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Lioba Moshi |
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IntroductionThis paper provides an overview of the manifestation of 'natural gender'1 in selected African languages. Unlike Indo-European languages, gender goes beyond the mere grammatical gender marking based on a three-place hierarchy: masculine, feminine, and neuter. Nevertheless, the lack of a rigid grammatical gender does not imply that African languages do not embrace value-differentiation based on 'natural gender' distinctions. Value differentiation plays a significant role in defining how language is to be used to distinguish between the male and female cultures. Social taboos and other cultural rules play a decisive role in developing the frames on which the male-female distinctions are built, shaped, and maintained. Illustrative examples are drawn from a variety of languages spoken in Africa, such as : KiChaga, Kikerewe, Swahili -- spoken in Tanzania; Lamba, Kikongo -- spoken in Central Africa; and Sotho -- spoken in Lesotho. Other citations include Zulu -- spoken in Southern Africa and Chichewa, Chinyanza -- spoken in Malawi.
Linguistically, the term 'gender' is better known as 'grammatical gender' and is defined as 'a meaningless linguistic form devoid of content' (Baron, 1986; Fodor, 1959; Gregersen, 1979; Jespersen, 1924; Katz & Fodor, 1963; Key, 1972). This definition is particularly useful in Indo-European languages in which grammatical markers are used to distinguish a class of nouns as either masculine, feminine, or neuter. Non-linguistically, gender is defined as 'a reflection of the sex of an object as either male or female.' This is also popularly known as 'natural gender' or 'referential gender' or simply 'the sex of the object' (Baron, 1986; Ervin, 1962; Fodor, 1959). Fodor (1959) discusses two opposing theories of gender arising from the distinction made between grammatical gender and 'natural gender'. On the one hand, the notion of gender is viewed in light of a close link between grammatical gender and 'natural gender'. In this view, there is a claim that the source of grammatical gender is the human desire to distinguish between the sexes and that 'natural gender' has always been represented in language through the division of human nouns into the categories male and female. The division began with words for men and for women and later was extended to include non-human words. The grammatical neuter category was, therefore, introduced to cover those concepts that had nothing to do with the sex of the object. On the other hand, there is the theory that seeks to dissociate grammatical gender from 'natural gender'. The assumption is that a masculine or feminine marked noun does not necessarily denote the sex of the object as male or female. Evidence is drawn from a number of Indo-European languages in which the grammatical gender system has become what the literature refers to as a chaotic system, one in which nouns referring to objects whose 'natural gender' is male appear grammatically marked as feminine or neuter. Likewise, there are nouns which appear grammatically marked masculine or neuter, but the 'natural gender' of the object in reference is female. For example, in German: der Hase, 'male/female hare'; die Maus, 'male or female mouse'; der Hund, 'male/female dog', but: die Huendin, 'female dog' (only); die Katze, 'male/female cat'; der Kater, 'male cat' (only). Likewise in French: La sentinelle, 'sentry', (usually a man) yet the noun expressing this concept is marked for feminine. Also personne [+feminine], 'person', but requires masculine concord when referring to a male; les personnes. More illogical than the French example, are that the German examples of words that end in -chen and those which end in -lein (diminutive endings) take neuter endings even if they refer to people. Thus, das Weib, 'woman' (marked as neuter); das Frauenzimmer, 'women's room'. Although both forms are now outdated and are avoided in conservative speech, they can be used, especially derogatorily. For example, das Frauelien, 'Miss' (diminutive of woman); das Maidchen, 'maid /girl contemporary.' These two examples have separate entries in the German dictionary. Examples like these provide a strong support for the theory of gender that seeks to dissociate grammatical gender from 'natural gender'. The grammatical gender markers in these languages are assumed to be meaningless linguistic forms devoid of content. English is not among the Indo-European languages whose grammatical gender assignment is considered chaotic because it is largely a 'natural gender' language. The third person pronouns (he, she, it) are the main forms that exemplify grammatical gender. In addition to their grammatical functions, they explicitly identify an object as either male (in the case of he except where the pronoun functions as an epicene pronoun), or female (in the case of she) or unmarked for 'natural gender' (in the case of it). The close relationship between the grammatical function of the English pronouns and their manifestation of 'natural gender' has been largely responsible for the epicene pronoun/androcentric rule (male-as-the norm) controversy (Baron, 1971/1981; Mackay, 1983; Mackay & Konishi, 1980; Martyna, 1978; Stanley & Robbins, 1978; Stericker, 1981). Baron (1986) notes that it is because of the close relationship between grammatical gender and 'natural gender' in English, that English lexicographers and grammarians in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries defined gender simply as 'the distinction of sex' and described four principal methods of distinguishing sex in the English noun system. Such distinctions, which are applicable in many African languages, are exemplified in different words such as man, woman, boy, girl, son, daughter, cock ; or by a difference of termination as duke, duchess; count, countess; poet, poetess; hero, heroine; actor, actress; waiter, waitress; or by adding an adjective or pronoun to the substantive such as a male child, a female child; a he-goat, a she-goat; or by prefixing another substantive to the word such as a cock-sparrow, a hen-sparrow, a man-servant, a male-nurse, congresswoman, male/female doctor.
