The Center for
International Trade & Security
Export Control Newsletter
No 41
17 January – 6 February
2004
CITS/ UGA News
1. CITS Holds a Briefing for Members of Azeri Parliamentarians in Baku
2. Scholars from Uzbekistan at CITS
3.
CITS Releases a New Report “Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls”
4.
CITS Releases a New Report “Export Controls in Brazil”
5. Ambassador Mariusz Handzlik,
Recent MTCR Chairman, spends sabbatical at CITS.
“Former MTCR Official:
“China Seeks to Join Missile Nonproliferation Regime,” By Mike Nartker,
Global Security Newswire, February 5,
2004
1.
“Bush Proposes Steps to Halt WMD Proliferation, Says Such Weapons Are
'The Greatest Threat to Humanity Today',” CNN, February 12, 2004
2. “Bush Administration Modifies Export Control
Lists,” Global Security
Newswire, January 21, 2004
3. “U.S. Charges Man with Smuggling Nuclear
Equipment to Pakistan,” Global
Security Newswire, January 13, 2004
4. “Illinois Company Settles Charges of Illegal
Exports to South Korea,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce, Department of
Commerce,
February 6, 2004
7. “Hearing to
Examine Export Rules for Cruise Missiles, UAVs,” By Marc Selinger,
Aerospace Daily, January 30, 2004
8. “The Department
of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-Based Approach to Its
Counter-MANPADS Development Program,” GAO-04-341R, January 30, 2003.
International Export
Control Developments
1. “Bleak future for Pakistan's 'bomb hero',”
By David Blair, The Daily Telegraph, February 07, 2004
2. “U.N. Nuclear Chief Warns of Global Black
Market,” By Peter Slevin,
3.
“Inspectors Find Clandestine Centrifuge Drawings in Iran,” Associated Press, February 12, 2004
4. “Musharraf Rejects Outside Investigation of
Pakistani Nuclear Smuggling,” Global
Security Newswire, February 6, 2004
5. “Pakistani Takes Blame for Nuclear Transfers;
Top Arms Scientist Tells Nation He Erred but Acted on his Own,” By
David Rohde, The International Herald
Tribune, February 5, 2004
6. “Malaysian Authorities Investigate Domestic
Firm for Nuclear Smuggling,” Global
Security Newswire, February 5, 2004
7.
“Salesman on Nuclear Circuit Casts Blurry Corporate Shadow,”
By Raymond Bonner, New York Times,
February 18, 2004
8. “Malaysia Pledges Cooperation on Nuclear
Investigation,” Associated Press, February 13, 2004
EU
9. “EU Invitees Must Improve Export Controls,”
by Scott
Jones, CITS Senior Research Associate, Defense
News, 26 January, 2004
10. “EU and Russia Start Talks on Nuclear Exports,” RosBusinessConsulting Database, February 3, 2004
11. “Germany Drops Charges Against Man Suspected
of Aiding Nuclear Smuggling to North Korea,” Global Security Newswire, January 8, 2004
12. “Netherlands Probing Suspected
Centrifuge-Related Diversions,” By Mark Hibbs , Nucleonics Week, January
22, 2004
13. “US to Keep Focus on Lithuania's Control of
Radioactive Materials,” Baltic
News Service, February 5,
2004
14. “Libyan Nuclear Procurement Network Was
Greater Than Expected, Experts Find,” Global Security Newswire, January 22, 2004
15. “Probe of Libya Finds Nuclear Black Market,”
By Joby Warrick and Peter
16.
“China, France Agree to Form Nonproliferation
Task Force,” Global Security
Newswire, January 28, 2004
17. “China Applies to Join Nuclear Suppliers Group,”
BBC Monitoring International Reports,
January 26, 2004
18. “Putin Makes Changes in List of Exported
Nuclear Materials,” ITAR-TASS
News Agency, February 8,
2004
19. “America Invites Russia to Participate in
Global Intercept Initiative,” Vremya
Novostei, By Andrei Zlobin, Yelena Suponina, February 3, 2004
20. “Bulgarian Government Updates Arms Exports
Blacklist,” BBC Monitoring
International Reports, January
22, 2004
21. “Response of the Ukrainian Military, Scientists,
and Politicians to Al-Hajat's Publication on Kiev's Sales of Tactical Nuclear Weapons to Al Qaeda,”
Russky Kurier, By Ivan Vorotynsky,
February 11, 2004
22. “Nuclear Parts from Japanese Firm said Brokered
to Libya,” By Masao Shimazaki, Yomiuri
Shimbun, February 8, 2004
23. “Japan Offers to Aid Cambodia in
Strengthening Export Controls,” Global
Security Newswire, January 15, 2004
24. “Japan, ASEAN to Meet on WMD Proliferation Export Controls,”
6 February 2004, Kyodo News Service.
CITS/ UGA News
1. CITS Holds a Briefing for Members
of Azeri Parliamentarians in
On February 22-25, 2004 CITS researchers will
accompany a group of
2. Visitors from
On February 18, 2004, Mr. Bakhrom Djuraev, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic
and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Mr.
Mirzohid Rahimov, Senior Researcher at the Institute of History of the Academy
of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan, will arrive UGA in mid-February 2004
for 5 weeks and three months internship, as a part of educational exchange
between University of Georgia and the
Republic of Uzbekistan (Freedom Partnership Project). As a part of this
project, the University of Georgia (UGA) has partnered with
two institutes and one university in
3. CITS Released a New
Report “Strengthening Multilateral
Export Controls”
On 10-11 November 2003, at a
workshop in
for International Trade and Security
(CITS) at the
together 17 governmental and
nongovernmental experts to discuss options for
reforming the multilateral export
control regimes. Held at
Agency for
dialogue on this matter of crucial
importance to national and international
security. The objective of
the workshop was to devise models or options for restructuring
multilateral export
controls. In September 2002, CITS issued a report,
Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls
(http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/regime_report.pdf),
recommending that the current
nonproliferation export
control regimes be merged into one overarching regime.
Over the succeeding
year, officials from several countries urged CITS to take the
lead in realizing this
vision. The
experts’ workshop in
4. CITS Released a New
Report “Export Controls in
CITS
released a new report on “Export Controls in
“In
any country, an export control system is an integral part of a larger political
and economic infrastructure. The economic, political, and security priorities
set by government form the basis for export control policies and practices. All
in all,
For
more information see CITS/ UGA webpage at http://www.uga.edu/cits/home/index.htm
5.
Ambassador Mariusz Handzlik, Recent MTCR Chairman, Visited CITS
On
January 14 - February 4, 2004, Ambassador Mariusz Handzlik, recent MTCR
Chairman visited CITS as a part of CITS continuing project to assist improving
efficiency of multilateral export control regimes. On February 4, 2004, he delivered a briefing on
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and multilateral export control
reform to the
Ambassador Mariusz Handzlik is a recent Chair of the
Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), the
multilateral export control institution established to prevent the
proliferation of missiles
and missile technology to countries seeking weapons of mass
destruction. Prior to his
service to the MTCR, Mr. Handzlik was a foreign policy advisor
to the Prime Minister of
the
the Polish Embassy in
Export Policy Department
and Deputy Director of the Security Policy Department at the
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Ambassador Handzlik worked in the Polish Mission to
NATO in
Polish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
Below is selected media coverage of his presentation.
