HYPATIA: Hello, Simplicia, where are you
going in such a hurry so early in the morning?
SIMPLICIA:
Hello, my friend! I am to join a demonstration in favor of our fundamental rights we hold
as human beings.
H: Oh, and what
rights could anybody possibly have that are so indisputable?
S: Surely you
are jesting. Have you not heard of the Declaration of Independence? Do you not recall that
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
Pursuit of Happiness?
H: I also recall
that the man who uttered those words made plenty of exceptions for women and men of colors
other than his own when it was most convenient for him.
S: Fair enough,
but the purity of the principle is more important than the faulty actuation of the same.
H: Let me
concede that for a moment. Nevertheless, just because somebody said it, or because it
appeals to our sense of poetry, it does not follow that it is true. What arguments can you
possibly adduce for the existence of natural rights?
S: As I
mentioned a minute ago, are they not self-evident?
H: Not to me,
they are not. On the contrary, it is self-evident that people have to struggle everywhere
to even approach what you consider obvious. Would it not be the case that if rights were
universal and incontestable facts of life, few if any human beings would contest them, in
principle, if not in practice? Doesnt everybody agree on the fact that people have
to feed themselves in order to survive? That is because it indeed is a fact of life.
S: Ah, my dear
Hypatia, but you know very well of people who allow others to starve, either through
inaction or by pernicious withdrawal of the necessary goods.
H: True enough,
Simplicia, but not even those people would deny the fact that people have to eat. They
will only deny that it is their right to do so, if you see the difference.
S: I do indeed.
So, you are saying that universal rights cannot be justified by appeal to agreement among
human beings, because such agreement is lacking.
H: My point
exactly.
S: But what
about other sources of natural rights? Is it not conceivable that they could come from
things other than human societies? After all, humans did not invent the necessity of food;
it is a thing that comes from nature herself.
H: That is
indeed a possibility. However, it seems logical that if one wants to derive rights from
nature one should dispassionately observe what happens in nature and then use such
observations as guidance to establish an independent foundation for rights, is it not so?
S: That does
seem like the logical course of action.
H: And yet, if
we were to do so in practice, we would probably come up with a set of principles that do
not reflect at all the kinds of rights you seem to have in mind!
S: How so,
Hypatia?
H: Because if
one looks at nature one can see that animals and plants are certainly not created equal.
On the contrary, it is precisely their differences that make it possible for natural
selection to shape the face of the organic world, as Mr. Darwin has shown long ago. The
negation of the so-called right to life is at the very basis of the struggle for existence
that makes evolution possible; as for liberty, it is guaranteed only insofar one animal
can defend it against intrusion from competitors or predators; and happiness is too vague
of a word to even consider as the proper object of a serious philosophical discussion.
S: Shall I then
conclude that you subscribe to the simple notion that nature is red in tooth and claws or
that, as Mr. Hobbes put it, life in nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short?
H: I am much too
much of an optimist to agree to that, my dear Simplicia. However, I would conclude from
even a cursory observation of nature that she is neither moral nor immoral, neither good
nor bad, but simply is. I believe it was David Hume who warned against the logical jump
from what is to what ought to be, and it seems to me that therefore one cannot defend
natural rights by appealing to nature; a rather uncomfortable situation for the promoters
of such rights.
S: Even if I
grant you that neither humans nor nature can be the sources of universal rights, most
people would not be faced in the least by these difficulties, and would simply retort that
there are higher authorities than both.
H: Ah, you mean
some gods or goddesses!
S: Precisely:
wouldnt a divinity be the ultimate source and guarantor of universal rights?
H: It surely
would, if not for any other reason than such divinity would presumably have the power to
impose her will on us mere mortals.
S: There, then,
do I see your skepticism about the possibility of natural rights beginning to wane?
H: No so fast,
my dear friend. Your latest answer to our conundrum begs the question in two ways: how do
you know there is such a divinity and, even if we should accept her existence as a matter
of hypothesis, how do you know what kinds of rights does she endorse?
S: My dear
Hypatia, you know very well that such a line of inquiry would bring us far into an
altogether new direction of conversation, and that would definitely mean that I would be
late to my protest march.
H: Indeed it
would. But it is no matter to brush aside. You might agree at least to the observation
that there are many people who have spent a great deal of time thinking about the
existence of god and the nature of gods will, without reaching even a minimal form
of agreement. Furthermore, you know that many cogent doubts have been raised and
objections construed against all the major arguments in favor of the existence of a deity.
S: Alas, this is
all very true.
H: Then you
cannot rest your defense of natural rights on the assumption of the existence of a god,
because that would be the substitution of one mystery with an even greater mystery.
S: But, Hypatia,
surely you see that by rejecting all possible sources of universal rights you are forced
in the position that anything goes and that we have no rational motive to fight for
anything that is dear to us.
H: Not at all.
You seem to assume, Simplicia, that there are only two options: either rights are
universal, or they dont exist.
S: Is there a
compromise somewhere that I have missed?
H: Most
definitely! Let me explain my position with an example. I know you love the work of the
painter Picasso. Surely you will agree that a painting by him cannot last forever, no
matter how carefully preserved.
S: Yes, but I
dont see where you could possibly be going with this.
H: Even though
you know that one day the painting will be gone forever, you still love to look at it now,
to go to the museum every time you can, and even to contribute to its preservation by
donating funds to the museum.
S: Yes,
and
?
H: Well,
Simplicia, is not this an example of something that is not universal, and yet is very
precious? If you were to apply your nihilism to art, you wouldnt care a bit about
what happens to Picassos work for the simple reason that it is not a universal
thing, it wont last forever.
S: So you are
saying that even though there may be no guarantor of universal rights, we are nevertheless
justified in defending and caring for them with all our energies because they matter to
us!
H: Precisely. It
matters not that you cannot justify, for example, your
right to freedom by universal laws. Freedom is still something that most human beings
want, and we are bound to fight for a society that grants such right simply because we
think it is a better society than any other alternative.
S: Thanks,
Hypatia. I am not sure that I agree with all your points, but this conversation did throw
some interesting light on what I am doing and why. I have to run to the demonstration,
now!
H: Until the
next time, then, my friend.
Next Month: "Intelligent Design, the Classical Argument"
© by Massimo Pigliucci, 2000
|