The English gender system, which is based on the Indo-European system and which exploits 'natural gender' in its grammatical gender classification of nouns, is the closest to the variable systems found in African languages. Pioneers in the study of the structure of African languages, like Meinhoff (1910), noticed the similarities and tried to categorize nouns in African languages, in particular the Bantu languages and the Semito-Hamitic languages based on the prototypical Indo-European model of grammatical gender. The Bantu languages are more sophisticated, showing between eighteen and twenty-one classes of nouns which could not be collapsed easily to the three Indo-European types (masculine, feminine and neuter). It was resolved, then, and has since become common practice, to refer to the classification of nominals in Bantu languages which show more than three gender groupings as 'nominal classes' rather than 'gender classes'. Nevertheless, Meinhoff believed that since true grammatical gender arises only with the requirement of concord, or agreement between a noun and other parts of a sentence (chiefly subject-predicate- attribute or a qualifying word), African languages, in particular Bantu languages, were the best examples of grammatical gender in the true sense of the definition. The markers he identified in these languages did not add any meaning to the noun and did not distinguish the noun as masculine or feminine based on the 'natural gender' male-female distinctions. The main function of these markers appears to establish concord or agreement between grammatical elements of an utterance or a written sentence. Consider the examples from KiSwahili, a Bantu language spoken in Tanzania (odd numbers denote the singular forms; even numbers indicate plural marking):
(1) humans: class (1/2)
m-toto m-zuri a good child (1)
wa-toto wa-zuri good children (2)
m-zee m-jinga a stupid old-person (1)
wa-zee wa-zuri stupid old-person (2)
(2) Various objects: class (7/8)
ki-dole ki-mepona the finger healed (7)
vi-dole vi-mepona the fingers healed (8)
ki-tabu ki-mepotea the book is lost (7)
vi-tabu vi-mepotea the books are lost (8)
(3) Various objects: class (5/6)
-tunda -dogo a small fruit (5)
ma-tunda ma-dogo small fruits (6)
-somo -refu a long lesson (5)
ma-somo ma-refu long lessons (6)
(4) Loan words: class (9/10)
radio i-linunuliwa radio it-was bought (9)
radio zi-linunuliwa radios they-were bought (10)
meza i-linunuliwa table it-was bought (9)
meza zi-linunuliwa tables they-were bought (10)
As these examples show, the main function of the prefixes is definitely to provide agreement between the adjective or predicate with its antecedent. None of the markers can be associated with referential gender, namely male or female. In fact, a good percentage of nouns making reference to humans is scattered in various classes other than the human noun classes 1 and 2. For example (KiSwahili):
(5) class 7/8
ki-jana youth (7)
vi-jana youths (8)
(6) class 5/6
-rafiki friend (5)
ma-rafiki friends (6)
(7) class 9/10
-babu grandfather (9)
-babu grandfathers (10)
Compared to Indo-European languages, it is obvious that the classification is not based on gender differentiation and cannot be collapsed into such simple three-place categories as masculine, feminine, and neuter. As examples (6)-(9) show, nouns are classified based on their morphological characteristics which will trigger agreement with other elements of the sentence structure. In some cases the categorization may be based on the group meaning: names of living things, names of tools, names of body parts, names of animals, names of humans, names of fruits, and so forth (see Guthrie, 1971/77 for a detailed classification of nominals in Bantu languages).
Natural gender distinctions in many African languages are semantic, generally resolved by 'heteronymy' (having different names as a pair of correlatives). For example:
(8) KiSwahili:
a. Gender neutral: mtu 'person'
mzee 'old person'
kijana 'young person'
mwalimu 'teacher'
mkulima 'farmer'
kuku 'chicken'
b. Gender specific: mwanamke 'woman'
mke 'wife'
mwanamume 'man'
mume 'husband'
mvulana 'young boy'
msichana 'young girl'
jogoo 'he-hen'
(9) KiChaga (spoken around Mount Kilimanjaro-Tanzania):
a. Gender neutral: mndu 'person'
mana 'child'
mburu 'goat'
iwace 'calf'
kite 'dog'
b. Gender specific: mndu-mka 'person-woman'
msolro 'man'
mii 'husband'
mka 'wife'
mfee 'parent 'female'
(lit. 'one who gives birth')
ngolo 'she-goat'
oro 'he-goat'
(10) Lamba (spoken in Central Africa):
Gender specific:
kombolwe 'he-hen' (cock)
inseke 'she-hen' (rooster)
(11) KiKongo (spoken in Central Africa):
Gender specific:
(di) toko 'young man'
nduumba 'young woman'
(12) Sotho (spoken in Lesotho):
Gender specific:
mofuma 'king'
mofuma-hali 'queen'
(13) Kikerewe (spoken around Lake Victoria-Tanzania (G. Ruhumbika,
personal communication, April 1992)):
Gender specific:
omusigazi 'a boy' (until 18th birthday-
marrying age)
omuseza 'an adult male'
omutamba 'unmarried adult male'
omugurusu 'an old man' (50+ years)
omuharakazi 'a girl' (until 16th birthday-
marrying age)
omukazi 'an adult female'
omusimbe 'unmarried adult female'
omukekuru 'an old woman' (45+ years)
Notice, in example (13), that the marrying age for Ukerewe men is higher (18 years) than that of women (16 years). Also, the age at which a man is considered old (50+) is higher compared to when a women is said to be old (45+). This is important in the Ukerewe culture as it defines the sociocultural differences between men and women. Ruhumbika notes also that the Ukerewe people have gender distinctions in the way they exchange greetings and responses. A man would use yego when exchanging greetings with another man. A woman would use yebe when exchanging greetings with another woman. The equivalence of the English response 'yes' is ye and is gender neutral, used by men to other men or women and women to other women. Men may also use karame ('yes sir/madam') while women use rama ('yes sir/madam'). In general, while men can use ye when responding to women, women must use rama when responding to men except where age is a factor (e.g., children to children or adult to children, in which case ye is used). The pattern also may be complicated by seniority, and family relationships (blood relatives versus other relatives through family extension). Relations by marriage supersede the male seniority rule so that, for example, a sister or a female relative of one's father/mother-in-law, or any female cousin of a man's mother, irrespective of her age, is given the same respect (reflected in language use to and around them) as one's own mother. Similarities to these Kikerewe cultural norms can also be found in many other Bantu languages such as KiChaga and KiSwahili. In KiChaga, for example, children would respond to adult males with (i)mbe ('yes sir') and to adult females with (i)mae ('yes mom') except to one's aunt (father's sister only) to whom they have to respond with (i)awae, a response also used to one's older siblings. Literally it means 'yes my older (brother or sister).' In KiSwahili, males respond with naam 'yes', while females may use labeka/abe/be which means 'at your service' or simply 'yes sir/madam'. Frederick Johnson, the author of the famous Swahili-English dictionary, notes that the response expected of females (i.e., labeka) is: "a common reply of a slave or an inferior to a master's call . . ." (1978, p. 239). Since this form is exclusively used by women, one only can conclude that it was meant to denote the inferior status of women compared to that of men in the Swahili culture and the Islamic culture from which the term is borrowed. In most African languages, kinship terms constitute the largest category of words that are gender specific, largely distinguished by heteronymy. For example:
