Developing
Nonproliferation Export Controls in Georgia
in the Context of the Emerging
Eurasian Transportation Corridor
Mamuka Kudava and Cassady Craft
Mamuka
Kudava is the Head of the Disarmament and Arms Control Division Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Georgia. The following paper was presented at The CITS
conference SECURITY challenges IN THE CAUCASUS and
central asia: enhancing long-term stability held at The University of Georgia on October 2 – 4, 1998.
INTRODUCTION
The entire region from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, including all the littoral
states from the Balkans to Central Asia through the Caucasus, is becoming a hub of
regional and international trade and transportation networks. The economic and security interests of many
countries in the West as well as in Russia, Iran, Turkey, and other states are
clear. The energy resources of the South
Caucasus
and Central Asia present enormous potential for the West; while at the same
time, it is also obvious that Russian control of the transit routes of the
energy resources of the region implies a risk—for the West and new independent
states (NIS) that are involved—that is simply unacceptable. Finally, since the breakup of the Soviet Union left fifteen states to
worry about the old Soviet weapons and manufacturing infrastructure that they
inherited, it was quickly realized that a grave threat to international
security existed in the underdevelopment of the means to control these weapons,
materials and technologies in the NIS. Even though energy security provides the
impetus behind almost all of the players’ activities in these regions, it
provides the backdrop against which we will analyze the development of
nonproliferation export controls in the critical, and representative, state of
Georgia.
There are three
prerequisites for energy security:
political stability, secure and cost-effective lines of transport, and a
positive financial and investment climate entailing agreed legal regimes and rules of the game that dovetail
with dominant international norms and are not subject to arbitrary change.
(1) The development of nonproliferation
mechanisms, including border and export control systems, could prove
instrumental in supporting energy security in the region. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview
of the developing political and economic processes ongoing in the region, and
then analyze the importance of nonproliferation export control development in
providing the needed energy security in Georgia.
THE EURASIAN TRANSPORTATION
CORRIDOR—A SILK ROAD OF THE 21st CENTURY?
The New Oil Rush
The main reason the
international community devotes increased attention to the South Caucasus region is, of course, the
vast amount of natural resources in the Caspian Sea Basin and the necessity of building
the pipelines and other infrastructure for their transit to the world
market. The scope of these interests are
illustrated by the fact that the proven oil and gas reserves of the Caspian Sea
region, estimated to hold 100-200 billion barrels of oil worth $2 to $4 trillion at current market prices, are
second in size only to those in the Middle East. In an immediate sense, it is unfortunate that
there is no “easy” menas of getting these resources to markets. The Caspian Sea itself is really a landlocked
lake, Central
Asia
is very remotely located, and the Transcaucasus region (the North Caucasus areas of Russia as well as the South Caucasus) has been fraught with
political and military struggles for power.
The isolation of the Caspian Basin and lack of a East-West transportation net due to the Cold War political
and economic relationship between the Soviet Union (of which Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea were a part) and NATO
Europe means that a “transportation corridor” must be built. The political and economic environment of the
entire region in southern Russia, the former Soviet states in the Central Asian
and South Caucasus regions, and the other important states situated close by
(Iran and Turkey, especially) means that the development of the resources in
the Caspian Basin and a subsequent transportation infrastructure will not be
easy. As this chapter should make clear,
it is only when one views the cross-linkages between political and economic
policies, as well as domestic, regional and international relationships that
solutions begin to appear.
We
analyze Georgia because of its interesting
future role in the creation of a Eurasian Transportation Corridor. By modernizing its Black Sea ports, Georgia hopes to fulfill its
promise as a natural transit link for energy resources flowing from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and from the Black Sea to the Turkish
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. However, Western expertise in pipeline
construction and maintenance are needed to ensure that Georgia fully benefits from the
potential conferred upon it by its geographic location. In 1996 the Azerbaijan International Oil
Consortium (AIOC) decided to transport Azerbaijan’s “early oil” through two
pipelines, one of which (the western pipeline running from Baku to Ceyhan) passes through Georgia. Georgia’s position as a key link in this
route is enhanced by the fact that other countries, such as the US, Turkey,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, advocate a broad strategic approach to
the transit of the “main” Azerbaijani oil and Central Asian hydrocarbon
resources through the Western-based pipeline as well. In other words, each of these players, albeit
for differing reasons and to different degrees, wishes to avoid the major
alternatives for strategic reasons: a
southern route that extends a pipeline from the Caspian Sea to link up with the
existing Iranian pipelines and empties into the Persian Gulf; and a northern
route which transits the Northern Caucasus portion of Russia, including Chechnya.
The Eurasian Transportation Corridor—A Modern Silk Road?
The
development of oil and gas pipelines is only the first step in building a
greater Eurasian Transportation Corridor which will include the development of
road and rail links that will allow growing trade through and within the Caspian Basin and Transcaucasus. Such infrastructure development will increase
in importance as the economies of the South Cacuasus and Central Asian nations
grow and diversify, allowing them to expand their ties to the countries beyond
the NIS.