“Former MTCR Official: Libya's WMD Admission Could Impact
Other Middle Eastern Countries,”
InsideDefense.com, February 4, 2004 (for personal use only)
Libya's December agreement to do away with its weapons of mass destruction
programs could serve as a catalyst for other Middle Eastern countries to do the
same, according to the former chairman of the Missile Technology Control
Regime. "If this cooperation is handled properly, it can have a very clear
impact on countries . . . like
According to Handzlik, Libya first signaled its willingness to begin
cooperating on nonproliferation issues by signing the International Code of
Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, also known as the Hague Code
of Conduct (HCOC), at a conference in the Netherlands on Nov. 25, 2002. While
not legally binding, the HCOC is intended "to supplement, not
supplant," the MTCR, and is administered collectively by all the signatory
countries, according to a State Department fact sheet. The HCOC calls for
greater restraint in developing, testing, using, and spreading ballistic
missiles, according to a Netherlands Foreign Ministry fact sheet. "It does
not prohibit states from owning ballistic missiles nor from benefiting from the
peaceful use of outer space. But to increase transparency and reduce mistrust
among subscribing states, it introduces confidence-building measures such as
the obligation to announce missile launches in advance," the fact sheet
reads.
Handzlik said
Monterey, CA, the Soviet Union during the 1970s provided Libya with Scud-B
missiles with a range of up to 300 km. Libya allegedly also has Scud-C variants
with a range of up to 550 km. "Libya encountered various difficulties in
developing an effective indigenous missile production capability and has
allegedly relied on foreign suppliers, mainly European nations, China, and
North Korea," a December 2003 CNS report reads.
a "reported range" of 950 km, according to CNS, but has not completed
it nor
tested it.
“China Seeks to Join Missile
Nonproliferation Regime,” By Mike Nartker,
Global Security Newswire, February 5,
2004
Talks
are set to begin later this month that could lead to Chinese membership in the
primary international effort to restrict missile proliferation.
The first of at least three planned rounds of talks on
A second round of talks will discuss export control regulatory systems,
Handzlik said, and future talks will focus on political issues, such as Chinese
nonproliferation policy and the possibility of Beijing joining the Hague Code
of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The code, launched last
year and now with more than 100 members, calls
on subscribers to exercise “maximum possible restraint” in developing and
deploying ballistic missiles and to avoid aiding the missile programs of any
countries that might be
developing weapons of mass destruction. Despite the planned talks, Handzlik
warned yesterday that
possible date”.
A U.S. State Department official today, however, characterized this month’s
talks as “technical” discussions between Chinese and MTCR officials. The
official told Global
Security Newswire that the meeting does not have a “membership focus.” Over the
last few months,
to implement such provisions in their national export control systems. Also in
December,
“Traditional
Suppliers”
During his speech yesterday, Handzlik described his efforts over the last year
as MTCR chairman to reach out to other countries and to increase the regime’s
membership. For example, Handzlik said he visited
industry levels has made
Delhi
Countries of Concern
Handzlik also said that he has opened diplomatic channels with several
countries of proliferation concern, including
had offered ballistic missile technology. According to reports, though,
positive effect on other Middle Eastern countries, especially
Other Countries
In his speech yesterday, Handzlik said that several other countries not
traditionally seen as suppliers or as proliferation concerns are also seeking
increased ties with the MTCR, specifying
supports the “deliberate, prudent expansion” of the MTCR.
President Bush offered several proposals to halt the
proliferation of unconventional weapons, saying the world must confront the
dangers of the post-September 11 world "with open eyes and unbending
purpose." The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of
secret and sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear
weapons," he said a speech at the
Bush urged the Nuclear Suppliers Group -- the
roughly 40 nations that provide most of the world's nuclear technology -- to
refuse to sell designs and equipment to any country not already capable of
making nuclear fuel if they refuse to renounce efforts to enrich or reprocess
the fuel. "This step will prevent new states from developing the means to
produce fissile material for nuclear bombs," Bush said. The president
proposed that nations restrict the sale of nuclear technology to countries that
do not agree to vigorous inspections by the IAEA to ensure their nuclear
programs are for peaceful purposes. His called for the creation of a special
IAEA committee to focus on safeguards and verifications. He said that only
countries in good standing and not under investigation for nuclear violations
should be allowed to serve on the IAEA board of governors. Bush noted that
2. “Bush Administration
Modifies Export Control Lists,” Global
Security Newswire, January 21, 2004 (for personal use only).
As part of a four-year interagency review of the
3. “
4. “Illinois Company Settles Charges of Illegal
Exports to
The U.S. Department of Commerce today
announced that Global Dynamics Corporation (Global), of
The U.S. Department of Commerce today announced that
Emcore Corporation (Emcore) of
The Additional Protocol, by expanding the application
of the U.S. Safeguards Agreement to civil nuclear activities, subjects
additional
BIS has a successful history of assisting industry to
comply with the only other international arms control treaty that directly
affects
(1)
Demonstrating industry compliance;
(2) Emphasizing the protection of confidential information; and
(3) Minimizing burdens and costs to industry.
This approach has been
successful from a compliance standpoint and has been commended by the largest
domestic chemical industry trade group. We intend to implement the industry
compliance provisions of the Additional Protocol following these same
principles.
Industry
Outreach
As was
done in preparation for CWC implementation, BIS will conduct seminars, training and other
outreach to industry in order to assist companies in understanding and
implementing their declaration and complementary access obligations. We will
also offer site assistance visits to companies that seek help in preparing for
inspections. A primary focus of such outreach is to assist companies in
identifying and protecting proprietary and other sensitive information and
technology.
7. “Hearing to Examine
Export Rules for Cruise Missiles, UAVs,” By Marc Selinger,
Aerospace Daily, January 30, 2004 (for personal use
only)
A House panel has scheduled a March 9 hearing to scrutinize the
effectiveness of
8. “The Department of Homeland
Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-Based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS
Development Program,” GAO-04-341R,
January 30, 2003.
Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) faces significant challenges in adapting a military
counter-MANPADS system to commercial aircraft. These challenges include
establishing system requirements, maturing technology and design, and setting
reliable cost estimates. For instance, DHS has to account for a wide variety of
aircraft types in designing and integrating the system. Our past work on the
best practices of product developers in government and industry has found that
the use of a knowledge-based approach is a key factor in successfully
addressing such challenges. This approach includes the use of exit criteria or
controls to ensure that sufficient knowledge has been attained at critical
phases of the product development process. Based on input we provided during
the course of our review, DHS updated its initial solicitation to incorporate
these knowledge-based exit criteria. We think this a positive first step, and
we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that the
knowledge-based approach is fully implemented throughout the course of its
counter-MANPADS development program. DHS fully concurred.
DHS Faces Challenges in Adapting
Military Counter-MANPADS System to
Commercial Aircraft
In proceeding through
Phases I and II of the counter-MANPADS development program, DHS intends to
establish system requirements, mature technology and design, and set reliable
cost estimates. Such issues are interrelated and their resolution will have a
direct impact on DHS’s ability to effectively implement its program. A brief
discussion of these program issues follows:
·
Requirements involving new
technologies, system maintenance, system integration, and system security for
the counter-MANPADS system are to be developed and this may involve trade-offs
between competing objectives. For example, DHS intends to study the trade-off
of system performance objectives with total cost to derive the most effective
solution at a realistic life-cycle cost.
·
Technology and design problems include a high
false alarm rate affecting the current generation of Missile Warning Systems
(MWS) used by the military; changes needed to adapt military countermeasures to
commercial aircraft; and the use of classified jam codes by civilian aircrews.
MWS’s current high false alarm rate may increase system failures. Whenever the
MWS detects a missile launch, the system cycles. If a false alarm has been
received and the system is cycling unnecessarily,
it will reach its mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) rate threshold much faster.
