferation at the source through better monitoring, managing, and protecting sensitive nuclear, chemical, and biological items and their means of production is only possible through extensive international cooperation. Strong treaties designed to stem WMD proliferation, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, informal nonproliferation supplier arrangements, such as the Australia Group or the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and other multilateral efforts, are essential to combat WMD proliferation. In addition, innovative bilateral efforts to address specific aspects of the proliferation problem can reap tremendous benefits. In that regard, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), which helps in the destruction and management of WMD assets in the former Soviet Union, is one of the most visionary and cost-effective activities of the U.S. government.

Recommendations

Develop and implement an overall strategy or doctrine against the threat of terrorism and WMD.

While the United States is well prepared to address more traditional security threats, and has many programs in place to manage threats from terrorist activity and proliferation concerns, our country lacks an overall strategy for meeting the WMD terrorism challenge. The National Security Council, and the coordinator in particular, should have primary responsibility for organizing this effort.

Encourage a national debate on the roles of federal state, and local governments and the public in this effort.

America has to show that it can and will "stay the course." Protection against WMD threats will be expensive and will also raise questions about the propriety of limits on the military, the intelligence community, and law enforcement agencies. The United States must also find an appropriate balance between public awareness and avoiding panic or threatening essential sources of information. Under these conditions, greater public awareness of the issues, alternatives, risks, and consequences related to WMD terrorism is necessary for a credible and durable policy.

Improve the capacity of state and local governments to manage the consequences of acts of terrorism involving nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

The Department of Defense must move beyond the assessment stage to conduct training and preparedness exercises in all 120 cities prudently, and prepare a plan to maintain an adequate level of preparedness. At the same time, the Defense Department should work with civilian authorities to develop response plans appropriate for smaller communities. The additional importance of predeployed assets (and Posse Comitatus limits) suggests that the National Guard should play an important role in meeting the threat of WMD terrorism.

Improve the capabilities of and the coordination between U.S. domestic and foreign intelligence activities regarding terrorist groups and the proliferation of sensitive goods, technologies, and services.

The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1997 dedicated a commission to review the structure and organization of the U.S. government for fighting proliferation. The traditional distinctions between responsibilities for intelligence gathering, analysis, and distribution at the local, national, and international levels enhance the risk that transnational terrorist activities involving WMD will fall through the cracks. In addition, many intelligence assets designed for Cold War priorities are not fungible or flexible - the new priorities of proliferation and antiterrorism call for major changes and investment in transforming and expanding existing intelligence capabilities. With far more targets spread out across the globe, the WMD terrorism will prove a tough test for U.S. intelligence agencies.

Increase support for CTR and other bilateral and multilateral programs that limit proliferation of WMD to terrorists or rogue states at their source.

Defense Department plans for CTR programs do not extend beyond the year 2001. Nonetheless, a huge arsenal and defense industrial complex for the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and an enormous nuclear energy industry remains in the former Soviet Union. Deterioration in command, control, materials accountancy, physical protection, and export management, coupled with endemic corruption, economic, and political instability, will sustain this proliferation danger well into the next century. As an investment in U.S. security, innovative policy tools, such as the CTR, also might be tailored to apply to other countries of proliferation concern. This should include, for example, improving the capacity of East European states to detect, track and intercept transfers of sensitive items from the former Soviet Union through their borders.

Panelist

Graham T. Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University and director of the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSLA) at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is the former dean of the Kennedy School (1977-89) and the founder of its Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, now part of CSIA. Allison served in 1993-94 as assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans in the Clinton administration, and was a special advisor to Secretary of Defense Perry. His publications include Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; Fateful Visions; Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War;and, with Russian economist Gregory Yavlinsky, Window of Opportunity: The Grand Bargain for Democracy in the Soviet Union. His most recent book is Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy.

Kenneth Berry is president of the American Academy of Emergency Physicians and a member of the board and special counsel to the chair of the certification board in emergency medicine. He serves as director of emergency services at the Jones Memorial Hospital in Wellsville, N.Y. Berry is a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Medicine and the American College of Forensic Examiners. He has considerable experience in forensic investigations of aircraft accidents, including the case of the July 1996 TWA Flight 800 crash in Long Island, N.Y. Berry is a member of Phi Sigma Tau, the National Honor Society of Philosophy, and has written many papers and given numerous lectures on bio-ethics issues. He has multi-instrument ratings as a commercial pilot, and is an aviation medical examiner with the Federal Aviation Administration. Berry is a graduate of Fairfield University and the American University of the Caribbean School of Medicine. He held several medical student clerkships, predominately at the Yale University School of Medicine.

Gary K. Bertsch is the University Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia. Bertsch directs the Center's multiyear project on "Nonproliferation Export Controls in the 1990s." He has served as a Fulbright professor in England and an IREX (International Research and Exchanges Board) professor in the former Yugoslavia, and as chairman of the education committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. He currently serves on the National Academy of Science's National Research Council Committee on Dual-Use Technologies, Export Controls, Materials Protection, Control and Accountability. He is the author and editor of numerous books, including International Cooperation on Nonproliferation Export Controls; Export Controls in Transition; Reform and Revolution in Communist Systems; and After the Revolutions: East-West Trade and Technology Transfer in the 1990s. He and his University of Georgia colleagues recently released their annual report on Restraining the Spread of the Soviet Arsenal.