Historically, the Silk Road was a network of caravan routes running from
China and India through Central Asia and the Transcaucasus to Europe. The valuable oil and gas reserves of the Caucasus and Central Asia are likely to make the new Silk Road a trade and investment
engine to power tremendous economic growth because of the pure cost-efficiency
(in time and distance) of the Eurasian Corridor. (2)
While the Georgian
government is still in the process of formulating a national security policy to
meet the challenges posed by the international and regional political, economic
and security environments in which the country finds itself, it is clear that
the realization of the full potential of an Eurasian
Transportation Corridor is and will be vital for the future. The profits of transporting the Caspian oil
will have political ramifications in strengthening the independence and
sovereignty of Georgia and the countries along the
corridor. However, the crucial issue is
this: if the Georigan government cannot
control its borders, the activities of its businesses and citizens, and provide
political stability within the country, then the powers that will finance and
build the Transportation Corridor will be forced to aviod Georgia. Because the Corridor is seen as vital for Georgia’s future, it is understood
that activities must be undertaken to improve the trust that international
actors have in the Georgian government’s ability to safeguard their interests.
The Political
and Security Aspects of the Development of the Eurasian Transportation Corridor
In
the context of establishing a modern Silk Road, several important factors
must be seriously considered because they potentially influence the stability,
security, and economic viability of the Central Asian and South Caucasus regions. First, the “Russian factor” must be better
understood. The Russian government has
pursued a policy, according to one well accepted line of thought, of “frozen
instability” in the Caucasus. (4) Another view is that Russia’s policy in the Caucasus—if one can even speak of
such a thing—is confused, sometimes contradictory, and often destabilizing.
(5) Russian activities in the Caucasus
(real or imagined) have contributed to anti-Russian feelings, leading to claims
that “in Georgian public and political circles, the main threat to the
existence of the country throughout the entire period of independence came from
the north—from Russia.” (6) Russia’s policy, perhaps, follows from
convictions that an independent region of the South Caucasus, with pipelines
and other transportation infrastructure running from there to Turkey and the
West, “would prevent Russia from exercising a monopoly on access to the region
and would thus also deprive Russia of decisive political leverage over the
policies of the new Central Asian [and South Caucasus] states.” (7)
At the same time, it should
be noted that there are healthy aspects of Russia’s relations with the
countries of the region. The resolution
of conflicts there, which will certainly reqire either Russian cooperation or
complicity, will be followed by the opening of closed roads and rail links
that, if it includes the Abkhazian region of Georgia, would create the
possibility of a profitable and practical north-south axis of the Eurasian
Corridor. This infrastructure
development would bring many more economic and political benefits for the
Transcaucasus region than the continuation of any policy akin to “frozen
instability.” The
latter policy only promises the “Balkanization” of the Transcaucasus region,
with the “clashes of civilizations” predicted by Huntington and Brzezinski.
(8) Russian cooperative behavior in the
region would create natural political, social and economic relationships within
the region that would benefit all states.
Gun Running
and Drug Lords: The
Other Implications of the South Caucasus Region’s Transit Functions
Along
with the existing and potential legal and economically useful transit
capabilities of the South Caucasus and Georgia, the region can also be
used for the transportation of high- and dual-use technology; conventional,
chemical, biological, missile, and nuclear weapons and materials; and the
illicit trafficking of drugs and contraband.
The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union resulted in proliferation
dangers emanating from the transit potential of the South Caucasus region. The most prominent of these fears were that
the obvious proliferation chain from Russia to Iraq, Turkey, Iran, or Syria would run through the
Central Asian states or the South Caucasus. (9)
In addition to the problems
of the movement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or materials was the fear
of a “brain drain” of unemployed (or unpaid), but highly trained ex-Soviet
scientists and weapons-making technicians to rogue states. Some felt that it would “be impossible in
newly-emerging democracies to keep thousands of people in an iron cage. The virtual certainty is that some crucial
expertise will travel southwards.” (10)
In particular, it was feared that states like Russia, Armenia or Georgia could furnish
Soviet-trained nuclear scientists and nuclear materials to those countries with
nuclear weapons programs.
If the South Caucasus were to become a major aspect
of the new Silk Road, the proliferation concerns mentioned above must be
addressed (we will address how this is being done in Georgia in the sections
below). However, there are other
items—drugs, contraband and conventional weapons among them—that transit the South
Caucasus region that also pose a serious threat to the realization
of the full potential of the Eurasian Transportation Corridor. These items, by their very nature, threaten
the economic health (via the black market) and security (highly armed criminal
groups and separatists) of the state.
Unfortunately, their transit also threatens the attractiveness of the South
Caucasus route for the Silk Road by virtue
of establishing an international reputation for the region as a place where
drugs, guns and nuclear materials are smuggled through porous borders, with
corrupt official taking bribes and protecting organized criminal groups along
the way.
WHY EXPORT CONTROLS?
Export controls for nuclear,
chemical, biological, missile and dual-use materials, equipment, and technology
contribute—together with other instruments such as safeguards, regional
diplomacy, disarmament and arms control initiatives, and security assurances—to
the strength of the nonproliferation regime. (11) Although export controls are not the only
pillar of the regime, they play an important role in the relationship between
countries, facilitate the development of economic cooperation, and constitute
the necessary preconditions for the export and import of high technology and
dual-use goods. Also, the political will
and international commitments of a country to have effective export controls
together with internal regulations and legislation is a basis for the
development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In short, export controls can play a vital
role in establishing the bona fides
of a country that desires to play a prominent role in the creation of the
Eurasian Transportation Corridor.
While establishing export
controls, Georgia has kept in mind that an
effective system would strengthen international nonproliferation efforts as
well as enhancing its national security and economic potential. Failure to establish proper export controls
in the South
Caucasus region not only jeopardizes international security, but also
contributes to regional arms races and domestic instability as well. The creation and maintenance of
nonproliferation export control systems are beneficial for the following
reasons.