A new MWS that would resolve this issue is being developed but is not yet
mature. The solicitation also requires a “call back notification system” that
would alert air traffic controllers once it detects a missile launch, but it
has not been developed. A MWS with a high false alarm rate connected to a call
back system could cause unnecessary airport closures. The DHS solicitation also
requires a system reliability MTBF rate of greater than 3,000 hours—10 times
the current rate for DIRCM systems on military aircraft of 300 hours. A low
reliability rate drives the operations and support costs and the ability of the
airlines to maintain the system. DHS also intends to require a common system
attached to the wide variety of commercial aircraft, even though the design,
placement, and integration of this system are all unknowns that will affect
each aircraft type differently. For example, a system container that causes a
1-percent excess drag on a Boeing 747 aircraft will cause greater drag on a
smaller 737-model aircraft, which will affect the airlines’ fuel consumption
and increase costs. Design issues surround the classified jam codes used in
DIRCM. Military pilots are cleared to handle the classified material and
military aircraft are safeguarded, but DHS has not yet developed a plan to
handle the classified material and safeguard the hardware on a commercial
aircraft. According to DHS officials, any system developed will need to have a
tamper-proof design.
·
Operational
test requirements are not clearly specified by the solicitation.
DHS
compressed its development cycle to comply with congressional direction.
According to program officials, DHS has acted to reduce the time and cost
required to conduct testing by having the contractor conduct required testing.
However, DHS intends to approve both test concepts and the test plans. They
stated that DHS will closely monitor all contractor conducted testing to ensure
tests are correctly executed and accurately reported. Finally, operational
testing will be conducted on DOD ranges using its test facilities. DOD uses
independent live fire and operational test and evaluation that are not under
the control of the developers to demonstrate that the developed system is suitable
and effective before authorizing full-scale production.
· Reliable cost estimates regarding the
procurement, integration, operation,
and
support of DIRCM system on commercial aircraft do not currently exist.
DHS
intends to conduct its own cost estimates and also require independent
analysis,
which will be difficult because (1) DHS does not know how many
units
will be required and, therefore, cannot determine a price based on
economies
of scale; (2) costs for integrating the system on different types of
aircraft
are not yet determined; and (3) the reliability rate is unknown and
therefore
operations and support costs are difficult to estimate. In addition, the
production of a large number of countermeasure systems quickly would probably
require a significant capital investment to increase production capacity. An
industry official placed their current production capability at roughly four
DIRCM systems per month. According to a program official, DHS does not
currently know how many or what combination of the estimated 6,800 aircraft in
the U.S. fleet might be equipped. One option would
be
to initially equip the planes of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), but doing
even
that could take years.
International Export
Control Developments
Pakistan
1. “Bleak future
for Pakistan's 'bomb hero',” By David Blair, The Daily Telegraph, February
07, 2004 (for personal use only)
The call to prayer echoed over Islamabad from a mighty mosque
yesterday but the sound of Islamic devotion brought no apparent response from
the home of Pakistan's most decorated citizen - and one of the world's most
dangerous men.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, the self-styled "father" of Pakistan's nuclear
bomb and the man now revealed to have sat at the centre of a conspiracy to arm
the world's most radical anti-western states with nuclear weapons, lives behind
elaborate wrought iron gates. It is clearly the home of a wealthy man but he is
not free to leave.
Mr Khan was born in Bhopal, British
India, 11 years before the creation of Pakistan. He stayed in Bhopal throughout
the communal massacres that accompanied Partition and, according to his
official biographer, witnessed trains pulling into the local station carrying
nothing but the bodies of Muslims killed by Hindu gangs. When he emigrated to
Pakistan in 1952, he brought a deep hatred of India. "Hindus are
crooks," Mr Khan told his biographer. "They are dreaming of
destroying Pakistan." He might have been an ardent Pakistani nationalist
but Mr Khan did not stay long in his new homeland. After a few years at Karachi
University, he moved to Holland where he took a masters in electrical
engineering at Delft university in 1963. Next came a doctorate in metallurgy
from Leuven University in Belgium. When he achieved fame in Pakistan, Mr Khan
would often pose as a "nuclear scientist". In fact, he has no
academic background in nuclear physics. He revels in his hatred of the West.
"I want to question the bloody holier-than-thou attitudes of the Americans
and the British," he has written. "Are these bastards God-appointed
guardians of the world?" In one interview, he said: "All western
countries, including Israel, are not only the enemies of Pakistan but, in fact,
of Islam." Yet the West had its uses for Mr Khan. In 1975, he spent three
months on secondment with Urenco, an Anglo-Dutch consortium based in Holland
that dealt in uranium reprocessing.
By chance, Urenco had acquired a new centrifuge which could enrich uranium to
weapons-grade level. It was classic "dual use" technology. Mr Khan promptly acquired detailed
drawings and blueprints. He asked for the help of a Dutch friend, Fritz
Veerman, who innocently photographed the centrifuge design. In December 1975,
Mr Khan returned to Pakistan laden with his haul of nuclear know-how. These
blueprints would form the basis not only of Pakistan's nuclear program but also
those of Iran, Libya and North Korea. A Dutch court later convicted Mr Khan of
espionage and theft and sentenced him to four years in jail in absentia. The
sentence was quashed on a technicality. Straight after Mr Khan's return,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then prime minister, placed him in charge of Pakistan's
nuclear programme. Bhutto had famously said that "if India builds the
bomb", Pakistanis would "eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we
will get one of our own". India had tested a bomb in 1974, so Pakistan's
nuclear programme became a national obsession. Mr Khan was given a secret
nuclear facility - Kahuta research laboratory, 20 miles south-east of Islamabad
- and told to build a bomb.
The army treated the nuclear program as
its domain and Ms Bhutto was barred from visiting the Kahuta plant, re-named
the Khan Research Laboratory. Gen Musharraf has insisted that no one in the
military hierarchy knew what was happening but a senior military source said that
the army chiefs of the day must have known about the help given first to Iran
and Libya and later to North Korea. Many Pakistanis resent western criticism of
their nuclear capability and suspect a conspiracy. "America, Israel and
India want to destroy our bomb," said Hussam ul-Haq, whose brother, Islam
ul-Haq, worked as Mr Khan's principal secretary and is now in detention.
"That is what this is all about. They are the axis of evil in our
minds." As Mr Khan paces his garden, filled with exotic birds, he probably
won't reflect that the ultimate weapon, intended to earn Pakistan respect, has
instead brought the label of rogue state.
In another apparent link to
the nuclear black market emanating from Pakistan, United Nations inspectors in
Iran have discovered undeclared designs of an advanced centrifuge used to
enrich uranium. The diplomats said preliminary investigations suggested that the design
matched drawings of enrichment equipment found in Libya that was supplied
through a network headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. The
revelations came a day after U.S. President Bush, in a keynote speech,
acknowledged loopholes in the international enforcement system and urged the
U.N. and member states to draw up laws that spell out criminal penalties for
nuclear trafficking. Khan, a national hero in Pakistan for creating a nuclear
deterrent against India, confessed on Pakistani television last week to
masterminding a network that supplied Libya, Iran and North Korea with nuclear
technology. President Pervez Musharraf then pardoned him.