(14) KiSwahili
a. dada 'sister' b. shangazi 'aunt'
kaka 'brother' mjomba 'uncle'
c. wifi 'sister-in-law' d. babu 'grandpa'
shemeji 'brother-in-law' bibi/nyanya 'grandma'
(15) KiChaga:
a. mshiki 'sister' b. wawa/awa 'aunt'
msacha 'brother' washiru 'uncle'
c. usu 'sister-in-law' d. wasau 'grandpa'
mho 'brother-in-law' kyeku(yo) 'grandma'
In both KiSwahili and KiChaga, the terms 'aunt' and 'uncle' are gender restrictive. The term 'aunt' can only refer to one's father's sister. The term 'uncle' can only refer to one's mother's brother. One's mother's sister is given the title 'mother' and is either 'big mother' if she is older than the addressee's mother and 'small mother' if younger. Likewise, one's father's brother is either 'big or small father.' The terms for in-laws also are restrictive. The KiSwahili term shemeji and KiChaga term mho are both gender neutral and gender specific depending on the user and the referent. They can be used by both males and females to refer to a brother-in-law, but can be used by males only to refer to a sister-in-law. Females use the term wifi in Swahili and usu in KiChaga to refer to a sister-in-law. Thus, whereas men have only one term to use in reference to a brother or sister-in-law, women have two distinct terms, one for males and another for females. These terms of address are very culturally significant in the society, and members of the family know that they reflect the social situations that exist in the community. There is no excuse for anyone to misuse these terms, and failure to use them appropriately will be construed as a lack of respect for the relative in reference. Disrespecting a relative is unacceptable behavior which can cause conflicts that may take years to resolve or put a permanent strain in the relationships between members of that family. An example of an attitude that can be construed as a lack of respect is a failure for a member of the family to recognize the important position relatives of the father or mother hold in the family. The titles 'father' for one's father's brothers and 'mother' for one's mother's sisters are unconditionally respected. That is, one does not have to like these relatives to respect them in the same way as they would their own father and mother. Both the Swahili and Chaga communities have a clan system and, as Gregersen (1979) notes, such a system is very likely to group its members according to the accepted social situations. One's mother's sister is likely to be grouped along with one's mother under the same term since they belong to the same gender and clan. Likewise, one's father's brother will be grouped with one's father. One's mother's brother cannot be identified terminologically with the mother since the two are gender opposites. Likewise one's father's sister cannot be grouped with the father because of the gender differences. In addition, the referent identified by the term 'aunt' is not an inclusive member of one's father's clan. Likewise, the term 'uncle' does not identify an inclusive member of one's mother's. This is a consequence of the perceived flexible status of women in the society. A woman is either the 'daughter of' or the 'wife of'. Thus, one's aunt will, upon marrying, become a co-opted member of another clan in which her status (mother) will be more permanent and prominent than that which she holds in her own clan: namely, 'daughter of'. By the same token, an uncle (one's mother's brother) is determined by the status of the female in question. Because his sister has acquired a new status, 'mother of', he cannot be a central member of the adoptive clan (i.e., his sister's adoptive family) since his role and status of 'father' lies in another clan. Nevertheless, his role as 'uncle' to the children of his own sister remains crucial since they are members of his extended family through marriage. The significance of this role is noticeable in policing proper informal and formal education for his nephews and nieces and wedding arrangements. Uncles have the responsibility to check the reputation of the families from or into which his sister's children plan to marry. Needless to say, the 'outsider' image associated with the titles 'aunt' and 'uncle' remains unchanged. This image is evident in the extended meaning afforded to these terms. There is a generalized reference made by these terms which does not identify the referent as a blood relative. In many cases, the terms 'aunt' or 'uncle' are used to refer to close family friends who are the same age or younger than the parents and certainly much older than the children calling them 'auntie' (female friends of parents) and 'uncle' (male friends of parents). Close friends of the family are usually given honorary family membership. The derivation and modification of terms of reference, which exemplify 'natural gender' manifestation, is also indicative of the social hierarchies in the society. For example, in Kichaga, some female terms are formed by modifying a generic and or gender neutral term. For example (Chaga):
(16) mndu 'person' (gender neutral)
mndu-mka 'person-wife' (i.e. woman)
Compare with:
(17) msolro 'man'
mii 'husband'
mka 'wife'
The stem -ka in the word mka ('wife') is synonymous with the stem -ka used to imply 'a sitting position' or 'be under/lower'. The term for 'husband' mii is synonymous with the stem -mii implying 'light' (noun), 'leader' or 'one who provides guidance.' Other interesting terms worth commenting on are the equivalents of the English terms 'boy' and 'girl'. In some African languages, they are derived, respectively, by compounding the terms for man and woman/wife with the generic term for child. For example:
(18) KiChaga:
mana 'child' (gender neutral)
msolro 'man'
mka 'wife'
mana-o-kisolro 'child of man' (boy/son)
mana-o-kika 'child of wife' (girl/daughter)
Consider also the term mndumka, a term for 'woman' which is a compound derived from the nouns mndu ('person') and mka ('wife'). As noted above, the literally meaning of mndumka is 'person-wife. Comparably, mndu-mii, which would have translated to 'person-husband,' has a different and more impressive connotation: namely, 'the almighty', 'the powerful'. It generally is used to describe God's power, that of a ruler, and in many cases the power and bravery shown by man. It can be used in reference to a woman who has shown great courage and ability, especially in cases of managing the affairs of her family singlehandedly. In other words, such a woman would be an honorary man. Examples from KiSwahili are comparable:
(19) Swahili:
mwana 'child'
mke 'wife'
mume 'husband'
mwanamke 'child of wife' (female/woman)
mwanamume 'child of husband' (male/man)
These terms are mirror images of the cultural roles and status assumed by the individuals in reference. I will return to this point shortly. Heteronymy, therefore, is the main means by which gender identification can be made at the word level. As we saw earlier, the classification of nouns does not bear out 'natural gender' differentiation. However, it does not mean that 'natural gender' is not exploited in the same way as found in other languages of the world -- in particular, Indo-European languages. For example, the assignment of grammatical gender to inanimate objects exploits the system already in place. English uses metaphorical gender in the personification of inanimate objects. Although it can be argued that the choice of a particular grammatical gender marker (masculine or feminine) for a specific inanimate object is arbitrary and in no way a reflection of the attributes associated with objects that fall into that category (Fodor, 1959), one cannot avoid noticing the possible connection. At least, early grammarians tried to explain the rationale for the selectional process which reflects value differentiation between the objects that appear grammatically marked masculine and those that are grammatically marked feminine. Wilhelm Wundt (1921) believed that some societies perceived living beings, objects, and natural phenomena according to their value. In his view, the basis for the classification of meaningful words was value-differentiation, and gender connotations reflect value-differentiation. Concepts of superior value are categorized as masculine, while concepts of inferior value are categorized as feminine. Baron (1986) considers Wundt's theory as the basis for the English metaphorical gender system, which assigns masculine or feminine gender to inanimate nouns. She cites the following examples:
(20)
a. the sun (masculine)
from communicating light which was native and original.
Also from the vigorous warmth and efficacy of his rays.
b. the moon (feminine)
receptacle of light from a source other than its self, and
from shining with rays more delicate and soft.
c. the heavens (masculine)
because he is the source of the rain that impregnates the earth.
d. the earth (feminine)
receiver, container, mother of every sublunary substance.
e. ships (feminine)
receive, contain.
f. cities (feminine)
contain, mother, and nurse their inhabitants.
g. ocean (masculine)
Its depth, roaring sound and boisterous nature (even though
it contains, receives from rivers and produces a variety of
animals and vegetation).
h. time and death (masculine)
irresistible power.
i. the horse (masculine)
usefulness and his generous nature.
j. the hare (feminine)
because of her timidity.
k. the elephant (masculine)
strength and size.
The correlation between the three-place Indo-European classifications of masculine, feminine, and neuter and the assignment of gender to objects, as exemplified here, provides evidence for a gender-worthiness hierarchy. It also proves that there is a correlation between the theories of sex, grammatical gender categories, and value-differentiation. As Baron (1986) notes, it is quite evident that the theory of sex includes the theory of value differentiation. Humans exploit this link in the process of creating grammatical gender categories, starting with humans, and then extending it to non-humans. Although African languages do not humanize or dehumanize nouns for the purpose of assigning grammatical gender to them, value differentiation is evident in the semantics of gender. For example:
(21) KiChaga:
mfee 'female parent' (fee - 'give birth')
mka 'wife' (-ka 'sit/lower/beneath')
mii 'husband' ('high/top position', light)
msolro 'man' (u-solro 'strength'/'power')
mkyeku 'old woman' (-kyeku- 'absent/invisible')
mmeku 'old man' (-meku 'reputable one, wise, wealthy')
Recall also the examples that were given earlier showing the derivation of the equivalent terms for boy/girl and male/female in KiChaga and KiSwahili. Their meanings reflect the value attached to a male or female child in the family and society at large. Generally, both Swahili and Chaga cultures are patriarchal in nature. As such, children are exclusively under the custody of the immediate male parent or other male members of a family. A male child is considered a more complete representation of the father, both within his clan and the society at large. A male child also is considered the ultimate link between the mother and her husband's family. A woman remains unlinked to the husband and his family until she begets a son. This is why most women would prefer their firstborn to be a son. Once a son is born, the pressure on the woman to produce sons is dramatically reduced, although many families would prefer more than one son. Because of the concept of linkage, a woman who begets only girls will remain unlinked to her husband and his family until a son is born. In many cases (even to date), the birth of a son is celebrated with a big naming ceremony, and among the invited guests are the parents of the wife, who then are officially recognized and thanked. The birth of a girl is less elaborately celebrated except in those cases of a firstborn girl. Such exceptions are characterized by an optimism for the birth of a son, and the celebration is for the woman's fertility more than for the birth of a girl. In part, this is a reflection of the importance attached to a male heir. The role of a male child as the sole representative of the father in the clan and society at large makes it necessary for families to favor sons over daughters. The male child, irrespective of his age, is the man of the house and all the females in that family (aunts included) are expected to respect that social position while they assume a position that is often less significant. A male child as a link between the mother and her husband's family also is clearly played out if the husband dies before an heir is born. In some cultures, the mother is either forced or encouraged to leave, and any land owed to her husband can be appropriated by his brothers. Otherwise, she might be encouraged to stay, especially if her female children are very young (a woman cannot have sole custody of her children; sole custody is awarded, by traditional law, to the father or his family). In some cultures, she might be encouraged to cohabit with another male member of the husband's family (father-in-law included) with the hope that a male heir will be born to the family of the deceased patriarch. Should a male child be born in this arrangement, he will bear the name of the deceased husband and not of the biological father (at least until he is old enough to realize he could not have been fathered by the man he calls father). Such knowledge would be treated as a non-issue (unlike perhaps the way it might be interpreted in a western society). In the absence of his father, a son born in this arrangement is automatically the head of his family and his main concern will be his role as head of that household. His position and status is, therefore, autonomous and independent of that of the man he calls father. In other words, his status as the primary member of the family supersedes that of the son of the man to whom he is biologically linked. The terms of reference used in this case emphasize this acquired status. In Kichaga, for example, terms like mdumii ('the mighty one'), msulri, ('the honorable one'), meku ('the elder'), kishamba ('the esteemed one'), uruka ('the leader of the nation'), are among the few titles of respect accorded to such a male child. Such terms will be deemed inappropriate if they are used for a woman, even if she is well regarded in the community (through wealth, royal birth, political leadership, or higher social status achieved through education). The significance of this observation is that terms of reference are not randomly selected, but are sensitive to the social structures that are already in place and which are indicative of the 'natural gender' distinctions in the society. As such, the selected terms will not merely be linguistic forms but also will connote the cultural and social values that help define the gender distinctions. Natural gender also is manifested in the way speakers view natural and supernatural beings. The naming of various gods as either male or female is based on the same principles applied in assigning a value aggregate based on the prototypical roles assumed by ordinary males and females in the society. Mythologies and folk stories which involve animals or natural phenomena also are based on the understanding, by the society, of the value and roles of humans who feature prominently in the folk stories. Animals (like the elephant, the hyena, the fox, the hare, the snake), and inanimate objects (like the mountain, the forest, certain types of trees, and other natural phenomena), appear in folk stories in record numbers in a variety of cultures (Moshi 1993). In each case they seem to bear values based on their performance, strength, or appreciation in the culture. The elephant is forever the king of the jungle, and who are revered in that culture are often animated as the elephant or inanimated as the mountain. Men who have achieved a reputable status in the society, as well as male rulers who are revered, are often referred to as 'the lion'. Stories featuring the hare capitalize on the activities that are considered feminine and show the soft side of the feminine nature of women. Exceptions can be found in those stories in which the hare is cunning and clever in his deeds. In such cases, the male attributes are emphasized. The dependency nature of the hyena on other big animals for food disqualifies it from stories that reflect well on the qualities that define manhood. A real man is a provider, not a 'freeloader.' In pre-Christianity oral literature, the snake was an animal that was respected and often used in stories whose morals praised man for his ability to give and protect life (Moshi, 1993). Presently, the snake often is used to describe an individual who appears cunning -- such as a woman who takes away a man's honor (often in accusations of immoral acts). Women also are described by their roles and activities in the society. In his famous PBS Series, The Africans (1986), Ali Mazrui2 compares the African woman to the earth, fire, and water. Air, which is often synonymous with 'life' is not included in the attributes afforded women. It usually is used as a trait for men based on their assumed family role, the provider and protector of life. The woman as earth, fire, and water is exemplary of both her nature and ascribed social roles. By nature, a woman is like the earth: She enhances the creation of life and takes full responsibility in nurturing that life. Mazrui notes that the African woman takes upon herself the responsibility of protecting mother-earth, since she depends on it for sustenance. She is also the custodian of the fire and water, two items that are essential in a woman's major daily activity -- namely, cooking. We also should note that the woman as the earth is symbolic of her maternal role in the society. This often is played out in child custody claims. As mentioned earlier, in these societies, a man but not a woman may claim custody of the offspring. As earth, the woman's role rests in her ability to nurture but not to create and to own. This is evident in the following Chaga proverb: Mbeu nyi ya mo waaya,' it is the sower who owns the seed'. Literally, the proverb means that the sower is the owner of the seed, the plant, and its fruits. The soil into which the seed is sown neither can claim the seed, nor the resulting plant, nor the fruits of that tree. The role of the soil is diminished simply to nurturing the seed and seeing it to fruition. Despite the obvious biological contributions made by the woman in procreation, her role is analogous to that of the earth (soil). Like the soil, the role she plays is not considered sufficient to warrant a claim to the ultimate product. This proverb often is used to explain the fact that a woman says a child does not belong to her, but rather to its father (or its father's family). This type of ideology, which is not unique to the African culture as it also can be found in many patriarchal societies (in particular eastern ones), explains what I will call the primacy-of-the-male rule. The rule is culturally based and presumes the existence of a primary member in a unit that can be said to constitute a family. Here family is viewed in the broader sense where it includes both close and distant relatives. Defined narrowly, family would imply the nuclear family (father, mother, and their biological/legally adopted children). Such a definition is unattainable in the African culture. The broad definition also may be extended to imply the society in which one is a member, since the boundaries for the concept of extended family are difficult to set.
From the foregoing discussion, one might conclude that the African family provides a perfect example for Wundt's (1921) theory of value differentiation. Wundt saw gender as nothing more than a reflection of value differentiation, with men appearing as superior and women as inferior -- categorized with children, animals, and other inferior objects and beings. It is not an accident that men are granted a superior status in the society. It is by design, based on the cultural and social roles expected of them. Thus, the manifestation of the gender differences in these languages follows from what we refer to as the 'primacy-of-the-male rule.' This rule is clearly marked in the grammar, especially in the ordering of nouns in sequence. In English, for example, the ordering rules are fairly flexible in that there is much tolerance and either a male or a female term may be ordered first. For example: mothers and fathers, men and women, boys and girls, brothers and sisters, ladies and gentlemen, kings and queens. In some African languages, the rules are clear: The term that refers to a male must be ordered before that which refers to a female. I will use Swahili to illustrate:
(22) Swahili: Ordering of gender type nouns (* = unacceptable order).
1. baba na mama 'father and mother' *mama na baba
2. kaka na dada 'brother and sister' *dada na kaka
3. wavulana na wasichana 'boys and girls' *wasichana na
wavulana
4. babu na nyanya 'grandpa and grandma' *nyanya na
babu
5. mume na mke 'husband and wife' *mke na mume
6. mfalme na malkia 'king and queen' *malkia na
mfalme
The English 'ladies and gentlemen' is invariably translated as mabibi na mabwana (ladies and gentlemen) or mabwana na mabibi (gentlemen and ladies). This depends on whether the speaker is college-educated and liberal (uses the first ordering), or not college-educated or fairly conservative (second ordering). The 'male-first' ordering rule has been in practice for centuries; it follows from the role of the male as the head of household, a role that entitles him the status of the 'primary member' of his family. He is considered the bread earner even where his role as the head of the household is only symbolic rather than based on the activities that define him as the head of household (in many cases, only women and children produce the cumulative family wealth). A man earns his respect in the community based on how well he manages his family and represents his family in public, and his status of 'man of the house' is enhanced by his family's economic power and reputation. Likewise, how well a family is respected depends on how the man of the family protects it and represents it outside the home by his reputation and well being. A man who is not a good ambassador of and to his family is considered less of a man. Many African languages have a special derogatory term of reference for such a man. For example, in KiChaga, the term mndopulre ('a useless person') is used. A man referred to by such a term may find himself socially isolated by his peers and ridiculed by women and children. Because of the stigma such terms of reference carry, and because the stigma is not confined to the one deserving it but rather affects the whole family, there is a tendency for the family to cover up any incidents that may endanger the reputation of the man of the house and consequently destroy the family's reputation. The cover-up task usually is assumed by the women (wives, mothers, sisters, aunts); and considering the nature of the African extended family, this may involve an entire community. Protecting the family honor is enforced strongly by the matriarchs of the society who are entrusted with the responsibility of making sure that younger female members of the family adhere to this unspoken rule. The one important reason for a woman to expose a man's misconduct to the public, such that he earns himself a derogatory term of reference, is to send a warning, to both the referent and others, that such a behavior or conduct will not be tolerated in the community. Such extreme cases are rare just because women do such a good job protecting the public images of their men. The need to protect a man's name is a reflection of the society's attempt to preserve the primacy of the male. It is, therefore, not an accident that the syntax of the language has a male-first ordering rule for nouns appearing in sequence. By western standards, this system may appear unequal and unfair, but in the minds of those who revere the rule, it is legitimate even where it is abused. An abuse can occur where the men do not show respect to their families, in particular the women who cover up for them. Apart from appearance, in the eye of a non-member of a community, there is no documented evidence, in the African context, that the primacy-of-the-male rule creates inequality between men and women. There are men and women who will argue that the main purpose of keeping the rule is that it provides stability and respect and that it solidifies the family unit. Often, a family without a strong and reputable male is not highly regarded in the community. The absence of a male head of household or of stability in a family brings added burdens to other members of the extended family who may have to provide for the children as well as act as guardians for the family. One of the many complaints that often is heard from upper-middle-class and middle-class couples refers to the traditional responsibility of caring for their extended families, especially the children whose demands have grown with the changes brought by social development. The question is, why should reputation, stability, and family unity be the derivatives of the primacy-of-the-male rule? Why can't they be independent of such a rule? Through discussions with other African women, it has become clear that the primacy-of-the-male rule stems from a widely accepted philosophy that man is central to the social fabric of the society. If the man is weakened in any way, the family and the society at large also are weakened morally and socially. If the society is weakened morally and socially, then all else falls apart. As the primary member, the man is the head of the household, and he is fully responsible for the welfare of all the members of his household without necessarily claiming control over the affairs of the house. There are areas that are considered out of bounds for him: the kitchen, the women's garden, and the females' rooms. He is confined to those areas that are exclusively male territory, and he cannot mingle freely with the women, in particular his daughters or girls of her age, who, upon reaching puberty, are considered young adults. Communication involving controversial social issues between a father and his daughters who have reached puberty is made through an intermediary, one's mother, aunt, or grandmother. This social rule imposed on men is intended to show men's respect of their daughters and of other young female adults. Other male members of the family also are expected to follow the good example of the man of the house, a respect that is reflected not only in their use of language to and around females, but also in their actions. A man is respected based on how he respects himself and respects others, especially women. Women, in particular young women, are not exempted from these standards. Through informal education, they are taught the use and abuse of verbal and body language. An abuse is an impetus for the lack of respect they may receive from the society. It is assumed that men will disrespect only those women who do not conduct themselves properly. It goes without saying that such an assumption places a heavy burden on the women in terms of abuses that they may receive from men. That is why it is