Ashton B. Carter is the Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. From 1993-96, Carter served as assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, where he was responsible for national security policy concerning the states of the former Soviet Union (including their nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction), arms control, countering proliferation worldwide, and oversight of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and missile defense programs; and chaired NATO's High Level Group. He was twice awarded the Department of Defense Distinguished Service medal, the highest award given by the Pentagon. Carter received bachelor's degrees in medieval history and physics from Yale University and the doctoral degree in theoretical physics from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He is the author and editor of a number of books, including Soviet Nuclear Fission - Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union; Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World; and Cooperative Denuclearization from Pledges to Deeds.

J. Gilmore Childers is the senior trial counsel in the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. During most of 1996, he was detailed to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, where he served as special counsel for the Olympics, including the coordination of all law enforcement and security operations for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games. In this capacity, he worked closely with not only federal, state and local law enforcement, but also with the Department of Defense, the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games and private security. Prior to his appointment as special counsel for the Olympics, Childers served as lead prosecutor in the World Trade Center bombing case. For leading the government's prosecution and winning convictions of all charged in that terrorist bombing, he received the Department of justice¹s highest honor - the Attorney General's Award for Exceptional Service. Over the past five years, Childers has led many of the nation's largest international terrorist investigations. Additionally, he was one of the first Department of justice attorneys dispatched to Oklahoma City to assist in the investigation of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building on April 19,1995. Childers specialized in organized crime cases before becoming involved in terrorist investigations. He received the B.A. degree from Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, and the J.D. degree from Boston College Law School.

William S. Cohen was sworn in as the nation's 20th Secretary of Defense on January 24, 1997. He previously served three terms in the U.S. Senate representing the state of Maine (1979-97), and three terms in the House of Representatives from Maine's 2nd Congressional District (1973-79). Cohen served on the Senate Armed Services and Governmental Affairs Committees from 1979-97. He was a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 1983-91 and 1995-97, and he served as vice chairman from 1987-91. An influential voice on defense and international security issues, Cohen played a leading role in crafting the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. He was the Senate sponsor of the GI Bill of 1984 and the subsequent enhancements to this landmark legislation. His efforts led to the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force, which later developed into the Central Command and the maritime prepositioning program, both of which were key to the success of the Gulf War. Cohen also co-authored the Intelligence Oversight Reform Act of 1991, as well as legislation designed to overhaul U.S. counterintelligence efforts and defense against foreign political and industrial espionage. He served on the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1989-97, and in 1996, he chaired the council's Middle East Study Group. He has also chaired and served on numerous study groups and committees on issues ranging from DoD reorganization to NATO enlargement and chemical weapons arms control. Cohen has authored or co-authored eight books, including two books of poetry, three novels, and three works of non-fiction. He received the B.A. degree in Latin from Bowdoin College in 1962, and the LL.B. degree cum laude from Boston University Law School in 1965.

Jamie S. Gorelick served as deputy attorney general of the United States from March 28, 1994, to April 1, 1997. She was the second ranking official in the Department of Justice and the chief operating officer of the department. Gorelick also was named to the National Commission to Support Law Enforcement by President Clinton. From May 12, 1993, until she joined the Justice Department, Gorelick served as general counsel of the Department of Defense. In 1994, she was awarded the Secretary of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. She also has served as vice-chair of the Task Force on the Evaluation of the Audit, Investigation and Inspection Components of the DoD and, thereafter, as assistant to the secretary and counselor to the deputy secretary of energy. In 1980, she was awarded the Secretary¹s Outstanding Service Medal. Gorelick has served as a litigator with the Washington, D.C., firm of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin, where she specialized in civil and criminal matters. She has served as president of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, as an officer of the Council of the American Bar Association's Section of Litigation, and on the boards of various public interest groups and charitable organizations. Gorelick has litigated in courts across the country, as well as having written and spoken on various subjects. She was honored as the Woman Lawyer of the Year by the Women's Bar Association in 1993, received the Prominent Woman of International Law Award in 1994, and received the Servant of Justice Award from the Bar Association of the District of Columbia in 1995. Gorelick is a graduate of Harvard University and Harvard Law School.

H. Allen Holmes has served as assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict since November 18,1993. He is responsible for the overall supervision, including oversight of policy and resources, of the special operations and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Holmes previously served as the ambassador at large for burdensharing and assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs from 1985-89. In that position, he chaired the interdepartmental groups on arms control negotiations, chaired NATO's special consultative group on the U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations, and co-chaired working groups with the Soviets on chemical warfare and nuclear testing during frequent visits to Moscow with the secretary of state. Holmes directed the negotiation of the Missile Technology Control Regime and supervised munitions and strategic high-technology export controls, security assistance and political-military crisis management. His foreign assignments have included: U.S. ambassador to Portugal; political officer in Rome, Italy; counselor for political affairs in Paris, France; and deputy chief of mission in Rome, Italy. He received Presidential Meritorious Service Awards in 1983 and 1987, and a Presidential Service Award in 1989. Holmes is a graduate of Princeton University, and did graduate work at the Insitut d'Etudes Politiques of the University of Paris.