Beyond adding a
link to the chain of equipment, middlemen and companies comprising the
clandestine nuclear network supplying weapons-related technology to rogue
governments, the find cast doubt Tehran's willingness to open its nuclear
activities to international inspection. Accused of having nuclear weapons
ambitions, Iran -- which denies the charge -- agreed late last year to throw
open its programs to pervasive inspections by the Vienna-based International
Atomic Energy Agency and said it would freely provide information to clear up
international suspicions. But the diplomats, who spoke on condition of anonymity,
said Iran did not volunteer the designs. Instead, they said, IAEA inspectors
had to dig for them. "Coming up with them is an example of real good
inspector work," one of the diplomats told The Associated Press.
"They took information and put it together and put something in front of
them that they can't deny." At less enriched levels, uranium is normally
used to generate power. Highly enriched, it can be used for nuclear warheads.
Iran -- which says it sought to make low enriched uranium -- has bowed to
international pressure and suspended all enrichment. But it continues to make
and assemble centrifuges, a development that critics say also throws into
question its commitment to dispel suspicions about its nuclear aims.
The United
States and its allies interpret enrichment suspension as encompassing the whole
process -- including a halt in assemblage of related equipment. U.S. State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher warned last month that failure by Iran to
indefinitely suspend "all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities
would be deeply troubling."
The IAEA
continues to negotiate with Iran on what constitutes suspension, but Mohamed
ElBaradei, the agency's director general, also is known to be seeking a
commitment from Iran to stop and assembling centrifuges. The diplomats said
Iran had not yet formally explained why the advanced centrifuge designs were
not voluntarily handed over to the agency as part of its pledge to disclose all
past and present activities that could be linked to weapons. "They'll
probably say it's an oversight," said one of them.
4. “Musharraf Rejects Outside
Investigation of Pakistani Nuclear Smuggling,” Global Security Newswire, February 6, 2004
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said yesterday
that he would not provide international nuclear inspectors with documents
related to Pakistan’s internal probe of proliferation activities by its nuclear
scientists. Musharraf yesterday pardoned the “father” of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, for transferring nuclear technology to
Iran, Libya and North Korea. Musharraf said he based his decision to
pardon Khan, who he called “my hero,” on the scientist’s role in developing
Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. “No one can negate it, no one can cancel it, no one can
disprove it,” Musharraf said of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. “This hero has
given us grace and respect,” he added. Musharraf yesterday, though, also said
that Pakistan would not share documents from its investigation with
international inspectors, nor would he order an independent investigation into
the possible role of the Pakistani military in any nuclear transfers. He
added that he would never allow the United Nations to supervise Pakistan’s
nuclear program. “Negative to all three,” Musharraf said. “It is an
independent nation. Nobody comes inside
and checks our things. We check them ourselves,” he said.
The United
States yesterday praised Musharraf for disbanding one of the world’s largest
nuclear proliferation networks. “The actions of Pakistan have broken up this
network,” White House press secretary Scott McClellan said. McClellan also said
the White House believes Musharraf’s assertions that the military was not
involved in any transfers. “President Musharraf provided us assurances that the
government of Pakistan was not involved in any kind of proliferation
activities,” he said. “We value those assurances and his actions since he
made those assurances demonstrate his commitment to the issue of
proliferation,” McClellan added. Outside experts, though, had mixed reactions
to the news of Musharraf’s pardon of Khan. “I can think of no one who deserves
less to be pardoned,” former chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq David Kay
said. Some have said that Khan’s pardon may be a type of plea bargain designed
to gain additional information on nuclear smuggling. “We could beat our chests
and be outraged,” said former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley, but
“the most important thing is to get as much information [as] possible as to
where the links (to accomplices) were. … We have to make sure it doesn’t happen
again,” he said. Pakistani opposition lawmakers have expressed outrage at the
treatment of Khan, who is seen by many in Pakistan as a national hero. “The
people of Pakistan clearly feel that the apology and confession obtained from
Dr. Qadeer Khan were obtained under pressure, while the world feels the whole
process has basically been a cover-up,” said opposition lawmaker Chaudhry Nisar
Ali Khan. Khan said a parliamentary inquiry was needed to investigate whether
Musharraf capitulated to foreign pressure in his treatment of Khan.
5.
“Pakistani Takes Blame for Nuclear Transfers; Top Arms Scientist Tells Nation
He Erred but Acted on his Own,” By David Rohde, The International Herald Tribune, February 5, 2004 (for
personal use only)
In an extraordinary announcement, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the revered
founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, appeared on national television,
admitted that he had shared Pakistani nuclear technology with other countries,
and asked the nation for forgiveness. "I take full responsibility for my
actions and seek your pardon," the scientist, once one of the most
powerful men in Pakistan, said in a soft voice.
He said that he had acted entirely on his own and that he had not had
permission from his superiors to share the technology. "There was never, ever any kind of
authority for these activities from the government," he said. His
statement, which his supporters said was coerced and humiliating, marked an
ignoble end for a scientist lauded in Pakistan but derided in the West.
Pakistani government officials said the country's National Command Authority, a
group of senior military and civilian officials who oversee Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal, met Wednesday evening to decide whether to prosecute Khan and six of
his aides accused of carrying out the proliferation. A senior official said the
president of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, would announce the
government's decision Thursday, although Pakistani analysts said it was
unlikely that Khan would be prosecuted.
On Sunday, a senior Pakistani official said a government investigation had
found that the scientist had shared Pakistan's nuclear technology with Iran,
Libya and North Korea for more than a decade. In what appears to be one of the
most successful efforts to evade antiproliferation controls in history, Khan
sent nuclear-weapons related parts, plans and designs to the three countries
with the aid of middlemen from Sri Lanka, Germany and the Netherlands.
Analysts have said that it would have been nearly impossible for Khan to have
passed on such information without the tacit approval of the country's powerful
military, and a series of carefully scripted events Wednesday appeared to be
designed to quickly put the issue to rest.
Khan was convicted of stealing plans for a high-speed centrifuge, which
can be used to produce enriched uranium, a key component in a nuclear bomb,
from a European company in the 1970's. The conviction was overturned on appeal.
In Pakistan, he was hailed for achieving a miracle by overcoming a huge
American effort to prevent Pakistan from acquiring the technology to enrich
uranium. He is the only Pakistani to have been twice awarded the nation's
highest civilian award. Khan is rumored to own dozens of houses across
Pakistan. American investigators suspect that he has profited handsomely from
the nuclear black market. Senior Pakistani officials told them that Khan said
he had shared technology with three to four other Muslim countries in the hope
that the creation of more nuclear-armed Muslim nations would ease Western
attention on Pakistan's program. A senior official said Khan had no good answer
for why he shared technology with North Korea. "None of his explanations
were satisfactory," the official said.
Malaysia
6. “Malaysian Authorities
Investigate Domestic Firm for Nuclear Smuggling,” Global Security Newswire, February 5, 2004
Malaysian authorities are investigating whether a
company there supplied uranium enrichment centrifuge components to Libya, the
Associated Press reported today. The company, Scomi Precision Engineering Sdn.
Bhd., also known as SCOPE, produced centrifuge components that were intercepted
en route to Libya in October, national police chief Mohamed Bakri Omar said
today. In a statement, Bakri said U.S. and British intelligence had
informed Malaysia in November about a transaction involving SCOPE and a
businessman based in United Arab Emirates who brokered a deal “supplying
certain centrifuge components from Malaysia for Libya’s uranium enrichment
program.”
Wooden boxes
marked with SCOPE’s name and containing centrifuge components were found on a
ship seized in Italy in October heading for Libya, Bakri said. A company
spokeswoman said today, though, that there had been no obligation to inform the
government of export beyond routine customs procedures. An official in the
prime minister’s office, though, denied any government involvement. “Malaysia
was an unwitting participant in all this,” the official said.
