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Last modifications on
Wednesday, November 28, 2007 13:02

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Copyright ©1996-2007
Center for International Trade and Security

Survey on U.S. Industry Compliance and Export Controls: Executive Summary

Purpose

Export controls remain an important component of US policy to stem the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons. Corporate export control policies play a key role in the US export control policy process. As part of a larger program on improving nonproliferation export control policy by the Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia (CITS/UGA), the survey explores the current export control compliance practices of 120 leading US exporters of strategic munitions and dual-use items.

Findings

  • Violations of export control regulations among US companies are not rare. 30% of the survey respondents believed that violations of export controls occur "very often" or "often" in their industry. Nearly 54% of the companies had self-reported violations and nearly 27% had received a warning letter from the US government about violations. More than 81% of the respondents contend that lack of knowledge about export controls was a "most important" or "important" cause of violations.
  • Many US companies have adopted comprehensive export control compliance programs in recent years. In this survey, 78% of the companies now have such programs and another 13% have plans to adopt one. Of the 93 companies with comprehensive compliance programs, more than 47% were created in the last five years. Nonetheless, a substantial proportion of leading US exporters of high-tech items currently have no comprehensive export control compliance program. Overall, industry scored a "C" (76 out of a 100 possible) on an index of "best practices" for export control compliance.
  • Comprehensive company export control systems are expensive. On average, larger exporters in this survey expended $637,333 per year on export control compliance, while medium size firms spend an average of $53,500 annually, figures comparable to expenditures made during 1985. Smaller exporters, however, averaged $71,000 per year, an increase of 340% from 1985.
  • Compliance programs work, although many respondents had some doubts. About 58% of the respondents believed that export controls were an "effective" or "very effective" means of stemming proliferation and about 63% asserted that their control program had helped their company avoid suspicious transactions. More than 50% indicated that compliance programs had a "positive" or "very positive" impact on their company.


Survey on US Industry Compliance and Export Controls: Findings

Introduction

Export controls, however maligned, remain an important tool in efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons), their means of delivery, and advanced conventional weapons.[1] A modern system of national export controls requires companies to implement effective compliance practices.[2] In the 1990s, several controversial cases, such as those involving Hughes Electronics Corporation or McDonnell Douglas, have focused attention on the gap that may exist between the best compliance practices and industry compliance efforts.[3] Unfortunately, very little systematic data on corporate export control compliance practices exists. More than fifteen years have passed since the last comprehensive survey of US corporate compliance practices regarding export controls.[4] In the meantime, the end of the Cold War, the emergence of nonproliferation as the primary export control policy rationale, and the movement toward increased corporate responsibility in implementing export control policies have radically altered the compliance environment.

To address this knowledge gap, the Center for International Trade and Security of the University of Georgia (CITS/UGA) constructed a survey instrument to measure the export control compliance of US industry on defense and dual-use items (i.e., goods, services, and technologies with primarily commercial but also military applications). This report summarizes some of the key findings from responses by US-based export control officials in 120 companies during the year 2000. These companies come from a set of companies most involved in trade in controlled items, consequently the results likely reflect the highest levels of US corporate compliance activities for export controls (for additional information on the survey see the Methodology and Respondent Demographics section at the end of the report).

Compliance Efforts

Most respondents, 78%, indicated that their company had a comprehensive compliance program, while another 13% indicated that their company planned to adopt such a program (see Table 1). Although this suggests that most of these companies take export control compliance seriously, nearly 8% of the respondents specifically indicated that their companies did not even plan to have a comprehensive compliance program. As important, 44 of the 93 companies with programs (around 47%) have created them in the last five years. This suggests that the increased complexity of export control policy has pushed companies to create more comprehensive compliance programs in the late 1990s.

On average, these compliance activities cost large companies $637,333, slightly more than what it cost similar companies in 1985 (even less if controlled for inflation).[5] For medium enterprises, the average of $53,500 was less than average spending in 1985, but for small businesses the $71,000 average cost marks a nearly 340% percent increase over 1985 spending levels, not controlling for inflation. For the majority of firms, these costs remained the same during the past five years. While about 51% of the companies employed between one and five people full-time, more than 26% percent had no personnel working full-time on export control compliance (although nearly 97% of the respondents indicated that their company had at least one person working either full- or part-time on export control compliance). 80% of the respondents cited avoidance of fines and government penalties as a "very important" reason for company compliance, more important than either corporate responsibility or preserving the corporate image which were also ranked "very important" reasons.