First, the realization of
the Eurasian Transportation Corridor promises the revitalization of foreign
trade in the region. Without relevant
export control systems, Western investors cannot cooperate as fully with the
countries along this route. This fact is
especially relevant to advanced technology sectors where South Caucasus states need the most aid to
develop effectively in the coming years.
Second, without firm
guarantees of proper export controls, Georgia and similar states will
lose opportunities to be used as routes for the transit of various goods and
technologies that their territories provide by virtue of their location. Also, with sound export controls, Western
companies will consider the transit of goods through Georgia as being reliable. All of these things would facilitate the
maintenance of the infrastructure included in the Eurasian Transportation
Corridor and give regional governments additional revenues.
Third, export control
development will strengthen Georgia’s security by providing the
country with more leverage in international political and economic affairs and
enhance the country’s international and regional prestige. This will establish it as a more important
and reliable partner of the international community and the West.
Fourth, export controls will
help to create a positive financial and investment climate and give real
guarantees to foreign investors and hence encourage capital investment and high
technology transfer from the West. This
is necessary not only because Western countries are legally bound to condition
their high technology transfers on the establishment of export controls, but
also because international foreign direct investment is strongly tied to the
confidence that investors have in realizing a steady return on their initial
investments.
Fifth, enhanced export
controls in Georgia can make illicit transfers
of all kinds much more difficult and therefore enhance national security. Because customs and border controls will be
strengthened and equipped through foreign assistance for nonproliferation
export control and law enforcement aid, Georgia would benefit enormously in
terms of national security. In
particular, participation in a common information net
designed to maintain the timely exchange of information on illicit movement of
goods, services, products, technology, drugs and weapons would be of enormous
value.
Sixth, if Georgia is perceived as having
effective export controls and expresses its clear will to satisfy related
international norms and criteria, it will have access to a greater array of
defense-related equipment, technology and armaments. Georgia produces virtually no
military commodities and does not have the strong technological base within its
economy needed to become self-sufficient in this area. Rather, most of the few defense enterprises
and defense production associations in Georgia are dependent on deliveries
from Russia or the other NIS. Due to this, Georgia will be mainly dependent on
the import of military equipment into the foreseeable future. Without a sound system of export controls,
the import of much Western military equipment is not possible because foreign
exporters need firm guarantees that high technology weapons and dual-use goods
will not go to countries of proliferation concern. Because these restrictions are of lesser
concern to the Russian Federation, Georgia would still be able to
acquire Russian weapons for its defense needs. However, such an arrangement would leave Georgia reliant on its biggest
external security threat for the weapons needed for its national security! It would also probably require Georgia—at least at this time and
in the near future—to agree to military basing, economic concessions or other
arrangements with the Russian government that would allow a continued Russian
military presence within Georgian borders as well as strategic economic
domination by its neighbor to the north.
It is emphatic that neither of these situations is ultimately acceptable
for a politically independent and economically robust Georgian state.
Finally, because control of
borders is one of the primary functions of a soverign government, the issue of
developing export controls (which rely on border controls to be effective) must
be considered in light of their role in the most basic—and therefore
important—undertaking that faces the Georgian government at this time. The challenges rendered by the difficulties
in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adzharia are ultimately unacceptable to the Georgian
state because they affect the sovereignty of the government. For much the same reason, the fact that
border guards from the Russian Federation perform border control
functions in other areas of Georgia is unacceptable. Because of the importance of these final
issues, they are discussed in greater detail in the following section.
CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR EXPORT CONTROL DEVELOPMENT
IN GEORGIA
As we see, fully
capitalizing on the transit potential of Georgia—and other South
Caucasus and Central Asian states—is impossible without an
effective system of export controls, and especially border controls. Furthermore, export and border control
development is not possible without addressing first the sovereignty
issue. This is well understood and
continues to be a high priority in the Georgian political establishment. The two main challenges for the establishment
of an effective border and export control system in Georgia are the sovereignty
challenges of the Russian military presence and the uncontrolled territories.
The Russian military
presence, which includes Russian border forces, Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) mandated peacekeeping forces and four military bases, creates
difficulties in the fulfillment of international obligations from the Georgia
side. Because Russian border guards
protect the border with Turkey according to a 1994
agreement, they control one of the most economically vital portions of Georgia’s borderline. Not only do Russian forces in this manner
threaten economic interests and usurp the physical sovereignty of the Georgian
state, even more serious is the fact that their lack of respect for the rights
of Georgian citizens and at times simply unlawful actions in defiance of the
Georgian authorities creates a legal and political challenge for the Georgian
government as well. The Russian problem
includes the existence of Russian military airports on Georgian soil. Because these are almost completely
uncontrolled by Georgian authorities, it is extremely difficult to control the
transit of goods into and out of the country.
It is commonly accepted that the territory of Georiga is used for illegal drug
and weapons trafficking from the north to south and east to west. (12) For instance, in 1997 there was the big
“Yerevangate” scandal (still being “investigated” by the Russian parliament)
regarding billions of dollars worth
of illegal Russian arms shipments to Armenia. There is an indication that the military
armaments were delivered to Armenia from Russian military units
stationed in Georgia. This fact undoubtedly worries the Georgian
government because, as stated by President Aliev of Azerbaijan, “in
principle, all countries in the region may suffer as a result of the
shipments.” (13) Although Georgia has an
agreement (singed in October 1993) with Russia “on the Procedures of the
Passing of Military Echelons of the Russian Federation, as well as Armaments
and Equipment, and on the Procedures of Transit of Other Military Cargo through
the State Border of the Republic of Georgia,” the Russian military, who many
suspect have a primary interest in smuggling weapons and drugs in close association
with organized criminal groups from outside Georgia, often violate it by not
informing the Georgian authorities about the routes and equipment transferred.