Ronald F. Lehman, II is director of the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at the Department of Energy's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In 1995, Lehman was appointed to the five-member President¹s Advisory Board on Arms Proliferation Policy. He was director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1989-93. Previously, he served in the Defense Department as assistant secretary for international security policy, in the State Department as U.S. chief negotiator on strategic offensive arms (START), and in the White House as deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs. Lehman also served on the National Security Council staff as a senior director, on the professional staff of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, and in Vietnam with the United States Army. He received the B.A. degree from Claremont McKenna College in 1968 and the doctoral degree from the Claremont Graduate School in 1975. Lehman has served as a postdoctoral fellow at the Hoover Institution and as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

Richard Lugar was elected to the United States Senate in 1977 and is currently serving his fourth term. Lugar is a former chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and co-chairman of the Arms Control Observer Group. He is also chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, and has served on various other committees. He successfully led the 1988 Senate ratification of the historic I.N.F. Treaty with the Soviet Union, which reduced the number of nuclear weapons for the first time in history. Lugar followed this achievement four years later as manager of Senate ratification of the START I Treaty. He and Senator Nunn co-authored legislation creating the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar program, which provides incentives for the former Soviet republics to dismantle and safely handle their nuclear arsenals. Lugar also has been highly active in shaping American agricultural policy, expanding export markets, reforming outmoded subsidy programs, and restructuring the federal bureaucracy at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Lugar received degrees from Denison University and Oxford University in England, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He has been a Naval officer, farm manager, and the mayor of Indianapolis, Indiana.

Sam Nunn was elected to the United States Senate from Georgia in 1972 and served four terms. He is a senior partner in the Atlanta law firm of King & Spalding, where he is focusing his practice on international and corporate matters. During his tenure in the U.S. Senate, Nunn served as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. He also served on the Senate's Intelligence and Small Business Committees. In collaboration with Senator Richard Lugar, Nunn co-authored legislation creating the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar program, which provides incentives for the former Soviet republics to dismantle and safely handle their nuclear arsenals. With Senator Barry Goldwater, he drafted the landmark Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which established the clear lines of authority and efficient organizational arrangements that proved so effective during the Persian Gulf War. Nunn developed a comprehensive anti-drug strategy, initiated a national land conservation program to protect the environment, co-sponsored legislation creating the nation's first national service programs, and worked to combat waste, fraud and abuse in government programs and agencies. He is a distinguished professor in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech.

William C. Potter is a professor and director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He also directs the MIIS Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is the author and editor of numerous books, including Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States; International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation; International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers¹ Network; and Dismantling the Cold War: U S. and NIS Perspectives on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. His present research focuses on nuclear exports, nuclear safety, and nonproliferation problems involving the post-Soviet states. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and serves on the National Academy of Science's National Research Council Committee on Dual-Use Technologies, Export Controls, Material Protection, Control, and Accountability.

George Vuilleumier currently serves as president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police (NACP), a 12,000-member non-profit organization, which along with its other endeavors, monitors federal and state legislation impacting law enforcement. The NACP considers itself "the voice of the American command officer." Vuilleumier is a veteran of 36 years in law enforcement, including service with federal, state and county agencies. After beginning his career with the U.S. Coast Guard, he served eight years as a trooper with the Massachusetts State Police before being appointed a U.S. treasury agent. Vuilleumier served more than 20 years as a treasury agent, attaining the position of divisions chief with the Internal Revenue Service's South West Region. He continues to participate in "grass roots" law enforcement, serving as a reserve officer in the warrant execution division of the Dallas, Texas, County Sheriff's Department. Vuilleumier has written extensively for law enforcement publications and has appeared on the Law Enforcement Television Network.

R. James Woolsey was the director of Central Intelligence from 1993-95. He served as an ambassador and United States representative to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Vienna from 1989-91. Woolsey served as the undersecretary of the Navy from 1977-79, and was general counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services from 1970-73. In addition, he has been an advisor in the U.S. delegation to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in Helsinki and Vienna, an analyst with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and National Security Council staff, and a captain in the U.S. Army. Woolsey was a delegate at large at the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Space Arms Talks (NST). In the private sector, he has served as director of Martin Marietta, as well as British Aerospace, Fairchild Industries, Titan Corporation, DynCorp, USF&G, Sun Healthcare Group Inc., and Yurie Systems Inc. Woolsey has been a member of the President's Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform, the President¹s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, and the President Commission on Strategic Forces. He also has served as a trustee at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, the Goldwater Scholarship & Excellence in Education Foundation, the Aerospace Corporation, and Stanford University. Woolsey is a graduate of Stanford University, Yale Law School, and Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar.