III. 2002 GEORGIA ELECTIONS
Roy Barnes versus Sonny Perdue

The use of negative campaigning proved highly effective in the recent 2002 race for governor of Georgia. This election is consistent with all of the conditions set forth by Lau and Pomper. First, the incumbent governor, Roy Barnes, was well-financed and used positive campaigning with commercials about himself and his attributes prior to any attacks from the Republican challenger Sonny Perdue. To call Barnes “well-financed” is an understatement. Compared to Perdue’s $3 million spent on his campaign, Barnes spent a record amount in Georgia of approximately $19.5 million. The Republican challenger had to gain the electorate’s support and undermine votes for Barnes with a much smaller budget. Perdue threw the first punch by calling for a criminal investigation of the state purchase of land by the State Road and Tollway Authority (Salzer, 2002). Barnes’ retaliation satisfies the condition that a candidate usually counterattacks negative campaigns. Barnes immediately advertised that Perdue voted against the lottery which supports the HOPE scholarship and against a teacher pay increase. Barnes also approved a three day television ad accusing Perdue of doing favors for Georgia prison inmates. Perdue claimed that he merely passed requests on to the state Board of Pardons and Paroles. Perdue ran his campaign by promising that he “would not be another Roy Barnes” (Salzer, 2002). He attacked Barnes for revamping school policy that angered teachers, the one week in which he passed legislation that changed the state flag, and the fact that he supported building the highly controversial Northern Arch highway. The “mudslinging” that continued throughout the 2002 election distressed the citizens of Georgia but political experts and the general public expected Barnes to win. To the dismay of Democrats and the gleeful surprise of Republicans, Perdue won the close race with 51.4 percent of the vote with Barnes trailing at 46.2 percent. In this election, the use of negative campaigning was successful to defeat an incumbent. Thus, Sonny Perdue became the first Republican governor of Georgia since Reconstruction.

Analysis of the Campaign

Barnes and Perdue’s campaigns both illustrated and deviated from the principles of negative campaigning previously discussed in the research. Illustrating the characteristics of candidates likely to “go negative” found by Lau and Pomper (2001), Perdue ran as the Republican challenger with fewer resources and was not expected to win the race. Also consistent with such characteristics, Barnes used negative advertising once attacked. In another scholarly study illustrated by the campaign, Tinkham and Weaver Lariscy (1995) concluded that the perception of incumbency advantage leads to the decision to use negative campaigning. Perdue illustrated this finding in his campaign because he seemed to use negative advertising to combat Barnes’ incumbency advantage, including name recognition and funding. As a Republican challenger, Perdue’s decision to “go negative” demonstrated Tinkham and Weaver Lariscy’s (1996) research that indicates challengers are more likely to use negative advertising, as well as Theilmann and White’s (1998) conclusion that Republicans use negative campaigns more than Democrats. Other studies illustrated by the campaign include Houston and Doan’s (1999) study that explains opposing-ideology candidates are not harmed by the lack of evidence for negative claims. Due to the controversial nature of both Barnes' and Perdue’s campaigns, it follows that if the candidates were in the same party, both would be harmed by their failure to substantiate their claims for the public. Another consequence of the controversial nature of the campaigns was their emotionally-charged messages and the effects these messages had on public opinion. Perdue illustrated O’Cass’ (2000) research in which the more emotional the public becomes, the more they tend to believe negative campaigns. Perdue appealed to citizens’ emotions regarding controversial subjects such as teachers’ salaries and the state flag; thus ensuring his negative advertisements were more believable. Although Barnes and Perdue’s campaigns illustrated several principles previously discussed, they violated Jasperson and Fan’s (2002) study’s findings, because, despite the degree of negativity in both campaigns, no obvious backlash was evident. However, Barnes and Perdue’s campaigns illustrated more principles than they violated so the campaigns ultimately supported the findings of the literature review.