7. “Salesman on Nuclear
Circuit Casts Blurry Corporate Shadow,” By Raymond Bonner, New York Times, February 18, 2004 (for personal use only)
It has
lately begun to seem as if B. S. A. Tahir, a prominent businessman here, had
two faces. Acquaintances describe Mr. Tahir, who is in his middle 40's, was a
soft-spoken husband and father who lives in an upper-middle-class suburb of
Kuala Lumpur and has a passion for fast cars and flashy clothes. He has a
financial interest in a fine-chocolates franchise in a shopping mall in
fashionable Bangsur that was opened a couple of years ago by the wife of a top
politician. Nearby is a gourmet date shop that he also partly owns. In
addition, Mr. Tahir has been director of an investment holding company called
Kaspadu, until recently owned by his wife in partnership with the son of the
country's current prime minister and another prominent businessman. But
investigators are trying to determine whether Mr. Tahir's legitimate businesses
here have been a cover for nuclear black-market activities, a senior Malaysian
official said. President Bush, in a speech last week at the National Defense
University, called him the "chief financial officer and money
launderer" of an illicit operation headed by the Pakistani nuclear
scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. That operation has been accused of providing Iran,
North Korea
and Libya with technology for making atom bombs.
Investigators say Mr. Tahir put together a deal two years ago for a Malaysian
company, Scomi Precision Engineering, to make nuclear-centrifuge parts for
Libya, apparently without telling the company where the parts were going,
according to company officials and corporate documents. The deal was exposed
last October when a ship destined for Libya, the BBC China, was seized in the
Mediterranean. Scomi Precision's parent, the Scomi Group, is principally owned
by Kaspadu, the holding company linked to Mr. Tahir, according to corporate
documents on file with a government regulatory agency here.
Investigators say Mr. Tahir, a Sri Lankan who came to Malaysia in the mid-90's
by way of Dubai, may have been sent by Mr. Khan to secretly procure nuclear
parts. They also suspect this was not the first time or country in which Mr.
Tahir carried out an operation to acquire nuclear matériel, one senior
investigator said, adding that in Malaysia, Mr. Tahir had
"replicated" earlier operations — though the details of those are
still unknown.
Investigators have discovered that Mr. Tahir apparently traveled widely to
carry out his nuclear-technology business. On one occasion, they say, he went
to Casablanca, Morocco, to negotiate with Libyans for the purchase of the
centrifuge parts, which are important in making fuel for bombs. On a trip to
Switzerland, they say, he met with an
engineer who came to Kuala Lumpur to supervise production of the parts. Mr. Tahir also made trips to Germany and
Turkey to meet with suppliers, the investigators said. A Malaysian official
said Mr. Tahir's network included two father-and-son teams, one British and one
Swiss. In recent weeks, it appears Mr. Tahir has taken steps to cover up his
past. His wife sold her shares in Kaspadu, some of them to the Malaysian prime
minister's son, Kamaluddin Abdullah. In addition, a Dubai computer company that
Western investigators say Mr. Tahir was using as a front has removed evidence
of his involvement from its Web site. He has not been arrested, but is under
constant and close
surveillance by Malaysian authorities, who say he declines to comment publicly.
Nor did Mr. Kamaluddin respond to requests for interviews made at his home and
his business. Bukhary Seyed Abu Tahir was born in Tamil Nadu, India, on April
17, 1959, according to the Sri Lankan Embassy and corporate papers. When he was
about 5, his family moved to Sri Lanka.
He later returned to New Delhi to study, and it was during this time that an
uncle met Dr. Khan, according to investigators. The uncle had a business that
supplied parts to Dr. Khan's operation. In his early 20's, Mr. Tahir moved to
Dubai and opened a shop, SMB Computers, using his father's initials. He was
successful, and together with his brother, Seyed Ibrahim Bukhary, he helped the
company grow into SMB Group, which
has computer sales and services operations throughout the Middle East. In a
brief telephone conversation last week, Mr. Bukhary refused to answer any
questions, saying only that his brother had no current financial interest in
SMB Group and was not involved in the management.
Two weeks ago, the SMB Group's Web site implied a different story. For
instance, a press release from 2002, which announced that SMB Computers had
signed a "megadeal" with the United Arab Emirates Air Force, listed
Mr. Tahir as the managing director. That press release no longer appears on the
site. In the mid-90's, Mr. Tahir showed up in Kuala Lumpur, according to
Malaysian officials. Most notable among his new friends was Mr. Kamaluddin, son
of the country's foreign minister, Abdullah Badawi, who is now prime minister.
There was also Shah Hakim Zain, who was on the verge of joining the
"movers and shakers," to quote a recent article in a Malaysian
business magazine. Mr. Kamaluddin and Mr. Hakim had an investment company named
Kaspadu, according to records at the Companies Commission of Malaysia, a
regulatory agency. In 1998, Mr. Tahir married a cousin of Mr. Hakim's, Nazimah
Binti Syed Jajid. She was put on the Kaspadu board, but stepped down in
December 2000 and was replaced by Mr. Tahir,
who served until early 2003. He then stepped down and she rejoined the board,
according to corporate documents. Two weeks ago, after Mr. Tahir's reported
involvement with
the Libya-bound shipment became public, Ms. Nazimah sold her shares in Kaspadu
to Mr. Kamaluddin and Mr. Hakim, according to documents and Malaysian
officials. Kaspadu is the principal shareholder of the Scomi Group.
8. “Malaysia Pledges Cooperation on Nuclear
Investigation,” Associated Press, February
13, 2004 (for personal use only)
Malaysia
pledged on Thursday to share with Washington information from its
investigation of a man that US President George W Bush has described as a major
player in a vast network trafficking nuclear technology.
Prime Minister Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi, alluding to police comments that investigators had so far found
no evidence of wrongdoing by the company that made the parts, declared:
"There is no such thing as Malaysia's involvement. We are not involved in
any way. I don't know where Bush is getting his evidence from. "A senior
official, speaking on condition of anonymity, did not deny a Malaysian
connection, but said Bush had "overblown Malaysia's role in this. Making
Malaysia the central conduit to this is misleading.
EU
9. “EU Invitees Must Improve Export Controls,” by Scott Jones, CITS Senior Research Associate, Defense News, 26 January, 2004 (for
personal use only)
This year, 10 more countries will join the European
Union, expanding its free trade zone to the borders of Russia and the Middle
East. The free movement of capital, goods, services and people bodes well for
member countries’ economies, but complicates efforts to stop the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. The threat that WMD might be acquired by
terrorists or developed by states such as North Korea is the defining national
security imperative of our time. Keeping nuclear, chemical and biological
materials safe from thieves is key, but contemporary proliferation is driven
less by theft than by the purchase of WMD-relevant goods and technology.
Governments and private groups exploit weaknesses in the
export control system, such as inadequately enforced transshipment points,
meager intelligence resources and disparate compliance practices among supplier
states.
