Monday, March 29, 1999


NATO at 50
By Phil Williams

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will mark its 50th anniversary on April 4. Columns discussed NATO’s Cold War past and next century prospects with history professor William Stueck, an expert on U.S. diplomatic history during the Cold War.

Columns: How successful do you think NATO was during the Cold War?
Stueck: Some historians would argue that it was unnecessary. I believe that it was necessary and, I think, enormously successful.
When it was initially formed in 1949, there was not the anticipation in the foreseeable future of a Soviet military move into Western Europe. In fact, the original motivation for NATO was a kind of double containment: protect Western Europe on the one hand from the Soviet Union and on the other from Germany. There was a lot of concern among the other European powers about a German resurgence.
More than anything, NATO’s original goal, from the American standpoint, was to create an atmosphere of psychological comfort for Western Europe, within which, politically and economically, governments could make wise decisions that would promote prosperity over the long term. After the outbreak of the Korean War, a much more concrete military dimension emerged.

Columns: European allies have complained long and loud about American influence on NATO being too strong. Do you see the balance of power shifting in NATO?
Stueck: In a sense, it’s been shifting since 1949, because 1949 was the period of great American dominance.
As the Europeans have become stronger they have naturally become more assertive. So yes, the Europeans are more assertive, but this is nothing new.

Columns: Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO just this month. How will that addition change NATO?
Stueck: In an immediate sense, it won’t necessarily change it much at all. This of course is a very controversial move. Most academics in the United States think it’s a bad idea--that it’s not necessary.
It will cost a fair amount of money for the participants--not just the three new nations but the participating NATO members--because there will be contributions to creating a military arm in those three countries that will be a part of NATO.
But despite all the discussion and debate, the immediate impact won’t be very great at all.

Columns: Do you see tensions rising or abating between NATO and Russia in the next decade?
Stueck: I’m a historian, not a forecaster of the future, so it’s very difficult to answer that question. I just don’t know. I think there will certainly be a fair amount of anti-NATO rhetoric coming out of the Russian government. How deep-seated and how central that is to Russian foreign policy is another question altogether.

Columns: Do you think Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia or Ukraine will be invited to join NATO?
Stueck: I think there’s going to be a cooling-off period for a while to see how these three [other] new members work out in actual practice. Down the road, maybe, but I don’t think so immediately.

Columns: How about Kosovo? Can an organization like NATO really solve such intractable problems?
Stueck: Probably not--but it won’t make those problems any worse. In many ways, you have to think in terms not of solving the problems but of containing them, and I think NATO in a general sense can have a very useful function in containing them.
I think that the Kosovo situation is going to go on and on and on for a long time, but I don’t think it will be generally disruptive in Europe.

Columns: Do you think the United States should exert strong influence when European NATO allies can’t agree on strategy?
Stueck: It depends on the issue. It would have to be a very big issue, and I don’t think Kosovo is a very big issue.
It’s significant, but it’s not a major issue like needing to respond to a Russian military build-up.

Columns: Why, historically, has France been such a vocal critic of American influence in NATO?
Stueck: Because France is France--France has not accepted its declining role gracefully. Most nations in decline aren’t very graceful, and France is among the least graceful. The French still make wonderful wine and food, but they were used to being, for several centuries, a major power in Europe, and they’re not any more, and they resent it--which is perfectly normal.

Columns: If NATO’s military role fades, can its influence in other areas such as the economy increase?
Stueck: Yes. I think that in the post-Cold War era, the psychological dimension has come to considerable prominence. NATO can be an important facilitator of economic integration and prosperity simply by enhancing the climate of security that extends into Eastern Europe.

Columns: Is it possible for NATO to grow and flourish without a foe like the Soviet Union?
Stueck: For the short term, yes. If you read The New York Times during the early fifties, you see a lot of squabbling among the NATO powers, so this is nothing new. Democracies do it--they do it in the open.
I’m not really concerned over the recent flare-ups--that’s pretty much par for the course. So for the short term I don’t think there’s a problem--for the long term, we’ll see.
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