In situations where Georgian
law enforcement officials stop (or attempt to stop) Russian military personnel
in order to prevent illicit drug, black market or weapons trafficking (which
all have important effects on the Georgia economy), political
troubles ensue. Needless to say, these
do not enhance Georgian-Russian relations. This is particularly disheartening because,
while Russia is seen as the biggest
external threat to Georgia, it is also Georgia’s natural trading
partner. Thus, the political problems
forced upon Georgia by Russian unwillingness to either control their military
forces (who are perhaps acting in a freelance manner) or to comply with the
agreements negotiated between the two states have potential inter-regional, and
for Georgia international, economic repercussions as well.
The uncontrolled territories
of Georgia that exist because of separatist regimes, particularly in the region
of Abkhazia, create what are to this point insurmountable difficulties for
border and export control development.
Simply put, without positive control of its entire geographic space
neither Georgia nor any other state can pssibly assure the international
community that it controls all products, goods, and technologies that transit
it. The criminal essence of the regime
that controls the Abkhaz region generates difficulties and threatens much of
the progress of the Georgian government in the nonproliferation field. Two examples provide illustrations as to why
this is so. Two kilograms of 40 percent
enriched uranium-235 that was kept in the Black Sea port-city of Sukhumi (in Abkhazia) has
reportedly disappeared. A number of
reported cases of drug smuggling have occurred in a second uncontrolled
territory, in the Tskhinvali (South Ossetian) region. This territory has an outlet to Russia through the Roki mountain
pass, and is not under the control of Georgian authorities. As a US State Department 1997 report states,
“seizures of opiates elsewhere in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Turkey, and Western Europe suggest that there is drug
trafficking through Georgia.” (14) One can surmise that where drugs flow, so may
other materials and weapons, especially given the proximity of the defiant, if
not completely independent, Chechen region.
These examples make clear that only restoration of territorial integrity
and extension of the authority of the central government over all territory of
the country will allow Georgia to take full responsibility
in the sphere of border and export controls.
This will help to prevent drug smuggling and illicit trafficking of
conventional weapons and WMD materials, that, due to
the geographic location of the territories of Abkhazia, Chchnya,
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Kurdistan can create problems not only for Georiga,
but for other countries in the region including Turkey, Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. It will also allow Georgia to repair the damage done
to its international reputation—an important event in light of the hopes for a Silk Road through the country.
While the presence of
Russian military forces and the uncontrolled territories present the greatest
challenges to Georgian border and export control development, the country also
faces constraints on its ability to implement such policies, as well. In many ways, these constraints represent
problems that are every bit as intractable as the challenges noted above.
The difficult economic
situation of Georgia leaves less governmental
resources than is necessary for the full establishment of an export control
system in inplementation as well as in policy and institutional
development. In reality, there are
similar societal problems with political ramifications throughout the NIS. Because the people do not feel compelled to
completely follow the laws (e.g. they may not pay taxes or serve their time in
the military), a civic breakdown occurs because the government cannot obtain
the requisite resources to provide necessary services. Further, because shortfalls in tax collection
may be the result of increased black market activity as the citizens hide
income or assets, border and export controls are doubly affected (less resources
and more trafficking).
The lack of experience in
the nonproliferation field, or lack of a “nonproliferation culture,” in Georgia is also an important
inhibitor of export control development.
Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia did not have its own
legislation and export control structure.
These issues were handled by the relevant Soviet ministries. Unlike Russia and to some degree Ukraine and Belarus, Georgia had to begin the
construction of nonproliferation export controls from scratch. It lacks the resources and expertise to
establish systems that comply fully with international standards. One specific component of the insufficiency
of nonproliferation expertise was, undoubtedly, a lack of skilled specialists,
which caused a delay in serious consideration of nonproliferation policy and
the initiation of the establishment of an export control system. This problem also resulted in a lack of
appreciation among leaders and the Georgian citizenry on the importance of
designing and implementing export controls to meet international conditions for
expanded access to high technologies.
Further, the delay of
Western attention inevitably affected Georgian nonproliferation export control
development. While the four other
countries of this book (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) were given
immediate attention and nonproliferation aid by the West because they possessed
nuclear weapons, other countries—including the South Caucasus states—were
outside the “nuclear four” and merited less attention because they had no
nuclear weapons and less
technologies and capabilities of proliferation concern. Although the Western concentration on and
assistance to the “nuclear four” countries was understandable, it contributed
to the delay in development of nonproliferation policy-making in the other
countries of the former Soviet Union. This delay, as we have argued above, now
threatens the most vital aspects of these states’ political, economic, and even
social development.
AN OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE GEORGIAN EXPORT CONTROL
SYSTEM
A Brief
Outline of the Early Georgian Regulatory Process
In order
to understand the importance of export controls for the security of Georgia,
it is necessary to first examine how the government has attempted to establish
and maintain export controls to date. In
spite of the numerous problems indicated above, the first efforts to establish an export control system in Georgia
were made quite soon after national independence was restored after the
70-year domination by Soviet Russia. As
in many other states developing nonproliferation export controls from scratch,
the earliest basis for export controls came from commodity control decrees and
regulations that covered a variety of commercial items, including weaponry. For example, the first export control lists
were issued by the no-longer existent Cabinet of Ministers, and a March 1992
decree on foreign economic relations banned the export of certain items,
including weapons.