The United
States and many European countries, especially Germany, strengthened their
export controls after the West’s complicity in arming Iraq was revealed. Even
more important, the European Union (EU) created a dual-use export control
regime that binds its members and invited countries alike. And the union has a
new WMD policy, the “Action Plan for the Implementation of the Basic Principles
for an EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
which was hammered out after coalition forces overthrew the Ba’ath regime in
Iraq. It prescribes tighter controls over strategic goods and technologies,
especially fissile materials. The long-sought policy consensus was helped along
by the coming enlargement, which pushes the union’s territory to the borders of
Ukraine, Belarus and more of Russia. But the control systems among the incoming
EU nations are less developed than those of the 15 current members. And only
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland subscribe to all the multilateral export
control agreements. (The other invitees are Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.) Their admission on May 1 may create
weak points in the free trade zone’s borders. Bulgaria and Romania hope to join
by 2007, while Turkey is still negotiating its membership schedule. Most of
these members-to-be were former targets of the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls, and began export control development efforts only
within the last decade. Many of their systems do not meet regime or EU
standards. For example, a 2002 EU Commission report noted that Malta “is not a
member of any of the non-proliferation regimes and does not apply controls on
the full range of products covered by the EU export control regime on dual-use
goods. In this area, as others, Malta will have to assume the obligations of
the acquis communitaire, the body of EU laws.
And
the matter will soon grow more urgent. The new dual-use regulations liberalize
intra-community trade and limit members’ ability to impose restrictions.
Further liberalization is likely, given the combination of qualified majority
voting and the commission’s exclusive right of initiative. Some fear these will
allow commercial considerations to prevail over security concerns. Efforts to
improve invitees’ export-control systems have received more rhetorical than
substantive support from Brussels and the member countries. This must change.
One possible concrete step is adding the new EU members automatically to the
multilateral export control arrangements, although this would not necessarily
force them to make the required procedural adjustments. A better step would be
to follow the leads of Sweden and the United Kingdom in providing more export
control assistance to the members-to-be. Traditionally, Brussels has merely
coordinated such assistance efforts, leaving strategic trade and security
issues to the purview of the member states. Now the European Union must do
more, lest the expanding group contribute, however inadvertently, to
proliferation.
10. “EU and
Russia Start Talks on Nuclear Exports,”
RosBusinessConsulting Database,
February 3, 2004 (for personal
use only)
The European Union and
Russia are beginning intensive talks on the possibility of exporting Russian
nuclear products, such as uranium and enriched uranium, from Russia to the EU.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko declared.
Khristenko underlined that Russia hoped these talks would be finished before
May 1, 2004. During the talks, Russia plans to insist on maintaining long-term
contracts for supplies of fuel for nuclear power plants located in countries
that are expected to join the EU soon. "
Germany
11. “Germany Drops Charges Against
Man Suspected of Aiding Nuclear Smuggling to North Korea,” Global Security Newswire, January 8, 2004
A German court
dropped accusations against a 33-year-old businessman that he assisted a failed
smuggling operation to help North Korea build gas centrifuges for enriching
uranium, Agence France-Presse reported today. In exchange for the dropped
charges, Marc Wiese was ordered to pay a $12,680 fine for his “low degree of
guilt” in the operation, according to Stuttgart state court spokesman Reiner
Skujat. Prosecutors accused Wiese and two other men of attempting to ship 214
aluminum tubes through China to North Korea. The primary suspect in the
smuggling operation, Hans-Werner Truppel, could be sentenced to 15 years in
prison for violating German export regulations and “furthering the production
of a nuclear weapon.”
Netherlands
12.
“Netherlands Probing Suspected Centrifuge-Related Diversions,” By Mark Hibbs , Nucleonics Week, January 22, 2004 (for personal use only)
The Netherlands government Jan. 19 confirmed that its domestic
intelligence agency Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) is
investigating suspected diversion of know-how and possibly materials related to
centrifuge enrichment to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, in part via third
parties in and from Pakistan. A similar investigation is also underway in
Germany, Western officials said.
Data which has come to light suggest that uranium enrichment programs in Iran,
North Korea, and Libya are all based on original and virtually identical Urenco
centrifuge design information featuring G-1 rotor tube segments 1,000
millimeters in length which may be connected by a bellows to replicate the G-2
centrifuge. In the case of Iran and Libya, the rotor tubes are made of
aluminum. Western officials said last year U.S. intelligence suspected that
North Korea's program was based on using G-1 maraging steel rotor tube segments
to build the G-2 centrifuge.
While evidence indicates that the rotor tubes show basic identity, Western
officials said the centrifuges also share key fingerprints which point to
certain engineering breakthroughs made by Urenco over previous generic
Zippe-type centrifuges. ''The true signatures for these (G-type) machines,''
one European centrifuge expert said, ''are in components such as lower bearing
assemblies and bellows, and in gas-withdrawal systems.'' A Dutch businessman and engineer who was
exonerated in a 1980 investigation related to the export of a large consignment
of maraging steel to Pakistan, and who in 1985 was convicted for illegal export
of dual-use equipment to
Pakistan, more recently has been prevented from exporting other commodities to
that country from Amsterdam and Vienna by lack of export authorizations. Last
year, the same individual was involved in setting up the Eighth International
Symposium on Advanced Materials (ISAM-2003), sponsored by the KRL in Islamabad.
The organizing committee for ISAM-2003 included another scientist at the University
of Leuven who had worked with A.Q. Khan in Europe during the 1970s.
According to Frank Slijper, a Groningen researcher into the Dutch arms trade,
the Leuven scientist during the 1990s was appointed as a director of the Ghulam
Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering, Science & Technology, where he joined
A.Q. Khan. In 1972, the two scientists had co-authored a textbook on physical
metallurgy.
The list of sponsors for ISAM-2003 also included the firm Gemco Pakistan
(Pvt.). Its listed business activities are similar to those of a Dutch firm
named Gemco, but the Eindhoven-based company has denied there is any formal
connection with the Pakistan organization. Historical personnel links between
the two firms may be probed by investigators, sources said this week.
13. “US to Keep Focus
on Lithuania's Control of Radioactive Materials,” Baltic News Service, February 5, 2004 (for personal use only)
The United States will
continue to keep its focus on the strengthening of radiation control on Lithuanian
borders and on Russian transit trains going via Lithuania, says Paul M.
Longsworth of the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. The organization granted
Lithuania some modern radiation measuring equipment, which will help detect
attempts to transport weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous
substances. The equipment was officially handed to the border guards at the
Vilnius Airport. The technical assistance project is estimated at about 4
million U.S. dollars, with approximately half of the amount paid for the
special equipment. In Longsworth's words, the United States have already
granted 22 million U.S. dollars on various radiation security improvement and
control programs in Lithuania. A part of the amount was spent to improve safety
at the Soviet-built Ignalina Nuclear
Power Plant.
Longsworth described as "very successful" and "productive"
the cooperation of the National Nuclear
Security Administration with the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service, the Customs Department and other
institutions of the Baltic state. The administration's officials visited 41
locations in Lithuania that use radioactive substances, including scientific
research and medical institutions.
Libya
14. “Libyan Nuclear
Procurement Network Was Greater Than Expected, Experts Find,” Global Security Newswire, January 22,
2004
While Libya’s nuclear weapons program was only in its
initial stages when its leader Col. Muammar Qadhafi decided to disclose and
dismantle it, Tripoli had established an extensive procurement network to
obtain the needed technologies and expertise for its efforts. At the time
Qadhafi disclosed his program last month, Libya had acquired most of the
components needed to produce thousands of uranium enrichment centrifuges based
on an advanced German design. Most of the materials for Libya’s nuclear
efforts came from Asian and European countries and were shipped via the United
Arab Emirates, with some shipments moving through additional
countries. According to David Albright, president of Institute for Science
and International Security, Libya also had “real time” access to nuclear
expertise. “This is a major intelligence failure and a major failure of export
controls,” Albright said. He also said that the response of the intelligence
community to the scope of Libya’s nuclear procurement effort is likely to rival
that created by the discovery of Iraq’s nuclear efforts in the 1990s. A senior
U.S. official said yesterday that the United States had been aware of Libya’s
efforts, which increased after U.N. sanctions were suspended in 1999. “The
procurement program was across the board, not only on the nuclear
side. They were buying for quite some time and a lot of stuff was still in
shipping crates because they were just getting it in,” the senior U.S. official
said. “It was what we thought they were up to,” the official added. The
senior U.S. official also said that “there are still shipments that have to be
dealt with”.