difficult to argue convincingly that a good respectable woman in the community can be abused or harassed by a man. The assumption is that her body or verbal language may have contributed to the trouble in which she finds herself. Whereas respect has to be earned by women, that of men seems to be derived and greatly influenced by the primacy-of-the-male rule. There is no period (regardless of age) at which a woman can consider herself equal to a man or can see a man as her subordinate. The primacy-of-the-male rule is believed to be the basis for the cyclicity of mutual respect in the family. Should all members be equal, it is thought, no one would maintain the positions that are culturally assigned to them -- primary for men and secondary/auxiliary for women and children. These positions determine who is accountable and responsible for specific aspects of the family affairs. In the clan, the male members are ranked according to seniority based on age. Family responsibilities, like inheritance, are handed down the seniority line. To underscore this distinction, one (thirty-two-year-old with college education) African woman who favors the primacy-of-the-male rule noted that it is not her responsibility to support her nuclear family (financially); rather, it is her husband's. She prefers to operate her marriage and household under African cultural values in which her husband, she said, 'comes first'. She concluded that she does not consider herself a second-class member of the household but 'second in command.' Although many women accept and revere the primacy-of-the male rule, some, especially those who have been exposed to other social and cultural values, wrestle with its effects on their lives. Many of these women see the rule as designed to the advantage of men and see themselves (women) as shortchanged by it. While the rule enhances the preservation of the man's honor in the society, it fails to recognize the changing roles of women in the society. However, its value enables those who favor it to put out convincing arguments. They believe, and rightly so, that the primacy-of-the-male rule was not intended to translate as superiority and control, two features that seem to emerge as society changes. Identifying a man as the head of household was, and still is, an honor that gives him respect in his family, clan, and community at large. By contrast, a woman's respect and recognition need not come from the position she holds in her family, or community; rather, it is guaranteed by the cultural values which recognize women as the centerpiece in family structure. However, viewing her as the centerpiece in the family structure imposes a condition on the assumed guaranteed cultural stature. At some stage, a woman's respect will be measured by her marital status, her ability to secure linkage to a strong man in the community. To be referred to as the 'wife of so and so' is considered an honorable and expected step for any woman of good reputation in the community. This expectation puts pressure on women, especially those who accept the rule in principle but would like to modify it to suit their contemporary roles and lifestyles.
An important cultural ideal that feeds into the primacy-of-the-male rule is the face-saving rule. The concept of 'face' is borrowed from Brown & Levinson (1978). It is used to define politeness by emphasizing an individual's consideration of other people's feelings. However, even though politeness can be inferred from the interpretation of the face-saving rule, politeness is not intended to be its underlying base. This rule emphasizes cultural responsibility assumed by those who may be adversely affected by an individual whose actions cause him/her to lose face. The rule also is designed to favor men by virtue of their social roles in the community. Consequently, it follows from the primacy-of-the-male rule. In the African culture, cultural responsibility requires that individual members of the community (in particular women) work towards face-saving in order to minimize social damage. Thus, the sole purpose of the face-saving rule is to highlight the positive face and downplay the negative face. The social role and position held by men in the society makes the face-saving rule a cultural rule, by assuming that if the primary member of a family unit is protected from the ills of society, the entire community also is protected. As noted earlier, women more than men assume the role of protecting the primary member by enforcing this rule. As custodians of social values, women take this cultural role seriously and it is, therefore, one of their cultural responsibilities to protect the honor of the 'man of the house'. In an effort to apply the face-saving rule, a woman often is willing to cover up for her man for the simple reason that if the man looks bad, her position in the community will be adversely affected. There is an unspoken rule which requires women to refrain from verbal or non-verbal activities that may cause a man to lose face in the community. The importance of the face-saving rule is still evident in many traditional and contemporary societies on the continent of Africa and in the Diaspora. Events that support the assertion that this rule is greatly valued by people of African descent include the widely televised Judge Clarence Thomas versus Professor Anita Hill sexual-harassment hearings, the Mike Tyson rape and indecent exposure case, and the Latoya Jackson controversial book entitled Growing Up In The Jackson Family (1990). The majority of the members of the African community disapproved of the public attention afforded these cases because of the potential social damage on the part of the men implicated. The women in these three cases received less public sympathy, irrespective of the alleged pain and suffering inflicted upon them prior to and after the cases became public knowledge. Further evidence of the face-saving rule follows from the reception given to Mike Tyson on his re-entry into the community after serving his jail sentence. Needless to say, the re-entry extravaganza was initiated and supported by women, most of whom believe that Mike Tyson should not have been sent to jail for the alleged crime. The shifting of responsibility and blame on the women is indicative of the existence of the two rules, the primacy-of-the-man rule and the face-saving rule. The lack of community support and sympathy for each of the women in these three different and yet culturally similar cases exemplifies the general community feeling that in each of the cases the women failed to observe the two most revered social rules. Support for this observation comes from random interviews of community members. Both men and women appeared willing to believe that the women had been wronged, but were equally unwilling to forgive the same women for their role in the publicity of the cases. The community's main contention was the damage resulting from the women's failure to observe a simple face-saving rule, a rule assumed to follow directly from another assumed rule, the primacy-of-the-male rule. They expected the women to adhere to both rules without fail and consequently to do whatever was possible to prevent the publicity of the alleged crimes. In fact, for many (especially for the women), these are not crimes per se, but cases of 'misbehaviors'. In a traditional African context, such misbehaviors are dealt with at the community level where community leaders and not judicial units prescribe the appropriate punishment. Needless to say, punishments are rare since justice tends to overlook the woman's side of the story. It goes without saying that the ideological conflicts with respect to these two rules still exist both on the African continent and the Diaspora.