In July 1993, a decree on quotas
and licensing of commercial imports and export items (including again, weapons)
was issued. It applied to international
trade in Georgia with any foreign company,
unless otherwise stipulated in intergovernmental agreements. On 31 March
1994,
the Cabinet of Ministers passed Decree No. 265 entitled “On Quotas and
Licensing of Import and Export Goods and Services” which established that the
export or re-export of any weapons were prohibited. Despite several other decrees and resolutions
that for the most part have liberalized the restrictions on importing and
exporting commercial products to and from Georgia, the ban on weapons and
munitions trafficking is still considered in force. Finally, on 8
February 1995, the Georgian parliament passed Law No. 504, prohibiting the transit
and import of toxic and radioactive waste.
This provided an important step in moving export control awareness
closer to items of nonproliferation concern.
The Turning
Point in the Development of Nonproliferation Export Controls
While
the above commodity control efforts attempted to regulate mainly what in an
economic sense was strategic trade (things like meat, rice, and timber were
included), the true starting point for establishing the intellectual, policy,
political, economic, and security rationales for creating an effective,
internationally accepted nonproliferation export control system was the
Washington Forum on Export Controls and Nonproliferation for Senior Government
Officials, held in September 1996. This
forum consisted of briefings by US government officials to
representatives of eight Central Asian and South Caucasus states. This event initiated the involvement of these
countries in international export control arrangements. Of paramount importance was the US statement that export
controls in the so-called “southern tier” of the former Soviet Union were needed to prevent the
export of high technologies, weapons, dual-use goods, and radioactive materials
from Russia to nearby countries wishing
to have or improve their WMD programs.
The message of the forum was clear—the US was ready to begin serious
cooperation in the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions if certain guarantees
were proffered by these states. One such
guarantee was the creation and maintenance of effective export control
systems. The participation of these
previously neglected states of the NIS made clear that to fully
control the transit of goods through these regions, training and advanced
technological equipment from the US was needed.
From that time, Georgia started intensively working
to develop the legal and institutional basis of nonproliferation export
controls. The National Security Council
of Georgia actively considered the costs and benefits of an export control
system, concluded that there should be great importance attached to its
development, and initiated work on specific elements of such a system. Upon the National Security Council’s
recommendation, Georgian President Shevardnadze issued a decree on 2 December 1996 that created an interagency working group
authorized to work out the necessary proposals for preparing a legislative and
material-technical basis for the control of high technology, radioactive
materials, raw materials and “special destination” products. The interagency working group consists of
representatives from various ministries, and regularly gathers to discuss
developments in the export control system in Georgia, identify existing
problems, and so on.
The Draft Law
on Export Controls
The
draft Law on Export Controls submitted to the Georgian parliament in the fall
of 1997 was developed by collaborative effort of the interagency working group
in cooperation with experts from the US Department of Commerce (see the
appendix for an unofficial translation).
The parliamentary Subcommittee on Military Industry of the Committee on
Defense and Security took the lead in drafting a law that will provide a sound
legal basis for nonproliferation export controls in Georgia. It explicitly states that one of the main
principles behind regulating exports in Georgia is to adhere to
international obligations regarding the nonproliferation of WMD. The law gives the government of Georgia the responsibility for
developing an export control system and for defining the responsibilities of
executive branch agencies in that sphere.
In addition, the government is responsible specifically for granting
export permission for items subject to export control. Although the government has yet to complete
its drawing up of control lists, the draft law states that the following
categories of items will be subject to export controls:
·
conventional arms and military technology; raw
materials, materials, special equipment and technology, and services connected
with their production;
·
nuclear materials, technology, equipment,
facilities; special non-nuclear materials and products; dual-use equipment and
technologies; radiation sources and isotope products; and lists of items established by international nonproliferation
regimes;
·
chemical and dual-use technologies which could be
used in the creation of a chemical weapon in accordance with lists of items established by international
nonproliferation regimes;
·
disease agents, their genetically changed forms and
fragments of genetic material which could be used in the creation of
bacteriological (biological) weapons; and lists
of items established by international nonproliferation regimes;
·
equipment, materials, and technologies that could be
used in the creation of a missile weapon; and
lists of items established by international nonproliferation regimes; and
·
scientific-technical information, services, and
results of intellectual activity that is connected to military products.
Of special note, as indicated by the
italicized statements above, is the commitment made to the international
nonproliferation regime. Not only is
this a symbolic step for Georgia, but it will also require real efforts to
alter the existing, rudimentary system that is based on the old Soviet nomenklatura lists and licensing
procedures that did not conform to many of the regime lists. The law also outlines the process for
obtaining an export license and explicitly states that nuclear materials can
only be exported if the importing country guarantees that:
1.
the items will not be used in the production of a
nuclear weapons or for the achievement of any military goal;
2.
the items will be placed under International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards;
3.
the items will be placed under physical protection
at levals not less than those recommended by the IAEA;
4.
the items will be re-exported
only if the third country can guarantee the three conditions above. In the case of highly enriched uranium (HEU),
plutonium enriched to over 20 percent, or heavy water, re-export will take
place only with the written permission of the relevant authorities within Georgia.
In order to make Georgia more compliant with the
guidelines of the international nonproliferation regime after the adoption of
the umbrella Export Control Law, there are plans to issue several executive
decrees and regulations that will identify agencies involved in export
controls, the delegation of authorities among them, etc. These decrees will be followed by agency
regulations. Work in this direction is
currently underway.
The Current
Georgian Export Control System
For
controlled goods and services (e.g. munitions, armaments, etc.) an export
contact has to be registered prior to obtaining a license. These contracts are registered by the
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (MTFER) and have to be obtained prior to
applying for an export license.