Meanwhile, a
senior U.S. official said yesterday that Libya has been cooperating fully with
a team of U.S. and British experts there examining how best to dismantle Libyan
WMD programs, according to Reuters. “As of now, the Libyans have been very
cooperative ... it’s a day-by-day thing,” the senior U.S. official said. “Nobody
has any complaints at this point,” the official added. The U.S. and British
experts are working to decide how best to dismantle and remove Libya’s nuclear
program and how to dispose of mustard gas stockpiles, which will be destroyed
in Libya, the official said. Libya has also denied possessing a biological
weapons program, but “that is a subject for further discussion,” the official
added. According to the Associated Press, a second U.S. congressional
delegation is expected to travel to Libya this weekend at Qadhafi’s invitation
to evaluate his cooperation in dismantling Libya’s nuclear program.
15. “Probe
of Libya Finds Nuclear Black Market,” By Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, Washington Post, January 24, 2004 (for personal use only)
Libya's quest for atomic weapons was aided by a sophisticated
nuclear black market that offered weapons designs, real-time technical advice
and thousands of sensitive parts -- some of them apparently manufactured in
secret factories, according to diplomats and experts familiar with the probe of
Libya's weapons program. The scale of the black-market operation -- described
by one expert as an "international supermarket" for nuclear parts --
exceeds anything seen before, and it was undetected by Western intelligence
agencies until recent months, the officials said. The same operation also is
believed to have aided Iran, they said. The smuggling enterprise supplied Libya
with thousands of parts for gas centrifuges -- machines that enrich uranium for
nuclear weapons -- as well as machine tools for making additional centrifuges,
the sources said. It also provided Libya with designs for making a nuclear
bomb, officials with the International Atomic Energy Agency revealed yesterday.
Investigators believe some of the centrifuge parts came from factories built
expressly to manufacture nuclear components for the black market -- a
development that would represent a new and problematic milestone in nuclear
proliferation. U.S. and IAEA officials are investigating one possible manufacturing
site in Malaysia, with the help of that country's government, well-placed
officials said. The site has been visited by U.S. officials in the past two
weeks, the sources said. The identities of the people behind the smuggling
operation have not been revealed, but investigators say the centrifuges
provided to Libya are of the same design as machines used in Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program. In recent weeks, Pakistan's government has begun investigating
whether its nuclear scientists sold sensitive information to Iran and possibly
others. Most of the technical assistance was aimed at helping Libya produce
enriched uranium, which can be used in weapons or in nuclear power plants. But
the discovery of actual bomb designs strongly indicates an intention to build
weapons, the officials said. The IAEA, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, disclosed
that the designs had been turned over by Libyan scientists and would soon be
removed from the country. "The bomb designs have been placed under seal in
Libya," said IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky. Details about suppliers to
Libya's clandestine nuclear program have emerged from a month-long
investigation by U.S., British and U.N. inspectors who have been given access
to formerly secret nuclear facilities in and around Tripoli. The visits were
granted in December after Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi's dramatic announcement
that he would renounce weapons of mass destruction.
Beginning in the late 1990s, Libya began
purchasing components for a relatively simple gas centrifuge made mostly of
aluminum. But after acquiring parts for about 100 machines, Libya's scientists
decided to switch to a more sophisticated centrifuge design made of a
high-strength metal called maraging steel, knowledgeable officials said. Both
types of centrifuges were developed by Pakistani scientists in the 1970s and
1980s.
Officials familiar with the investigation said Libya had arranged to purchase
10,000 of the more advanced centrifuges, enough to produce fuel for several
bombs a year.
Some of the crates examined by inspectors this month in Tripoli contained what
officials described as ready-to-assemble "kits" for centrifuges.
"Everything you needed was there," said one source. "Someone had
gathered the parts from all over and put them together. The boxes even had
company nameplates and quality-control stamps."
Other boxes contained machines and precision tools Libya would need to build
its own centrifuges, including flow-forming machines and lathes for
metalworking, the officials said.
China
16. “China, France Agree to Form Nonproliferation Task
Force,” Global Security Newswire,
January 28, 2004
China and France agreed yesterday to establish a
joint task force on arms control and nonproliferation. In a joint statement
signed yesterday in Paris by visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao and French
President Jacques Chirac, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to the
importance of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles. To that end, China and France agreed to form an arms
control and nonproliferation task force “within the framework of [a] bilateral
strategic dialogue,” as well as to increase cooperation in arms control, export
controls and nonproliferation, the joint statement says. According to the
statement, France also “welcomes” Chinese efforts to develop a national export
control system, and supports China’s membership in the Missile Technology
Control Regime “at the earliest possible date.”
In their
statement, both China and France called on other countries to observe
international nonproliferation regimes, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Both countries also agreed to work for the entry into force of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
17. “China
Applies to Join Nuclear Suppliers Group,” BBC
Monitoring International Reports, January
26, 2004 (for personal use only)
China filed a formal application here Monday (26 January) to
join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). China' permanent representative to the
United Nations and other international organizations in Vienna, Zhang Yan,
submitted the application to NSG rotating president Cho Chang-beom. Zhang also
delivered a note to Director-General of International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Muhammad al-Baradi'i, informing him of China's intention for NSG
membership. In an interview with Xinhua, Zhang said China firmly opposes the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their carriers.
As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, China strictly abides
by its international obligations and has never supported, encouraged nor helped
any nation in developing nuclear weapons, the Chinese ambassador said. In
recent years, Zhang said, China has promulgated and implemented a series of
laws and regulations concerning the control of nuclear materials and instituted
strict administration and control of nuclear exports.
He said China has held talks and consultations with the NSG in recent years and
adopted policies and mechanisms in nuclear export control similar to those of the group. Joining the NSG is a
key step for China to play a more active role in nuclear non-proliferation, a
step conducive to its efforts in seeking closer international cooperation in
this regard, Zhang added.
Russia
18. “Putin
Makes Changes in List of Exported Nuclear Materials,” ITAR-TASS News Agency, February
8, 2004 (for personal use only)
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on making
changes in the list of nuclear materials, equipment, special non-nuclear
materials and appropriate technologies, subject to export control. The document provides for the replacement of words
"isotopes of uranium" in items 2.5, 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 of the section 2
"Equipment and non-nuclear materials" of the List with words
"isotopes of natural uranium, depleted uranium or a special fissionable
material". The subdivision "Common criteria for transferring
technologies on processing, enrichment of uranium and production of heavy
water" is recognized as invalid. The document also contains an instruction
to the Russian Foreign Ministry to forward a note to the director-general of
the International Atomic Energy Agency, confirming agreement of the Russian
side with changes, made in the initial list of the Zander Committee in
compliance with a decision, taken in Vienna on September 24, 2002.
19.
“America Invites Russia to Participate in Global Intercept Initiative,” Vremya Novostei, By Andrei Zlobin,
Yelena Suponina, February 3, 2004 (for personal use only)
The United States is actively promoting President George W.