Doug Haines versus Brian Kemp

The effectiveness of attack advertising is illustrated by the 2002 race for the seat in Senate District 46. In comparison to several other 2002 races, the Haines-Kemp election wass not extremely negative. Democratic incumbent Doug Haines faced Republican challenger Brian Kemp in the district that includes Clarke, Oconee, and part of Barrow County. Haines, a public service attorney for Georgia Legal Watch, emphasized his existing connections and experience, such as his service on the Appropriations committee (DeMao, 2002). Haines also pointed to his record, including his vote on a recent law to stop predatory lending to senior citizens. Kemp, a native of Athens, noted his good working relationship with businesses and the Athens community (DeMao, 2002). Kemp voiced his dissatisfaction with recent partisan redistricting early in the race. Largely focusing on issues, the candidates did not engage in overwhelming negative campaign tactics. However, the race in Senate District 46 was unique because, when Brian Kemp did use negative advertising, Doug Haines did not deliver a strong response. It is not clear how Haines’ decision ultimately affected the election results. However, in such a close race, with Kemp winning by only 486 votes, it is important to consider the consequences of leaving an attack unanswered. The candidates in the 2002 Senate District 46 race differed in their opinions of whether negative advertising is necessary to draw a distinction and what was permissible in negative advertising. Brian Kemp explainee that negative campaign tactics “work—in some cases they are necessary and in others an incumbent doesn’t need defense tactics” (Kemp, 2003). Doug Haines did not feel that negative campaign tactics were necessary, but “it is easier to run against someone else than for oneself. It’s also less expensive to paint someone with negativity than to play up positive features” (Haines, 2003). The candidates agreed somewhat on what is permissible in negative campaigning. Kemp claimed that “exposing an opponent’s voting record is fine, attacking personal character is not” (Kemp, 2003). Whereas Haines condemned attacks on personal character, he feels that negativity could be “softer, like ‘You can only trust one person in the environment.’ That indicates that you can’t trust me but you can trust [Kemp]” (Doug Haines, 2003). Despite their differing opinions, the directional meaning of negative applied to the Haines-Kemp race because Kemp’s attacks were in opposition to Haines or his programs. Unlike many elections in 2002, Haines and Kemp focused on several pertinent issues rather than attacking each other’s character and credibility throughout the race. Most issues were discussed at Athens forums where the candidates were able to share their views with the area’s constituents.

Leave No Attack Unanswered

Although the race in Senate District 46 was based on differing opinions regarding issues important to the area, challenger Kemp used negative advertising to further the distinction between himself and Haines. In comparison to other 2002 elections, the Haines-Kemp race was not the most negative. However, the effects of negative advertising were still evident. Haines refused to respond publically to Kemp’s negative attacks with his own negative advertisements. Kemp recalled that the “couple of radio ads he aired and several mailers” he sent out helped him win the election (Kemp, 2003). Jared Thomas, Kemp’s campaign manager, described one attack as “tying a $150,000 cut in education funding to Haines due to his service on the Appropriations committee” (Thomas, 2003). Another important attack was the questioning of Haines’ supposed endorsement by the Athens Chamber of Commerce. At the Athens Area Chamber of Commerce’s annual Eggs and Issues breakfast, Kemp questioned Haines’ campaign claim that the group endorsed him and that he received the highest possible rating by the Georgia Chamber of Commerce (Gurr, 2002). Kemp’s attack was based on the fact that the Georgia Chamber of Commerce does not rate legislators. Haines’ answered, “The Georgia Chamber of Commerce did release a report saying I voted with them on every single issue” (Gurr, 2002). Thomas focused on attacks based on Haines’ voting record as opposed to personal attacks and documented all negative campaign messages. Thomas believed that the election outcome was not solely due to negative advertising: “Haines alienated voters and didn’t try hard…There’s no reason we won except that we worked a lot harder and he had a voting record” (Thomas, 2003). Indeed, the grassroots effort of Kemp’s supporters strengthened his campaign immensely. In his defense, Haines illustrated a mistake made by many candidates after being attacked. Similar to Tinkham and Weaver Lariscy’s findings, CBS political commentator Christopher Matthews explained the effects of leaving attacks unanswered in HARDBALL: How Politics is Played Told by One Who Knows the Game (Matthews, 1998). Matthews argues that refusing to respond to negative attacks against one’s policies, record, or character will only send one message to voters: the attack is true. Matthews advises candidates to answer attacks as early as possible: “When someone makes an unfair attack, the onus is on the victim to set the record straight…Any story, particularly a negative one, travels at the speed of light, creating an electric paperstorm flying in every direction” (Matthews, 1988). Haines evaluated his campaign against Kemp: “In retrospect, I will never run a race without beating up the Republican Party wholeheartedly…The state party provided negative ads. I didn’t use them. I don’t do this just to beat people…It won’t make me a better person to tear someone else down…I’m comfortable with the fact that I lost this time because I did nothing I’m ashamed of—it’s important to me to do nothing to break my integrity or that trust” (Haines, 2003). Haines discussed the difficulty of running against a challenger: “What do you do with someone with virtually no record? The closest I ever came to going negative with Kemp was giving him a chance to redeem himself at a public forum. I said, ‘You’ve run a very negative campaign, is there anything I’ve done that you’ve liked?’ I gave him a chance to draw distinctions between us or to tell the public how he would be better and he had no real response” (Haines, 2003). The final election results reported Kemp winning with 17,496 votes to Haines’ 17,010 votes. Due to many important factors involved in the election, it is difficult to attribute a single factor to the election results. However, with a difference of only 486 votes, it is highly likely that negative campaigning played a significant role in Kemp’s Senate District 46 win. A campaign guideline is demonstrated in the race: any unanswered attacks are widely believed to be true.