Applicants are responsible for the authenticity of all information
provided and must seek the registration of a contract by submitting a copy and
original of the
contract, a bank account statement, and an application in order to be
considered. This application must be
acted upon within ten working days from the date when it is submitted, and if
approved the applicant is given a registration card, sealed and signed by an
official of MTFER. The registration card
has to be submitted to the Customs Service as the product is being
shipped. In case of a failure to do so,
Customs officials will not allow the export transaction, even in the case where
a license is presented.
Once a contract is obtained for exporting a
controlled item, an applicant may be granted one of two types of licenses: a general license covering a period of no
more than twelve months; or a single-use license authorizing a solitary transaction. Export licenses are issued by the MTFER
within a period of fifteen days after the submission of an application. According to Resolution No. 35 of the Cabinet
of Ministers (23 January 1995), an enterprise
seeking an export license must submit an application with the following
documentation: a) an export contract; b) a notice from the enterprise’s partner
bank confirming that the enterprise has submitted a copy of the contract and
notified the bank about the planned transaction; c) license fees; d) a
certificate stating the source or origin of the goods and services; and e) for
goods and services produced in Georgia, a certificate of quality. A rejection must be based on substantial
grounds and the applicant is entitled to notification in writing. Any rejected applicant is permitted to appeal
to the courts. (15) Because of the
nature of the Georgian production economy, the MTFER only rarely will review
nonproliferation-related applications.
The Customs Service of
Georgia is required to maintain a strict control over export and import of
licensed products and submit statistical data to the Ministry of Economics,
MTFER, and the State Committee of Social-Economic Information on a quarterly
basis. There are, however, many reports
in Georgian newspapers on the dangerous level of corruption in Customs as well
as the Border Forces. The Sarpi check
point at the Georgian-Turkish border comes closest to international
nonproliferation standards, while others are in various stages of development. Others are patrolled by Russians, as
mentioned above. Border Forces continue
to receive nonproliferation training, mostly within the framework of
US-Georgian cooperation. There are,
however, also cooperation programs between Georgian Border Forces and their
Ukrainian, Turkish, Greek, German, and Bulgarian counterparts. Georgian border guards declared that they
would take full control of Georgian territorial waters on the Georgian part of
the Black
Sea
beginning in July 1998. This step is of utmost
importance considering that the important links of the Eurasian Transportation
Corridor and pipeline infrastructure—the Georgian Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi—should be properly secured.
Georgian Involvement in International Nonproliferation Related Activities
Georgia has membership in only a
couple of the arrangements of the nonproliferation regime, but will attempt to
bring its policies into adherence with the others as its capabilities
develop. Georgia acceded to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty on 7 March 1994 and became a member of the
IAEA in February 1996. During the IAEA
General Conference in September 1997, Georgia signed the strengthened
(additional) safeguards protocol. Georgia has undertaken the
commitment to apply the protocol provisionally, pending its ratification by
parliament. The protocol grants the IAEA
complementary legal authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures
through providing greater access for the IAEA to information about states’
nuclear programs, both current and planned.
It also provides for more access to locations, including nuclear sites
and research and manufacturing facilites tha could be relevant to nuclear
activities. Inspectors will also make
use of advanced analytical technology under this protocol.
The protocol is now being
ratified by the parliament of Georgia. Once the protocol enters fully into force, Georgia will be one of the first
countries to start implementing the strengthened safeguards system. Georgia’s nuclear facilities that
will fall under the protocol consist of a pool-type research reactor
(8-megawatt thermal) that started up in 1959 and has been shut down since
1989. This reactor, near the city of Mtskheta, is currently under IAEA
safeguards. The Institute of Physics and
Technology, which conducted research and development activities at Sukhumi (in
the Abkhaz region) is not currently under IAEA safeguards and probably will not
become so until the sovereignty issue is settled.
Georgia is an observer in the
export control cooperation agreement known as the Minsk Accord that was signed
in Belarus in 1992. There are nine signatories to the Minsk
Accord, and while Georgia is not one of them, it
participates in the annual meetings as an observer. While initially promising, however, the Minsk
Accord has largely failed to facilitate coordination within the CIS on export
controls.
Because illicit trafficking
of nuclear materials contains a significant threat to global security, many
national leaders participated in meetings held in Moscow in June 1996 to address this
threat. The main results of these
discussions were the expansion of cooperation in all field s of proliferation
detection and information exchange, as well as in the areas of investigation
and prosecution of proliferants. The fundamental
responsibility of each country is to ensure consistency on a national level the
physical protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) of all possessed
nuclear materials. Georgia adheres to the principles
of this program, and considers it one of the key components of a complete
export control system.
On 31 May 1995 in Gudauri, Georgia, security chiefs from the
CIS countries signed an agreement on combating organized crime that included
protocols on nuclear smuggling, terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal armed
formations. (15) But this document, like
the Minsk Accords mentioned above, has had little, if any, real effects. Any cooperation on these issues are overshadowed by allegations from certain CIS countries
that other CIS member states shelter criminals and terrorists.
While WMD are the weapons
that threaten the most damage, conventional arms are those that kill in
practice. Furthermore, items of dual-use
nature pose the most difficult economic and security questions for governments.