Restrictions on language use follow from the respect expected of men and women for each other. Taboo words are largely those that have sexual connotations. Both men and women are expected to exercise caution in this respect when in the company of members of the opposite sex. Although violations can be found in both groups, instances that require a community action (except in city life) are relatively rare. In some African cultures, taboos are not confined to sexual connotations. They may extend to occupational terms, even food terms. In Malawi, women have a set of special (euphemistic) food terms which any man can understand and another set (non-euphemistic) which includes household details (personal communication with a native speaker of ChiChewa and Chinyanza). The set is specially coded for women's comprehension only (often inaccessible to researchers). Also words about conception, child birth, baby care, shopping, market, domesticity, hygiene, and hair are restricted to the women's lexicon and are out of male comprehension. In Zulu, women taboo every sound of a tabooed word or name. Such tabooed words include the name of one's husband and any other male member from the husbands side of the family. It is believed that at the King's kraal, it is sometimes difficult for an outsider to understand the speech of the women of the royal family because they taboo all the sounds in the names of all the King's deceased forebears, lineal and collateral (Jespersen, 1924; Baron, 1986; and J. Buis, personal communication, September 1993). In Kikerewe, taboo words apply to people's names. Like the Zulu women, Ukerewe women cannot disclose or invoke their in-law's names. Also, men and women maintain a separate vocabulary for certain activities and objects. For each of the following Kikerewe word (G. Ruhumbika, personal communication, April 1992), there is an euphemistic word used exclusive by women:
(23) neutral form: gloss: women's form:
kulya to eat kusobya
kuseka to laugh kutenga
kubona to see kukebuka
amagulu legs amaheto
amababi leaves amatutu
ente cow engomoke
echambu lake, sea ekisalikwa
omuseza man omukwata
mukulu an adult muziluke
It is unclear at the moment why Ukerewe women should taboo words which, when compared with similar words from other Bantu languages, appear to be rather ordinary. Ruhumbika notes that the women's lexicon is referred to as ensindo ('a term of respect'). In other words, women's language is marked for 'politeness'. Also, women and men are shut out from each other's secret initiation processes, but older women assist young men by providing them with tips on how to deal with women's issues. This includes a reinforcement on what they are taught in men's initiation processes, the importance of proper language use, and strict observation of taboo words and actions. Most of the terms that relate to sexual experiences are considered part of men's secret language of sex. Consequently, men are expected to restrict explicit sexual and vulgar terms to members of their own sex. Women, too, exercise the same restraint, but the assumption is that they have no words, secret or otherwise, to describe some of the simplest sex characteristics and expressions. To date, women's attitudes toward sexual terminology that is deemed taboo can serve as a model for the whole society as it holds on to its traditional sexual beliefs. It is very difficult to get women to break their taboo and disclose their knowledge of vocabulary items that relate to issues of sex and sexuality. Young women are made to believe that women are not expected to have extensive knowledge about sexual acts. The expectation is that if one has such knowledge, she should not reveal it. Instead, she is expected to display apparent ignorance, in particular to her spouse. Thus, most sexual terms are euphemistic in women's speech but can be explicit in men's speech. This should not be a surprise, considering that the undeclared common laws, which aim at controlling sexual behavior in the communities, bind the women more than they do men. The issues surrounding the circumcision of women attest to this control phenomenon. Sex-linked linguistic taboos establish a double standard by which what is tolerated in one sex group is prohibited in the other. All forms of aggressive, assertive, hostile, and vigorous language are considered acceptable if the articulator is male, but are placed under taboo in the case of women. In the Chaga culture (also in some West African cultures where the belief in supernatural beings/spirits is very strong), women are prohibited from mentioning names of male spirits or from discussing anything else about such spirits. They can, however, invoke the male spirit by imitating what they believe to be his voice: e.g., the roaring bull or the mountain dweller, or the mighty baobab tree, etc.
As stated in the Introduction, the manifestation of 'natural gender' in African languages may not be apparent in grammatical marking, and the [masculine-> feminine -> neuter] hierarchy is subsumed in the culture rather than in the grammar. Value differentiation is an acceptable part of the culture and plays a significant role in distinguishing between the male and female cultures. Language use, social taboos, the primacy-of-the-male rule, and the face-saving rule are examples of the interplay between value differentiation and cultural ideologies. This also is reflected in the terms and terminology that are selected and used to distinguish the male and female cultures. Such terms and terminology are not mere linguistic labels; rather, they represent cultural and social values that define and distinguish the genders.
Author's Note:This paper was first presented at the University of Georgia Humanities Center's Lunch-in-Theory Seminars, February 1992. I wish to thank faculty and students who attended the seminar for their stimulating questions and discussions that followed the presentation. I also would like to acknowledge the contributions made by colleagues who provided examples from their own languages: Gabriel Ruhumbika (Professor of African Literature at The University of Georgia): Kikerewe; Johann Buis (Professor of Music at The University of Georgia): South African languages; and a speaker of Chinyanza and Chichewa (who prefers to remain anonymous).
1. The term 'natural gender' simply implies the sex (male or female) of real-world entities. By contrast, grammatical gender has nothing to do with the sex of an object. Rather, it is a grammatical category used for the analysis of word-classes (particularly in Indo-European languages) displaying such contrasts as masculine, feminine, or neuter. By implication, the analysis distinguishes between the categories animate and inanimate. As such, grammatical gender signals grammatical relations between words in a sentence (adjectives agreeing with nouns, nouns with verbs, etc.). In Indo-European languages, the gender system is grammatical and can be shown by the forms added onto words in the language. 2. The nine-hour PBS documentary by Mazrui, a historian and a political scientist, looks at pre- and post-colonial Africa with emphasis on the political, social, and religious influences from outside the continent.
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Lioba Moshi (Ph.D., University of California-Los Angeles, 1985) is an Associate Professor of Linguistics and African Languages at The University of Georgia. Her research interests and publications are in discourse and grammar, the structure of African languages (especially KiChaga, Swahili, and other Bantu languages) and language, gender, and culture and discourse analysis. She also teaches Swahili language and culture at elementary, intermediate, and advanced levels. |