Using a composite compliance program score, overall corporate compliance efforts vary considerably.[6] Out of a possible program score of 100, the highest was 94 and the average was 76.6, or a "C" grade (see Table 3). The composite compliance scores appear to vary positively with company size and the ratio of export sales to total business activity (see Tables 3 & 4). Only about 29% of these compliance programs have undergone an audit from the Department of Commerce, which has a voluntary program for exporters to evaluate their programs. Even fewer, about 4%, have had an audit by the State Department, which has no parallel program. At the same time, more than 27% have had a warning letter on export controls from the US government and more than half (54%) have self-reported violations.

Given that these companies represent those firms most aware of their export control responsibilities, these numbers raise disturbing questions about the general level of US corporate compliance. Certainly, the perception of noncompliance exists, as 30% of the respondents asserted that violations occur "often" or "very often" within their industry, with 75% saying that violations took place on more than rare occasions (see Table 5). About 81% of the respondents believe that a general lack of knowledge about controls is a "most important" or "important" cause of industry violations, more significant than any other.

Most important, 50% of the respondents asserted that export control compliance had a "positive" or "very positive" impact on their company during the last five years, while only 18% attested to a "negative" or "very negative" impact (see Table 6). Overall, 58% thought that export controls were an "effective" or "very effective" means of stemming proliferation, with only 12% viewing controls as "rarely effective" or "ineffective." About 62% of the respondents stated that the compliance program had helped the company avoid suspicious transactions. Significantly, about 57% of the companies encountered at least one suspicious transaction per year, with the companies with the highest composite compliance scores naming more suspicious transactions on average. This suggests that many suspect transactions may go unidentified in companies without strong compliance programs.

License Processing

Much of the criticism of US export controls over several decades has focused on the problems associated with license processing.[7] Consequently, the licensing of dual-use items has undergone considerable reform in the 1990s, particularly as mandated under the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee. Nonetheless, processing times have risen in recent years. The reduction in the number of dual-use license applications from the Cold War era has stripped the system of the easiest licenses to process and the 1996 change in procedures has made more licenses subject to interagency review. At the same time, the licensing of munitions items has not undergone a parallel period of reform. The State Department is facing increasing criticism as the number of munitions license applications escalates dramatically and licensing difficulties are becoming more common. The survey indicates that there are significant problems in providing timely licensing-related responses, especially by the Office of Defense Trade Controls for munitions items (see Table 7).

Methodology and Respondent Demographics

The survey contains 61 questions addressing corporate demographics, corporate export control compliance, the impact of export controls on the company, industry views of control policy, and corporate efforts to influence US export control policies. The original mailing list was derived from the directory of the attendees to 1998 and 1999 BXA annual "Update" conferences on export controls and the membership list of the Society of International Affairs (SIA), a government sponsored association of defense exporters. We excluded law firms and other exporter service companies and mailed the survey in late February of 2000 to 481 companies from the first list and 95 from the second. We sent the first round of post card reminders in March. We called over 450 non-respondents to remind them again from May to June. While engaged in this process, we identified 154 invalid cases due to inappropriate business (e.g. consulting firms rather than manufacturers), company closures, personnel changes, disconnected and not-in-service phone numbers, etc. As a result, the original survey population was reduced to 422. 167 of those we called said that they were willing to fill out a second copy of the survey. Another 21 were returned as undeliverable, reducing the survey population to 401. By September, we received a total of 120 completed surveys for a response rate of nearly 30%, a much higher than average for mail surveys to industry.

The sample of 120 companies is not representative of the universe of more than 200,000 US exporters. The selection of the survey targets is biased toward larger companies that participate in several US government export control outreach programs. Since a very small proportion of US exporters account for the vast majority of US exports, we sample a larger proportion of these companies. The companies in this sample are likely to have the highest standards of export control compliance of US exporters, a useful sample bias.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, the Japan United States Friendship Commission, and the University of Georgia for their support for this research. Several graduate students at the University of Georgia, particularly Jing Xu and Chen Yi, made considerable contributions to the survey design, data collection, and analysis phases of this project. Thanks also goes to Gary K. Bertsch, Michael Beck and the rest of the staff of CITS/UGA. The author also benefited from participating in several outreach events of the US Department of Commerce, the US Department of State, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and lots of advice from representatives from several US and Japanese companies.