Italy's most prominent and influential philosopher-critic and man of letters of this century, whose writings have influenced generations of Italian students and critics. Following the death of his parents in a disastrous earthquake, he lived in Rome with his uncle, the Liberal professor of Law, Silvio Spaventa. Enrolled in the Faculty of Law,he preferred to follow the lectures of the philosopher and social writer Antonio Labriola. Settled in Naples from 1886. His philosophical and historical interests led him from Hegel to Marx by 1900. With Gentile founded "La Critica" in 1903 which was published without interruption until post World War II. A neutralist during the First War, briefly participated in Giolitti's last Ministry (1920) as Minister of Education. Came out against Fascism in 1925. His History of Italy (1871-1915) significantly is a Liberal evocation of a Golden Age. Generally avoided political participation in the 1930's, attending to his literary duties on "La Critica." Becomes head of the Liberal Party in 1943. Occupied a largely honorary seat in the Senate in post-war Parliament. Croce's final act of participation in national life was to support the monarchy in the 1946 referendum.
Main works:
L'Estetica
Poesia e non-poesia
La letteratura della nuova Italia
An Autobiography (1927)
The Anti-Fascist Manifesto:
The fascist intellectuals, meeting in Bologna, have issued a manifesto to the intellectuals of all nations, to explain and defend the policies of the Fascist Party. In so doing, those worthy gentlemen must have forgotten a similar famous manifesto put out at the beginning of the world war and signed by German intellectuals: a manifesto which resulted in universal disap- proval, and was later considered an error by its very authors.
And it is a fact that intellectuals--i.e. the cultivators of art and the sciences--are only exercising their rights as citizens when they enroll in a party and serve it faithfully. But as intellectuals, their role is accomplished when, through the means of critical enquiry and artistic creation, they raise the level of social discourse to a higher level... To go beyond those limits assigned to them, to contaminate literature and science with politics, leading to the support of deplorable violence, and even the tolerance of the suppression of a free press, is a totally inexcusable error.
In essence this manifesto is sophomoric rubbish riddled with errors, doctrinal confusion and ill-reasoned arguments. Among various matters is the facile rhetorical fascination for the submission of the individual will for the All (or the State), as if that were the sole question before us, and not whether totali- tarian forms of government are best suited for offering us the most suitable forms of moral elevation. But the mistreatment of doctrine and history is nothing compared to the travesty of the word "religion" as used in this document. Because according to these fascist gentlemen, we ought now to be rejoicing in a war of religion taking place this very minute in Italy, in the heroic attempts of a new gospel to wage war against ancient supersti- tions; and for them the proof of such a war lies in the zealotry and rancor that today pits Italian against Italian.
The hatred and resentment kindled by the very party that denies its opponents the very title of Italians, and damns all dissidents as foreigners; this is now called a war of religion. Equally daubed with the same name, religion, is this reign of suspicion and animosity that have stripped our university students of an ancient brotherhood of trusting ideals, dividing them into hostile camps. To boast of all this in religious terms so flouts the truth that it has turned into a very sour joke.
The true meaning of this new faith cannot be deduced from the miasma of words of this manifesto. In effect, it presents to the objective observer an incoherent mixture of appeals to authority and demagoguery, of professed reverence for law and violation of the law, of ultramodern social concepts, and musty sophisms from the past, of absolutist attitudes and bolshevik tendencies, of religious skepticism and courting of the Catholic Church, of an abhorrence of culture and a sterile attempt to fashion a culture in its own image, of mystical sentimentalism and cynicism. And even when certain plausible steps have been undertaken by the present government, they can in no way be characterized as original, as the authentic stamp of a new political system known as Fascism.
We have no intention of abandoning our ancient faith for this so-called "religion." That same faith has been the soul of resurgent and modern Italy, composed of an aspiration toward justice, a concern for all human and civil rights, of a zeal for moral and intellectual education, a concern for liberty and a guarantee of all forms of progress. We now turn to the men of the Risorgimento, who fought and died for Italy, and we see them horrified by the words pronounced here, and the acts committed by our opponents. Their looks urge us in all solemnity to keep the flag of the republic firmly in our hands.
The fascist intellectuals repeat in their manifesto the tragic phrase that Italy's Risorgimento was the work of a minori- ty; but they do not point out that precisely in this lay the weakness of our social and political constitution, and they actually seem content with the apathy and indifference of the majority of Italians as they face the struggle between Fascism and its opponents. We Liberals on the contrary have never taken pleasure from such a situation, and have always labored to bring the majority of citizens into the mainstream of national life. And this was the main reason behind some of their more controver- sial acts, such as the extension of universal suffrage. Even the favor granted to Fascism by the Liberals in the early days was based on an underlying and implicit hope that it would introduce into the political life of the State new and fresh forces, forces of reform, and (why not?) forces of conservatism. But it was never a part of the Liberals' thoughts that Fascism would maintain the majority in a state of inertia by satisfying merely their minor material needs. For this would have been a betrayal of the principles of the Risorgimento in a return to the evil arts of government by tyranny and quietism.
Co-Signers (along with Croce): Giovanni Amendola, Sem Benelli, Cesare de Lollis, Roberto de Ruggiero, Luigi Einaudi, A.C. Jemolo, Matilde Serao.