(16) The Wassenaar Arrangement, the
successor to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, has a
stated objective of contributing to regional and international security by
promoting transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. In the future, as its defense industry
develops, Georgia could legitimately be
interested in joining the Wassenaar Arrangement. But, first of all, it must achieve
sufficiently reliable export controls over arms and dual-use technologies. Georgia’s stance toward the other
parts of the nonproliferation regime, the Australia Group, Zangger Committee,
Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime, is very
similar. The intention to adhere to the
full range of regime control lists is made obvious by the clauses of the draft
Export Control Law italicized above.
A CONFLUENCE OF INTERESTS: US-GEORGIA COOPERATION IN NONPROLIFERATION
ACTIVITIES
Fortunately enough, the United States and other Western countries
have interests in the Eurasian Transportation Corridor that are similar to
those that drive export control development in Georgia. First and foremost, all players in the
Caspian oil sweepstakes have a priority of safe, secure and reliable
transportation of the oil and other resources through the Corridor. In order to ensure this, stability in Georgia and along the rest of the
Corridor must be enhanced. One means of
doing this, as alluded to above, is to devote attention and resources toward
solving the major problems that prevent Georgia from being able to uphold
its end of the bargain. Assistance for
nonproliferation and other anti-crime activities has been a useful way of doing
so.
US-Georgia cooperation in
the nonproliferation field began, as mentioned above, in the fall of 1996. After the Washington Forum on Export Controls
and Nonproliferation for NIS “southern tier” countries, an interagency export
control delegation consisting of representatives from State, Commerce, and
Defense Departments, FBI, Customs Service, Coast Guard, and Nonproliferation
Center visited Georgia in December 1996.
The main aim of the visit was to gather information on the situation
related to Georgia’s export control system,
the existing legislative and material-technical base, and to prepare
recommendations for US government assistance to Georgia in this field. The team had meetings in various governmental
agencies as well as with relevant parliamentary committees and also visited
control-exit points in Poti on the Black Sea, Sarpi on the border with Turkey, and the “Red Bridge” crossing at the
Georgia-Azerbaijan border. Practical steps for future cooperation were
discussed and approved as a result of this visit.
In May 1997, the US government invited a
Georgian delegation to participate in an export control-related legal and
technical forum, “Partnership and Cooperation in Export Controls,” hosted by
the Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce. The Georgian delegation was briefed by
officials from the Departments of Commerce, State, Energy, and Treasury, as
well as the Nonproliferation Center and the Customs
Service. During these discussions, US
officials examined and made comments on a draft of the Georgian Export Control
Law.
An important element in
US-Georgian nonproliferation cooperation has resulted from the opening of the
Cooperative Treat Reduction (CTR) program’s assistance to the non-nuclear four
states of the former Soviet Union. The utility of “CTR II” spreads far beyond
the technical application of resources: it has a latent diplomatic value
through its facilitation of communication on key mutual security concerns; it
serves as a significant bargaining chip in regional security affairs; and it
enhances US global nonproliferation
policy. (17) More concretely, CTR II
assistance provides equipment and training for the safe storage of weapons
materials and for export controls. After
working for several years to implement the initial four CTR umbrella agreements
with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, in 1997 the US signed agreements to begin
CTR II programs in Moldova, Georgia, and Uzbekistan. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Susan Koch asserts that the purpose of these programs is to “encourage [these
states] to become full members of the international [nonproliferation]
community.” The fact that export controls have been of increasing importance as
the threat of nuclear leakage has gained prominence as a policy concern has led
to funds being programmed for this task as part of the State Department’s
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, as well.
In addition, it was
considered that with the substantial influence of organized crime in the NIS, export controls are a
cornerstone of regional nonproliferation efforts and complement the MPC&A activities
funded by the US Department of Energy and IAEA in the region. The original MPC&A cooperation between
the US and Georgia began in early January 1996 with the initial
site survey of the research reactor site at the Institute of Physics outside of
Mtskheta (about 20 kilometers from Tbilisi).
In early 1997, Georgian officials announced the completion of a
“quick-fix” effort at establishing materials security at the Institute of
Physics, which contained about 4.3 kilograms of 90 percent enriched (i.e.
weapons-grade) uranium-235 and 800 grams of spent reactor fuel. A large brick obelisk was built to secure the
material, and intrusion detection sensors, video cameras, and a central alarm
station were installed as well. In
mid-April 1998, all of the nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and spent
fuel) were removed from the Institute of Physics in a tripartite operation
by the Georgian, US, and British governments.
Further cooperative
relations were built on the basis of bilateral relations between the US and Georgia. On 17 July 1997 President
Shevardnadze and US Secretary of Defense William Cohen signed an agreement on
“the Cooperation in the Area of Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Promotion of Defense and Military Relations” (see appendix for
this document). This umbrella agreement
was a historic step enabling preparation for additional cooperative bilateral
defense activities between the US and Georgia. As Secretary Cohen asserted after the signing
ceremony, “this program is going to ensure that Georgia remains a ‘sturdy brick’ in
the wall holding back the spread of weapons of mass destruction.” According to
the document, cooperation is envisaged in the following areas:
·
establishing verifiable measures against the
proliferation of WMD and technology, materials, and expertise related to such
weapons from Georgia;
·
preventing unauthorized transfer and transportation
of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and related materials; and
·
promoting defense and military contacts
and other cooperative military activities.
The endeavors above resulted in US
assistance in the nonproliferation filed, particularly export controls,
beginning in 1997. There have also been
other purposes of this assistance.