Bush's latest nonproliferation initiative. The aim is to allow ships and planes
to be intercepted in international waters or airspace if there are valid
grounds to assume that weapons of mass destruction or their components are
being smuggled. Here is an interview with US Undersecretary of State John
Bolton about the prospects of Russia's participation.
Question: Does Washington insist that Russia should join the initiative even
before the G-8 summit in the United States this summer?
John Bolton: We aren't setting a deadline or anything. But the threat of WMD
proliferation is not going to abate. The sooner we establish cooperation, the
better. Seven G-8 countries will be taking part in the Bush initiative by the
start of the summit off the coast of Georgia. It would be great to have Russia
participating as well. It would mean that the whole G-8 is involved. The
Russian government still has some questions it wants answered: how interception
will be used, how to divide responsibility, that sort of thing. I hope Moscow
will familiarize itself with our answers now and make the decision.
Question: Will blacklists be compiled of
the countries whose activities should be monitored within the framework of the
initiative?
John Bolton: Iran and North Korea are two major sources of WMD proliferation.
Still, the initiative is global. It will apply to countries that are potential
proliferators of WMD, and to terrorist organizations.
Question: There were assumptions that some Chinese companies were involved in
WMD proliferation. Does the United States still suspect China?
John Bolton: Not at all. We are still involved in debates with Beijing over
participation of some Chinese companies in WMD proliferation. We imposed sanctions
against some companies. It is a serious concern for us, and remains an
important aspect of relations between the United States and China.
Question: What about Russian companies?
John Bolton: As far as WMD proliferation is concerned, we are concerned about
all countries. We have an extensive system of export control in the United States, but even so some American
companies are involved in unlawful activities every now and then. We prosecute
them for these activities. We've worked with Russia on improving export controls for a long time now,
and much still remains to be done. We are determined to continue this work.
Cooperation within the framework of the initiative will enable all of us to
handle global problems and help Russia establish these controls.
Question: Do you think the archives seized in Iraq may include evidence of
unlawful cooperation between Russian companies and the previous Iraqi regime?
John Bolton: We are studying the documents currently, and will release them
eventually. The Iraqi documents interest us first and foremost from the point
of view of a black market for WMD, which Iraq had used for years. For all we
know, these documents may even mention American companies. We will investigate
and prosecute, if necessary.
Bulgaria
20. “Bulgarian
Government Updates Arms Exports Blacklist,” BBC
Monitoring International Reports, January
22, 2004 (for personal use only)
The Council of Ministers updated the list of countries and
organizations regarding which Bulgaria implements a ban or restrictions on the
sale and supply of arms and related materiel. The Council of Ministers decree
of 2001 was updated in the following manner: Item 7, on Iraq, was supplemented
to incorporate a ban pursuant to a common position of the EU of 7 July 2003;
Item 10, on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly called Zaire), was
supplemented to incorporate bans pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution
1493; Item 11, on Liberia, was supplemented to incorporate bans pursuant to UN
Security Council Resolutions 1497 and 1509 (of 2003).
The list is compiled in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and
with decisions adopted by the EU and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. As a UN member, Bulgaria complies with Security Council
resolutions that are mandatory for all member countries, the government's
Information Directorate said. As an EU associated country, Bulgaria applies the
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, which requires strict application of
sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and by the Council of the European
Union, as well as restrictions imposed in pursuance of other export control regulations.
Ukraine
21.
“Response of the Ukrainian Military, Scientists, and Politicians to Al-Hajat's
Publication on Kiev's Sales of Tactical Nuclear
Weapons to Al Qaeda,” Russky Kurier, By
Ivan Vorotynsky, February 11, 2004 (for personal use only)
Referring to Al-Hajat, European newspapers published articles claiming that
Usama bin-Laden's Al Qaeda bought tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine
in 1998. According to Al Qaeda, nuclear
devices fit into small attache case and Ukrainian scientists handed them over
to terrorists in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Reuters' reports indicate that the
weapons are ready now, hidden at the explosion sites or nearby.
These correspondents initiated their own investigation to try and find out if
there had been tactical nuclear
weapons in Ukraine. The first
official to mention tactical nuclear
weapons in Ukraine was the late
Alexander Lebed. He said in 1991 that almost 100 portable nuclear devices had disappeared after
disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Defense Ministry of Russia demanded
hard facts from Lebed and he failed to present any. Ukrainian expert in the
sphere of technological terrorism claims that "small nuclear devices were built in Russia
and the United States for acts of sabotage. They were not attache cases or
anything, they resembled school packs. A device like that, an equivalent of
1,000 tons TNT experts say that the bomb terrorists exploded in Moscow metro on
February 6 was an equivalent of 600 gr TNT , was a standard equipment of Soviet
special forces. These devices were to be used against deep command posts, nuclear power plants, strategic
communications, or for major seismic disasters and environmental
calamities." At the same time, the expert denounced the possibility of
theft of nuclear devices in the
Soviet Union. All of that (secrets, storage, and protection) was a prerogative
of the 12th Directorate of the Soviet Defense Ministry.
Ukrainian senior officers also deny the
idea that Ukraine possessed
small nuclear devices. Former
defense minister Alexander Kuzmuk said that the report in Al-Hajat was a lie
because all tactical nuclear
devices had been withdrawn to Russia in the early 1990's. Vladimir Gorbulin,
ex-secretary of the Ukrainian Security and Defense Council, said that Ukraine in the era of sovereignty did
not have anything to do with nuclear
ordnance or weapons. He added that after 1990 all nuclear weapons "were the province of the Russian Center of nuclear ordnance administrative
management".
Japan
22.
“Nuclear Parts from Japanese Firm said Brokered to Libya,” By Masao Shimazaki, Yomiuri Shimbun, February 8, 2004 (for
personal use only)
An unidentified broker is suspected of exporting to Libya parts for a
centrifuge to enrich uranium he had purchased from a Japanese firm, sources
close to the International Atomic Energy Agency said. The latest revelation
came after the IAEA investigated transfers of nuclear technology to Libya, Iran and other countries through the
black market by Abdul Qadeer Kahn, Pakistan's top nuclear scientist. The case
has highlighted the problem of black market brokers seeking advanced technology
from Japanese, U.S. and European companies, observers said. Calls for tighter
controls on exports and imports of nuclear
technology-related machinery and materials are expected to increase, the
observers said. According to the IAEA sources, brokers from at least five
countries have been involved in the export of nuclear technologies to Libya and Iran, with several brokers
helping Kahn sell such technology to the countries in question. Others
purchased nuclear-related parts on the black market for Iran and Libya, the
sources said. One of the brokers exported centrifuge parts he had purchased
from a Japanese firm to Libya, the sources said. The name of the Japanese
company and when the export took place were not released.
23. “Japan Offers to Aid
Cambodia in Strengthening Export Controls,” Global
Security Newswire, January 15, 2004 (for personal use only).
Japan yesterday offered to help Cambodia improve its
export control system to prevent shipments of nuclear weapons-related goods
from reaching North Korea, according to the Jiji Press Ticker Service. During
a meeting with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in Phnom Penh, Japanese trade
minister Shoichi Nakagawa proposed sending two export control specialists to
Cambodia next month.
24. “Japan, ASEAN to Meet on WMD Proliferation Export Controls,” 6 February 2004, Kyodo
News Service (for
personal use only).
Japan and members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will hold working-level talks on
export controls to stem
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Economy, Trade and
Industry Minister Shoichi Nakagawa said Friday.The move is apparently aimed at
countering North Korea's nuclear weapons development program.