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Columns::October 7, 2002
Pillar to pillar: J.W. Fanning Building will be dedicated on Oct. 10
Former education professor leaves UGA $1.7 million
D.W. Brooks Award winners announced
Study: Moms in poor, rural areas can rise above their surroundings
Tricia Kalivoda is named associate VP designee for public service and outreach
An ill wind: Researchers link human illness to sludge fertilizer
UGA welcomes new faculty
Sitting in judgment
Take it from the top
Campus News
Report: Agreements insufficient to contain weapons of mass destruction
By Kim Carlyle
kosborne@uga.edu
Last month, researchers from UGAs Center for International Trade and Security presented the results of a year-long study to the U.S. Senate. Findings of the study indicate current international agreements are insufficient to control trade of sensitive components used to make weapons of mass destruction.
Without improved international co-operation in monitoring sensitive exports, some terrorist organizations, like al-Qaida, and some countries, like Iraq and Iran, may find few barriers to acquire items needed to build weapons of mass destruction, says Mike Beck, assistant director of CITS and one of the authors of the report.
Four informal international export-control agreements--or groups--complement and support the nonproliferation treaty and other international treaties now in place. They are the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The CITS research finds that these four international agreements have serious flaws that, if left unattended, will increase the likelihood that rogue nations might obtain weapons of mass destruction. One problem identified is the growing difference among technology-supplier nations regarding security risks. Such disagreements are coupled with very informal commitments that cannot be enforced. In addition, these international agreements or groups require consensus to make changes in policy. According to the report, these rules allow even a single member to block efforts to strengthen international oversight of dangerous exports.
Russia is a particular concern, says Beck, noting that many countries that are party to these agreements are doing a poor job of enforcing export-control regulations. Russia is a party to most all international control agreements, but has impeded international co-operation aimed at controlling weapons proliferation. He points out that Russia has exported nuclear and missile technologies to such countries as Iran and India. The report also notes the need for greater international corporate responsibility about export controls dealing with sensitive technologies and goods used to build nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and weapons systems.
Many international corporations are poorly informed about licensing requirements for dual-use technologies, says Beck. Industry must play a greater role in ensuring that it knows its customers, and is certain that its customers are not in the business of making weapons of mass destruction. |
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