Foremost among these other purposes have been efforts to assist the
countries of the South Caucasus to secure their borders and effectively control
the trafficking of illegal narcotics, to contain and inhibit transnational
organized criminal activities, to provide international military education and
training, and to assist these countries in developing capabilities to maintain
national border and coast guards and customs controls. In addition to the State Department’s export
control programs, it has been proposed that Georgia
participate in the following programs: Department of Defense/Customs Service
Counterproliferation Program; Department of Defense/FBI Counterproliferation
Program; and the Department of Defense’s Military-to-Military
Counterproliferation Program. All these
activities are interrelated and have several similarities:
1. they are
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC) and NBC-related materials
counterproliferation programs;
2. they are for
training a community of relevant officials in Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and the NIS; and
3. they provide for the procurement of equipment for use by the above
governments.
Finally, the US Congress has even begun
to understand the importance of the South Caucasus’
resources to US
security, and also the interrelated nature of the political, economic, and
security issues at stake. For fiscal
year 1998, Congress passed legislation—popularly known as the “Silk Road
Strategy Act of 1997”—making available $250 million for assistance for the Southern
Caucasus. Of this, $92.5
million will be available for Georgia and $87.5 million for Armenia (because of
its blockade—an act of war—of Armenia, Azerbaijan is not eligible for such aid
due to the sanctions placed upon it by stipulation of Section 907 of the US
FREEDOM Support Act). In addition to
these sums, 28 percent of the funding is set aside for reconstruction and
remedial activities related to the destruction wrought during conflicts within
the region. Within that 28 percent, $15
million is devoted to developing border security telecommunications
infrastructure, $5 million to train border and customs control officers, and $5
million shall be available for urban and commercial development.
All of these activities discussed in this section illustrate the
importance of a multifaceted approach to the economic, political, and security
challenges of the Georgian element of the Eurasian Transportation
Corridor. One is left to question:
without the Corridor, would the United States
and other states have such an interest in the region?
CONCLUSION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPORT CONTROLS AND
THE EURASIAN TRANSPORTATION CORRIDOR
The development of the new Silk Road or Eurasian
Transportation Corridor that will link Central Asia with
Europe through Georgia
and the South Caucasus is in the process of becoming
reality. The establishment of
nonproliferation export controls in Georgia
and the South Caucasus is directly linked to the
process. Without effective systems of
export controls in the states along the Silk Road, this trading infrastructure
will be less secure, less stable, and have much less value. In other words, it will not meet the needs of
energy security in the region. On the
contrary, sound export controls in Georgia
and the other South Caucasus and Central Asian states would
greatly facilitate the realization of the project by assuring businesses of
increased regional stability, increasing accountability, ensuring the safety of
products in transit through the region, and creating an overall more positive
financial and investment climate.
There are several challenges that directly affect both the sovereignty
and also the creation of an export control system in Georgia. The existence of foreign troops on the
state’s territory, the existence of uncontrolled regions, a difficult economic
situation, and the pervasiveness of criminal, illegal, and unlawful activities
within the state all present major challenges and constraints. Fortunately, assistance from the US
for Georgian export control development has taken into account the domestic,
regional, and international situation in Georgia,
and almost all of these programs are multifaceted in their approach to
nonproliferation; i.e. they address the issues of criminality and border
control as well as the traditional nonproliferation elements of MPC&A and
export controls. The role of Western
assistance, along with the already declared clear political will of the
government of Georgia,
is crucial to the establishment of effective export controls that meet
international standards.
In spite of the many external and internal restraints, establishing an
export control system in Georgia
is underway. Growing attention toward
this process has resulted in its serious consideration in the political circles
of the country. Wile the first phase of
the creation of the system—the establishment of a legislative basis, the
initiation of coordination between relevant governmental agencies,
etc.—approaches its end and some improvements have already been achieved, still
much more must be done in order to meet the relevant requirements and
international standards. Because of the
perceived importance of the Eurasian Transportation Corridor, Georgia
must continue, and indeed redouble, its efforts toward developing export
control standards that are complementary with the West.
REFERENCES
1. Robert M.
Cutler, “Towards Cooperative Energy Security in the South Caucasus,” Caucasian Regional Studies (Vol. 1 1996).
2. Ariel Cohen,
“US Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Building a New ‘Silk Road’ to Economic Prosperity,” Backgrounder No. 1132, The Heritage Foundation, 24 July 1997.
3. Paul Goble,
“Analysis from Washington—New Players in the Caucasus,” RFE/RL, 5 April 1996.
4. Svante
Cornell, “The Unruly Caucasus,” Current
History (October 1997).
5. David
Darchiashvili, “Georgia—The
Search for State Security,” Working Paper, Center for International Security
and Arms Control, Stanford University, December 1997.
6. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its
Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
7. Ariel Cohen,
“The New ‘Great Game’: Oil Politics in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” Backgrounder No. 1065, The Heritage
Foundation, 1996.
8. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its
Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
9. Harald
Mueller, “Non-Proliferation: A New Role for NATO?” in David Fischer, Eric
Chauvistre, and Harald Mueller, Extending
the Non-Proliferation Regime—More Scope for the IAEA? 1994.
10. Ibid.
11. Harald
Mueller, ed., Nuclear Export Controls in Europe (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995), p. 12.
12. See Glenn
Curtis, ed., Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Country Studies (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1995); and any of
the 1993-1997 versions of the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (chapters on Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).
13. FBIS-SOV-97-099 9
April 1997.
14. US Department of State, “Background Notes: Georgia,” July 1997.
15. “CIS Accord on
Fighting Organized Crime,” OMRI Daily
Digest 2 June 1995.
16. Harald
Mueller, ed., Nuclear Export Controls in Europe (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1995).
17. Jason Ellis, “Nunn-Lugar’s
Mid-Life Crisis,” Survival (Spring
1997).