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Libertarian
Accounts
of Free Will
By Randolph Clarke
$49.95
Oxford University Press |
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Book assesses beliefs about free will
Most of us think that when we act we exercise free will and are
thus responsible for what we do. Most of us also think that at least
some free actions—those that are the sources of our responsibility—must
be undetermined by what precedes them. Most of us, then, endorse
libertarianism, which combines the belief that we have free will
with the belief that having free will (and being responsible) requires
indeterminism. (Libertarianism, in this sense, has no relation to
the political view of the same name).
Libertarian accounts of free will purport to tell us all that it
takes for someone to exercise free will, where one requirement is
that a basic free action must be undetermined. But this requirement
raises difficult challenges. An undetermined action, many object,
would be random or arbitrary; it could not be rational or rationally
explicable; the agent would lack control over such an occurrence.
Written by UGA associate professor of philosophy Randolph Clarke,
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will offers a balanced assessment
of libertarian accounts, defending some against some of the objections
that they face but finding none to be entirely adequate. The upshot
is that if free will and responsibility are indeed incompatible
with determinism, then free will and responsibility are impossible.
This is a troubling conclusion; if it is correct, then most of us
hold two basic beliefs about free will that cannot both be true.
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