Analysis of the Campaign

An analysis of the 2002 Senate District 46 race supports several academic principles discussed in the literature review. Lau and Pomper’s (2001) hypotheses were illustrated in a real campaign context as Republican challenger Kemp’s use of negative advertising fits the mold of a candidate likely to attack. Likewise, Haines’ role of a Democratic incumbent explains why he was less likely to use negative advertising. In light of Lau and Pomper’s (2001) research, it is surprising that Haines’ did not use negative advertising. Although Haines is the incumbent, the factors of an extremely close race and his opponent’s choice to use negative attacks seem to outweigh his incumbency status. However, Haines’ campaign behavior as well as Kemp’s decision to attack may be explained by Tinkham and Weaver Lariscy’s (1996) study citing incumbency advantage as an important factor in choosing to “go negative.” Also, Tinkham and Weaver Lariscy’s (1996) conclusion that challengers are more likely to use negative advertising and Theilmann and White’s (1998) study showing that Republicans use negative messages more readily than Democrats are illustrated as Kemp was a Republican challenger. Consistent with Houston and Doan (1999), as an opposing-ideology candidate, Kemp was not harmed even though he was not overly zealous about supporting his claims in comparison to other 2002 candidates. However, Haines illustrated a harmful consequence of Tinkham and Weaver Lariscy’s (1999) study that explains that candidates who use positive attacks, endorsements, or who choose to “take the high road” like Haines will fail against negative advertising as these are ineffective defensive strategies. While illustrating several principles, Haines’ campaign violated one of Lau and Pomper’s (2001) characteristics of candidates likely to “go negative,” because once attacked, he delivered a very weak response and claimed he did not respond at all (Haines, 2003). The consequences of Haines’ reaction may be explained by Tinkham and Weaver Lariscy’s (1999) principle of defensive strategies. Other studies, including Jasperson and Fan’s (2002) conclusion that backlashes occur due to extreme negativity, and O’Cass’ (2000) research in which emotional messages are more believable, are not illustrated nor violated. Due to the different, issue-based nature of Haines and Kemp’s campaigns, in comparison to other 2002 races, the campaigns were not as emotionally-charged or as negative. Despite this inconsistency, Haines and Kemp’s campaigns supported, rather than deviated from, the dominant research findings.

Joyce Stevens versus Renee Unterman

In the fall of 2002, Renee Unterman and Joyce Stevens battled for the open senate seat in the 45th district. Unterman, a registered nurse from Loganville, is a politician who has served her constituents as Gwinnett County Commissioner, then Mayor of Loganville for three terms, and two terms as state representative. Stevens, a lobbyist from Good Hope, promised voters that she would improve public education by offering income tax relief for teachers and increasing the state’s homestead exemption for people older than 65 (Money, 2002). Unterman ran on a platform of local issues, such as preserving the area’s water resources and upgrading transportation (Money, 2002). Each Republican woman devoted a large portion of her campaign to convincing the public that she was the more conservative candidate. The Republican Primary for Senate District 45 marked an extremely expensive Georgia legislative race. Senate District 45 stretches over five counties including parts of Gwinnett, Walton, Barrow, Hall, and Forsyth. Unterman explains the difficulty of campaigning in an elongated district: “It verges on being like a congressional district, and so to get your message out is very, very expensive” (Senate, 2002). Ultimately, Unterman spent nearly $800,000 and Stevens spent almost $500,000 during the race. These totals are equivalent to running a credible Congressional race. Stevens understands the challenge of running in District 45: “You have a totally new geographic area, and I, as an unknown, have had to build my name ID in five counties and several cities” (Hartstein, 2002). Charles Bullock, a political scientist at the University of Georgia, comments: “It’s kind of amazing to contemplate that kind of money being put into a contest where if you win, you make $16,000 a year. That’s far more than people spend to get elected statewide” (Senate, 2002). Indeed, political newcomer Angela Speirs spent $16.00 over the qualifying fees to win a statewide race for Public Service Commissioner in 2002 beating well-financed incumbent Lauren McDonald (Rehm, 2003). Contrary to the unprecedented level of expenditures, the 2002 Republican Primary is similar to most elections in Georgia in that the primary is more important than the general election. With no Democratic challenger, the winner of the primary is assured the open senate seat. As the main competitors, Unterman and Stevens largely ignored the two other candidates in the primary, Maria Strollo and Nathan Warnock. During the primary, Unterman took an early lead with 51% in election night vote returns as Gwinnett County, her main geographic base, tallied votes first. Unterman’s 51% lead fell back to 48% while Stevens won 24% of the vote. The runoff that followed determined the election outcome with Unterman’s 64% win and Stevens holding 36% of the vote. The path to this result was a difficult, expensive, and negative race. Unterman and Stevens both signed the Clean Campaign Pledge, but turned to negative advertising as the race heated up. Sponsored by Gwinnett’s Republican Chairman, Buzz Brockway, the Clean Campaign Pledge asked candidates to abide by specific campaign rules. Neither Unterman nor Stevens feel they broke the Clean Campaign Pledge. Stevens comments, “I didn’t violate the pledge—I answered each charge with correct information” (Stevens, 2003).

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