(Il Mondo: May 1925)
On Aesthetics:
Poetry must be called neither feeling, nor image, nor yet the sum of the two, but "contemplation of feeling" or "lyrical intuition" or "pure intuition" -: pure, that is, of all histori- cal and critical reference to the reality or unreality of the images of which it is woven, and apprehending the pure throb of life in its ideality. Doubtless, other things may be found in poetry beside these two elements or moments and the synthesis of the two; but these other things are either present as extraneous elements in a compound (e.g. reflections, exhortations, polemics, allegories, etc.) or else they are just those image-feelings themselves taken in abstraction from their context as so much material--restored to their condition before the act of creation.
Other Forms of Activity, as Distinct From Art: (Or: What Art is Not):
By defining art as lyrical intuition, we have implicitly distinguished it from all other forms of mental production. If the distinctions are clarified, we obtain the following negatives.
1. Art is not philosophy, because philosophy is the logical thinking of the universal categories of bring, and art is the unreflective intuition of being. While philosophy transcends the image and uses it for its own purpose, art lives in it as its kingdom. It is said that art cannot behave in an irrational manner, and cannot ignore logic; and certainly it is neither irrational or illogical; but its own rationality, its own logic, is a quite different thing from the dialectical logic of the concept, and it is in order to indicate this unique character that the name "logic of sense" or "aesthetic" was invented...
2. Art is not history, because history implies the critical distinction between reality and unreality: the reality of the factual and the fancied world. For art, these distinc- tions are as yet unmade: it lives as we have said, on pure images. The historical existence of Helenus, Andromache and Aeneas makes no difference to the poetical quality of Virgil's Aeneid. Here, too, an objection has been raised: namely that art is not wholly indifferent to historical criteria, because it obeys the laws of "verisimilitude;" but here again, verisimilitude is only a rather clumsy metaphor for the mutual coherence of images, without which they would fail to produce their effect.
3. Art is not natural science, because natural science is historical fact classified and so made abstract; nor is it mathematical science because mathematics performs operations with abstractions and does not contemplate...
4. Art is not the play of fancy, because the play of fancy passes from image to image in search of variety, rest or diversity, seeking to amuse itself with things that give pleasure or have an emotional or pathetic interest; whereas in art the fancy is so dominated by the single problem of converting chaotic feeling into clear intuition, that we recognize the propriety of ceasing to call it fancy, and calling it imagination, poetic or creative imagination.
5. Art is not feeling in its immediacy. Andromache, on seeing Aeneas, (Aeneid III, 1. 294 etc.) stiffens, almost totters, turns pale and barely finds the power to speak under the pressure of emotion. None of this happens to the poet, who expresses himself in harmonious verses. (A similar example, which would appeal to Croce, is Ariosto's handling of the madness of Orlando: Furioso C. XXIII) (Editor). Feelings in their immediacy are "expressed," otherwise they would not exist. Andromache expressed herself in the passage quoted above. But "expression" here is a mere metaphor for the "mental" or "aesthetic expression," which alone really expresses, i.e., gives to feeling a theoretical form and converts it into outer shape. This distinction between contemplated feeling (or poetry) and feeling actually endured, is the source of the power ascribed to art, of "liberating us from the passions," of "calming" us (the power of catharsis), and leads to the consequent condemnation, from an aesthetic point of view, of those works of art in which immediate feeling finds a vent. Hence, too arises another characteristic of poetic expression--synonymous with the last--namely, its "infinity" as opposed to the finitude of immediate feeling of passion: or as it is also called, the "universal" or "cosmic" character of poetry...
6. Art is not instruction or oratory: it is not circumscribed and limited by service to any practical purpose whatever, whether this be the inculcation of a philosophical, histori- cal or scientific truth, or the advocacy of a particular way of feeling and the action corresponding to it. Oratory at once robs expressing of its "infinity" and independence, and, by making it the means to an end, dissolves it in this end. Hence arises that Schiller called the "non- determining" character of art, as opposed to the "determining" character of oratory; and hence the justifiable suspicion of "political poetry"--political poetry being, proverbially, bad poetry.
7. As art is not to be confused with the form of practical action most akin to it, namely instruction and oratory, so it must not be confused with other forms directed to the production of certain effects, whether these consist in pleasure, enjoyment or utility, or in goodness and righteousness. We must exclude from art not only meretricious works, but also those inspired by a desire for goodness, as equally, though differently, inartistic, and repugnant to lovers of poetry.
Art in its Relations: Art (says Croce) cannot exist in a limbo.
Art (including poetry) is like a ray of sunlight shining through the darkness lending its own light and making visible the hidden forms of things. Hence it cannot be produced by an empty and dull mind; hence those artists who embrace the creed of pure art (art for art's sake) and close their hearts to the troubles of life...are found to be wholly unproductive, or at most rise to an imitation of others. Hence the basis of all poetry is human personality, and since human personality finds its basis in moral consciousness, the basis of all poetry is moral consciousness. Of course, this does not mean that the artist must be a profound thinker or an acute critic, nor that he must be a pattern of virtue or a hero. But he must have a share in the world of thought and action which will enable him...to live the whole drama of human life. He may sin, lose the purity of his heart, expose himself to blame; but he must have a keen sense of purity and impurity, of good and evil. He may betray signs of cowardice, but he must feel the dignity of courage. Many are the pages of heroic and warlike poetry written by men who never had the nerve to handle a weapon. On the other hand, the possession of a moral personality alone is not enough to make an artist, or poet....The `sine qua non' of poetry is poetry, the spark of poetical genius without which the rest is mere fuel...But the figure of the pure poet, the pure artist, the votary of Pure Beauty, aloof from contact with humanity, is no real figure, but a caricature.
(Article on Aesthetics: Encyclopedia Britannica 1929, Vol. I; extracted from Breviario d'estetica)
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